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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
They were 'broken men' and 'Protestant Hindus' to Dr. Ambedkar and 
'Harijan' to Mahatma Gandhi. To the Britishers they were the 'untouchables' 
and the 'depressed' classes. They were [put under a Schedule and] referred to 
as the 'scheduled castes' in the Constitution of India. 'Dalit' is a recent term 
adopted by the Dalits themselves to indicate the fact that they are the most 
oppressed, exploited and dehumanized section of Indian culture.' 
The caste system- a system of elaborately stratified social hierarchy- distinguishes 
India from most other societies. Indian society is divided into numerous castes and 
sub-castes numbering roughly over four thousand, besides the sizeable number of 
tribes and other religious communities. This hereditary and inegalitarian caste system 
is broadly classified into three: the dwijas (twice bom) or the upper castes which are 
also called, in some regions, the forward castes, the intermediate castes commonly 
known as backward castes or classes, and the lowest castes or Untouchables of the 
earlier times. Sanctified by religious texts and solidified through norms of inter-
marriage and inter-dinning, the caste system essentially orders different groups in the 
Hindu Indian society into an occupation based hierarchy. 
The caste system not only determines the individual's social status on the basis 
of group to which he is bom but also differentiates and assigns occupational and 
economic roles. This caste system puts the Brahmans or the priests at the pinnacle 
while the 'Shudra' Varna was kept at the bottom, with the population outside the 
Varna scheme being subsequently categorized as Untouchables. Each category 
comprises a large number of sub-castes or j'atis who with few exceptions are 
endogamous. The Untouchables or the Dalits as they are presently knovra, are one of 
the most vulnerable sections of people in India. They constitute nearly 17 percent 
(over 20 crore) of the total population in the country. But, despite being one of the 
larger sections of the population, they have been subjected to oppression and 
exploitation, subjugated for centuries and have lived a very miserable life, as 
Mukundrao Patil, a major figure of the Maharashtrian anti-caste Satyashodak Samaj, 
writes: 
India is a strange place which collects all sorts of social groups, divided by 
different religions, thoughts, practices and understandings. But, broadly 
speaking, they can be categorized into two- the majority low castes that have 
been devoid of humanity for centuries and handful who take their pleasure, 
call themselves superior and live at the cost of the majority. One's welfare is 
another's misery; that is their connection. 
In this context, the "majority of the low castes" constituted the 'Untouchable' 
section of the society. This section was called by different nomenclatures in the 
course of the time, for example, Harijan, the Scheduled Castes and the Dalits. The 
term Dalit has wider connotations, as was done by the Dalit Panthers in 1972-73, 
when they add various religious minorities, women, tribals, backward castes and 
economically deprived sections in their definition of the term Dalit. But, the term 
Dalit is currently used for and by the ex-untouchables all over the country. Over a 
period of time the social scientists have begun referring to the Dalits and 
Untouchables or the Scheduled Castes inter-changeably. We have also used the term 
Dalit, in this work, for ex-Untouchables or the Scheduled Castes by articulating their 
self-realisation and their struggle against the caste-oppression, their "will to act 
against exploitation, a rise from oppression, from death to life, from darkness to 
light".' The main figures of this movement, Jotiba Phule, Babasaheb Ambedkar and 
E.V. Ramaswami Periyar, with many others throughout India (Narayanswami Guru in 
Kerala, Acchutanand in U.P., Mangoo Ram in Punjab etc.) all attacked the system of 
exploitation at all levels, culturally, economically and politically. 
THE PROBLEM 
There has been an upsurge of the Dalits all over India right from the late nineteenth 
century. As a matter of fact, "the broader anti-caste movements" have become a 
central democratic movement of Indian society. In the pre-independence period this 
anti-caste movement comprised strong non-Brahmans movements in Maharashtra and 
Tamil Nadu as well as Dalit movements in Maharashtra, Punjab (the Ad-Dharam 
movement), Kerala (Narayanswami Guru's movement), and Hyderabad {Adi-Hindus). 
Independent India saw two decades of quiescence for anti-caste struggle, then a 
renewed upsurge from the early 1970s marked by the founding of the Dalit Panthers 
in 1972. This time the Dalits and their organisations were clearly in the vanguard, 
with the non-Brahmin castes, now known as Other Backward Castes (OBC's), 
following. Then during the 1980s, a new wave of assertion was felt when the Dalits 
wanted to exercise the political power themselves, particularly in the northern states 
of India, more specifically in Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar. 
The present study will attempt to analyse this assertion, its spread and impact 
on the lives of the Dalits. For this purpose the present study will analyse the roots and 
the course of the Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh, its socio-political context, 
leadership factor and its limitations. For this purpose, the problem has been seen and 
analysed with historical and political perspective. 
There are four main objectives of this study 
1. To understand the course of Dalit Movement in Uttar Pradesh: its nature, its 
aims and objectives, and its trends; 
2. To explore the various constituents of the contemporary Dalit political 
movement in Uttar Pradesh and their role in shaping the success of the 
movement in the last two decades; 
3. To investigate the ideological shift of the Dalit leadership from Bahujan to 
Sarvajan under Mayawati and its implications on the electoral prospects of the 
BSP in Uttar Pradesh; 
4. To analyse the role of the post-Ambedkar Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh in 
bringing about social transformation through political participation. 
CONCEPTUAL FRMEWORK AND DATA BASE 
To understand the Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh, the present study will use 
historical-political approaches. The Scheduled Castes constitute 20.7 percent of 
the total population of Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
role of the Dalits in the politics of Uttar Pradesh. This is being done after the brief 
analysis of the history of the Dalit movement in India where the logic of Dalit 
politics involved three major themes: 
(i) A challenge to the very definition of Hinduism as the majority religion and 
the core of Indian tradition; an insistence that it was rather a Brahmanic 
Hinduism that represented the hegemony of an elite over that tradition, and 
that this tradition had to be overthrown; 
(ii) A spreadmg of this theme beyond Dalits themselves to involve all the 
sections of those oppressed, exploited and marginalized by the process of 
the caste exploitation, including tribals, the other backward castes, 
peasants and women; 
(iii) A synthesis of a new economic and political direction with the cultural 
challenge.'* 
This study is primarily based on the secondary sources. Authoritative works 
on Dalit movement in India and particularly in Uttar Pradesh, newspapers, 
journals, seminar reports and research papers etc., were consulted time and again. 
Information regarding socio-economic and political data were collected from 
various sources. Other sources include Census of India (2011), Census of UP 
(2011), Election reports, Election results of UP etc. since the time-period of the 
study is confined to the late 1980s, the analysis of the data, particularly of the 
Dalit parties in Uttar Pradesh., is being done for that period, though, the historical 
analysis of the other organisations and parties is also being carried out. 
PLAN OF THE STUDY 
The study has been divided into five chapters. In the first chapter we have 
already dealt with a brief analysis of the problem, its nature, conceptual 
framework and database. In the second chapter an endeavour will be made to give 
a historical account of the Dalit movement in India where we will discuss, in 
detail, the meaning of the terms 'Dalit' and 'movement', its beginning and history, 
Ambedkar's representation of Dalits at different forums, his debate with Gandhi, 
formation of different political parties and ultimately his disillusionment with the 
Congress, Gandhi and Hinduism. In the last part of this chapter, an attempt has 
been made at deriving some of the important trends of the Dalit movement. The 
third chapter deals with the genesis of political consciousness among the Dalits in 
Uttar Pradesh. In this chapter an attempt has been made to evaluate the causes of 
the emergence of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) by taking into account different 
arguments and perspectives. Different mobilizational strategies and the electoral 
gains made by the party both in the Lok Sabha and the State Assembly elections 
have been thoroughly discussed with a view to emphasize the fact of how much 
significance the BSP accords to the ballot in bringing about social transformation 
and economic democracy. The fourth chapter deals with the nature and social 
composition of Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh. This has been done by analysing 
the nature of issues or demands the Dalit leadership has raised during different 
periods for amelioration of the Dalits, the form of its functioning and the style of 
its mobilization of the masses. The political ideology and the mobilizational 
strategies adopted by Kanshi Ram and Mayawati in their specific leadership roles 
find a special mention in this chapter. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to 
examine as to how the electoral stagnation of BSP beyond a certain point caused 
by the exclusion of upper castes forced an ideological metamorphosis of the Dalit 
leadership under Mayawati. This policy has in turn affected other aspects of the 
party-ideology, composition of mass base, its presence in the urban setting etc. 
Finally, the conclusion obtained from the study has been presented in a holistic 
manner which aims at providing some meaningful insights and possible remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF DALIT MOVEMENT IN INDIA 
Caste as a signifier of identity has been differently articulated and construed 
by intellectuals, politicians, social reformers and masses of India over time and space. 
Those who are excluded from the upper layers in the caste structure lament the 
hegemonic character of Hinduism with a striking Brahminical bias. To them, caste 
system in India essentialises occupational identity, endogamy, the practice of purity 
and pollution and in the process it fends off in the caste hierarchy. Hindu scriptures in 
general and Smrities and Shastras in particular are seen as legitimizing machines for 
such exclusionary constructs. Varnashram and caste system, therefore, are ploys as 
they provide sources of justification for perpetual perpetration of violence and 
exploitation of the lower castes. 
The very first question which comes to our mind while studying Dalit 
liberation movement is, who is a Dalit ? The confusion centers around the 
connotations of the word Dalit' which was originally used as a Marathi and Hindi 
translation of the British term 'Depressed Classes' and which has over a period of 
time been subjected to multiple meanings and definitions. It is not known precisely by 
whom, when and where this term, 'Depressed Classes', was first used. However, 
"most probably, it originated in Madras and began to be commonly used in the 
writings of the social reformers in the first decade of the twentieth century. The term 
found its way in the government officials sometime in the nineteenth century, but it 
gained currency in official usage only towards the begiiming of the second decade of 
the twentieth century"'. Vivek Kumar argues that "this term was in the high currency 
in the Government discourses. Even Ambedkar frequently used this term besides the 
Untouchables, in his writings and public discourses"^. The term 'Depressed Classes' 
refer to those castes which belong to the lowest rung of the Hindu caste hierarchy and 
whose touch and proximity is considered polluting by the caste Hindus. 
The various nomenclatures for Dalits suggested by different leaders created a 
lot of controversy in the past. However, the Government of British India did not select 
any of the suggested nomenclature. The Indian Statutory Commission and Indian 
Franchise Committee did not make any recommendations in this regard. The British 
Government, under these circumstances curved a new identity-the Scheduled Castes 
for the Untouchables by issuing the Government of India (Scheduled Castes) order, 
1936, specifying certain castes and tribes, previously termed as Untouchables, 
Depressed Classes or Exterior Castes.^ The expression of the term 'Scheduled Castes' 
was first coined by Simon Commission and was placed in the Government of India 
Act, 1935. Further the list drawn in the Constitution of India (1950) was a revised 
version of the above-mentioned Order of 1936. The test applied was the social, 
educational and economic backwardness arising out of the historical customs of 
untouchability. 
The Constitution does not provide any specific definition of the terms 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes except the procedure. However, the President 
is empowered to draw up a list in consultation with the Governor of each states, 
subject to revision by Parliament (341-342). Here it is apt to mention the 
constitutional provisions with reference to Scheduled Castes. 
In the Preamble itself we have the pledge to secure to all citizens: 
"JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, 
belief, faith of worship; EQUALITY of status and opportunity", where by the 
concept of disabilities arising out of the practice of untouchability in earlier period 
find no place. Then, there are various Articles safeguarding the Scheduled Castes, 
they are Articles. 15, 16, 17, 19, 23, 25, 29, 38, 46, 164, 330, 334, 335, 338, 341 and 
366. Further, the Parliament passed the untouchability Offence Act (UOA) to make 
the practice of untouchability a cognizable offence punishable under the law. This 
Act came into operation in December 1956, and was amended in 1976 and is known 
as "Protection of Civil Rights Act" (PCRA). 
Thus, the term Scheduled Castes has become the constitutional identity for the 
Dalits today. As Kanchan Chandra mentions "Scheduled Castes" (SCs) are so called 
because they remain "listed in a separate schedule of the Indian Constitution as 
eligible for affirmative action benefits.""* This category of Scheduled Castes have also 
been referred to as //ar//a«5, (Children of God), a term coined by Gandhi in 1933. The 
Harijan nomenclature is considered as pejorative by some leaders of the castes. They 
prefer to be called the Dalits i.e., oppressed, ground down, or broken to pieces. It was 
seemingly first used in the context of the caste oppression by the great nineteenth 
century reformer Jyotiba Phule. It is also said, that the term Dalit was first coined by 
Dr. Ambedkar to describe the Scheduled Caste community in Maharashtra but later it 
was used to refer to the Scheduled Castes as a whole.^ The Dalit Panthers, once a 
militant organization of Dalit youth has used the term in its manifesto. It says, 
"Members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, neo-Buddhists, the working people, the 
landless and the poor peasants, women and all those who are exploited politically, 
economically and in the name of religion are called Dalits". It further says, we do not 
want a little place in boatman alley. We want rule of the homeland. We are not 
looking at persons, but a system. Change of heart, liberal education, etc, will not end 
our state of exploitation. When we gather a revolutionary mass, rouse the people, out 
of the struggle of this giant mass will come the tidal wave of revolution".^ In any case, 
the Dalit Panthers have defined the term with a broader connotation and used it for the 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, neo-Buddhists, working class people of the 
landless and poor peasants, women and all those economically exploited. 
Therefore, the term Dalit indicates the idea that the Untouchables of India 
have themselves chosen 'a new identity', 'a revised self-image' that of Dalit- ground 
down, oppressed to indicate their lack of belief in being polluting, their sense that 
their condition was the fault of the caste system, and their inclusion in the Ambedkar 
movement, of all those subordinated by their religions, social and economic status". 
Through this new identity, Dalit movement directed itself "towards status-improving 
vis-a-vis social mobility among Dalits and shaping their agitational sensitivity and 
assertion for achieving their rights of equality and equal opportunity, self-respect and 
a respectful dignity.^ Thus, the Marathi word 'Dalit' was chosen by the group itself 
and is used proudly; and even in the English press, this word has to be used without 
translation. "None of the normal words Untouchables, Scheduled Castes, Depressed 
Classes, Gandhi's euphemism, Harijan- had the same connotation. Dalit implies those 
who have been broken, ground down by those above them in a deliberate active way. 
There is in the word itself an inherent denial of pollution. Karma, and justified caste 
hierarchy."^ Professor Gangadhar Pantawane, founder-editor of Asmitadarsh (Mirror 
of identity), the chief organ of Dalit literature, defines the word as follows: 
To me Dalit is not a caste. He is a man exploited by social and economic 
traditions of this country. He does not believe in God, Rebirth, Soul, Holy 
Books teaching separatism. Fate and Heaven because they have made him a 
slave. He does believe in humanism. Dalit is a symbol of change and 
revolution.'° 
These are the changing perceptions about the community, which was 
subjected to "institutionalized deprivation" for centuries. The struggle for its 
liberation started with various reformative kind of attitudes and passed through 
several radical and revolutionary phases. The host of discourse on Dalit consciousness 
including the issue of Dalit political mobilization, are essentially centered around the 
issue of devising political ideology and strategy towards deconstructing the 
hegemonic structure of caste Hinduism. In order to weave threads along which Dalit 
consciousness has evolved and Dalit political culture shaped, it is pertinent to 
historicize the contours of movements which are pre-colonial yet radical and 
reformative in time and tenor. 
The next conceptual issue is concerning the term 'social movement' accepted 
by scholars of all disciplines or as scholars belonging to the same discipline. "Like 
many other terms, such as, 'democracy', 'masses', 'popular', 'equality', the term 
'movement' is often used differently by different social activists, political leaders and 
scholars. Some scholars use the term 'movement' interchangeably with 'organization' 
or 'union'. Some use it to mean it a historical trend or tendency. It is fashionable for 
political leaders and social reformers to call their activities 'movement' even though 
their activities are confined to the forming of organizations with less than a dozen 
members. Some claim to launch movements by issuing press statements on public 
issues. Like many other words, the term 'movement' is still regarded a 'Hurrah'! 
word' to use T.D. Weldon's memorable classification"" 
The term 'social movement' gained currency in Europe during the early years 
of the nineteenth century. This period is marked by social upheaval and change 
where political leaders and intellectuals were concerned with the emancipation of the 
exploited classes. However, the term 'movement' remained largely in vague during 
these decades, and it was since early 'fifties that various scholars have attempted to 
provide 'thorough-going' definitions of the concept of social movement. Here we will 
discuss first some of the alike concepts before going into details of the term 'social 
movement'. 
One of the most important terms synonymous to movement is 'collective action'. 
This collective action may be of two kinds: 
A) Institutionalized collective action; 
B) Non-institutionalized collective action. 
The action which is legally permitted and "widely accepted as binding in 
society or part of society"'^ at a given point of time is institutionalized action. Such 
action includes petitioning, voting in elections, and fighting legal battles in courts of 
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law. Non-institutionalized collective action takes several forms, such as, protest, 
agitation, strike, satyagrah, Hartal, gherao, riot, etc. 
Ghanshyam Shah'^ classifies movements as revolt, rebellion, reform and 
revolution to bring about changes in the political system. Reform does not challenge 
the political system per se. It attempts to bring about changes in the relations between 
the parts of the system in order to make it more efficient, responsive and workable. A 
revolt is a challenge to political authority, aiming at overthrowing the government. A 
rebellion is an attack on existing authority without any intention of seizing power. In a 
revolution, a section of society launch an organized struggle to overthrow not only the 
established government and regime but also the socio-economic structure which 
sustains it and replace the structure by an alternative social order. 
The Marxist scholars argue that the causes for social movement are located in 
the economic structure of society. Antagonistic interests between the propertied and 
labor classes are inherent in the class-based society which generates contradictions. 
Subaltern studies group has begun to study 'history from below' and emphasized on 
cultural factors and also viewed a linear development of class consciousness. As per 
the Marxist ideology, the propertied classes in a class-based society use the coercive 
power of the state, as well as of the other institutions, including religion, education, 
mass media, to expose their ideology on society and to control the exploited classes, 
whereas, the labor classes resist, protest and occasionally revolt or launch organized 
or collective action against the dominance of the propertied classes. It is their effort to 
bring about revolutionary political change by overthrowing the dominant classes in 
power. Though to Marxists, structviral causes of conflicting economic interests are 
central to their studies, a number of Marxist scholars have begun to pay attention to 
ethnic, religious and other cultural factors. Some of them have attempted to analyze 
the nature of the consciousness of the exploited classes. 
There is another line of argument which asserts that mass movements and 
protests are redundant in the Indian culture and civilization due to its 'multi-linear 
character' and all 'pervasive hierarchy'. Because of the Brahminical ideology and 
hierarchical social structure the oppressed classes have become docile, obedient and 
fatalist. But such assertions are refuted by the scholars who point to a number of 
struggles by the oppressed classes in pre and post independent India. Some explain 
these protests as a result of the conflict between 'tradition' and 'modernity'. 
According to them parliamentary democracy has been transplanted in India, where 
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there is no tradition of voluntary effort. People have developed an ambivalent attitude 
towards authority, they take advantages offered by the political authority but at the 
same time do not legitimize it. Morris- Jones argues, "Even after Independence 
government is relied upon and at the same time spat upon and abused. The same man 
who is "looking to government" one moment may in the next take part in 
demonstrations involving violence and on a scale that threatens to make any 
government impossible.''* This is the outcome of the constant conflict between 
traditional values and modem institutions. 
Rajni Kothari argues that democracy in India has become a playing field for 
growing corruption, criminalization, repression and intimidation of large masses of 
the people. The role of the state as an instrument of 'social transformation' has been 
undermined. People have started asserting their rights through various struggles: 
'There is discontent and despair in the air still highly diffuse, fragmented and 
unorganized. But there is growing awareness of rights, felt politically and 
expressed politically, and by and large still aimed at the state. Whenever a 
mechanism of mobilization has become available, this consciousness has 
found expression often against very odds, against a constellation of interests 
that are too powerful and complacent to shed (even share) the privileges. At 
bottom it is consciousness against a paradigm of society that rests on 
deliberate indifference to the plight of impoverished and destitute who are 
being driven to the threshold of starvation by the logic of paradigm itself.''^ 
Kothari feels that mass mobilization at the grassroots level is both necessary and 
desirable. He asserts that it is in the state of 
'Vacuum in the traditional superstructure of the liberal polity that was 
supposed to render it humane despite powerftil trends that the real counter 
trends are to be found not in the party system, not in the area of electoral 
politics and of state power, not in the typical confrontation between the so 
called haves and have-nots within the conventional economic space dominated 
by trade unions. In their place there is emerging a new arena of counteraction, 
of countervailing tendencies, of counter- cultural movements and more 
generally of counter- challenge to existing paradigms of thought and action'. 
Another theory on agitation and mass movements is that of relative 
deprivation developed by American scholars, particularly by psychologists like T.R. 
Gurr'^ in 1970. However, a number of Indian scholars have pointed out the 
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shortcomings of this theory both on sociological and ideological basis. M.S.A. Rao 
asserts that relative deprivation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of protest 
and movement. He argues. "A sufficient level of understanding and reflection is 
required on the part of the participants, and they must be able to observe and perceive 
the contrast between the social and cultural conditions of the privileged and those of 
the deprived, and must realize that it is possible to do something about it". 
Ghanshyam Shah argues that the theory of relative deprivation ignores the importance 
of the consciousness and the ideological aspects of the participants. T.K. Oomen also 
argues that the deprivation theorists view movements as 'temporary aberrations' 
rather than as 'ongoing process of change'. Moreover, they do not deal with the 
source of deprivation. For Gurr, 'deprivation' is primarily psychological; therefore he 
does not deal with the socio-economic structure which is the source of deprivation. 
Partha Mukherji classifies social movements as accumulative, alternative and 
transformatory. Accumulative changes are changes within the given structure and 
system.'^ M.S.A. Rao also offers more or less similar typologies: Reformist, 
transformatory and revolutionary. However, T.K. Oomen believes that "the 
movements will neither have the potentialities to root out the existing system 
completely nor will they succumb to the traditional structure entirely. Essentially 
then, social movements, provide the stage for confluence between the old and new 
values and structures".^' His typologies are related to the process of movement 
crystallization, the lifestyle and phases of social movements. For him, movements are 
charismatic, ideological and organizational. 
From the above mentioned typologies it becomes evident that to define a 
social movement is a difficult and complex task. However, a working definition of the 
social movement is necessary to examine the Dalit movement. Paul Wilkinson gives 
the follov^ng working concept of 'social movement': 
A social movement is a deliberative collective endeavor to promote change in 
any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution 
or withdrawal into Utopian community. Social movements are thus clearly 
different from historical movements, tendencies or trends. It is important to 
note, however, that such tendencies and trends, and the influence of the 
unconscious and irrational factors in human behavior, may be of crucial 
importance in illuminating the problems of interpreting and explaining social 
movements. A social movement must evince a minimal degree and 
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organization though this may range from a loose, informal or partial level of 
organization to the highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movements and 
the corporate group. A social movement's commitment to change and the 
raison d'etre of its organization are founded upon the conscious volition, 
normative commitment to the movement's aims or beliefs, and active 
participation on the part of the followers or members?^ 
This particular characterization of social movements in terms of volition and 
normative commitment is endorsed by something approaching a consensus among 
leading scholars in this field. Heberle, for example, conceives of these belief systems 
as an expression of the collective will of the people among whom they are accepted. 
He is emphatic that it is the element of volition that makes the beliefs socially 
effective. It is the conscious volition of individuals acting collectively that brings 
about the embodiment of ideologies in social movements. 
Thus objectives, ideology, programs, leadership and organization are the 
important components of social movements. They are interdependent, influencing 
each other. We will examine the Dalit movement with the above working concept of 
the social movement where an attempt shall be made to seriously examine the 
important components and their effect on the Dalit movement in its search for 'new 
self-image' and new identity-building process. 
The third problem, which needs attention, is that of the begirming of the Dalit 
movement. This is also a complex issue and there are many contending views where 
some scholars trace the beginning right from the Bhakti movement or even back while 
many others consider the Mahar movement in Maharashtra as an important milestone 
in the movement. There seems a consensus among the scholars that Dalit struggle 
during the colonial period, particularly after the arrival of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, gained 
momentum where the main issues were gaining recognition, representation and power 
within the changing political order. 
Various important issues, like the identity building process, were raised during 
the course of the movement which we try to deal while tracing the brief history of the 
Dalit movement. 
"Acrimonious and atrocious fangs of Brahminical Hindu social order have 
always been interrogated and problematized by reformative and alternative 
socio-religious movements in India." 
Ghanshyam Shah '^* has classified Dalit movement into two broad categories, viz., 
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A. Reformative Movement, 
B. Alternative Movement. 
The reformative movements are further sub- divided into the following categories; 
i. Bhakti Movement 
ii. Neo-Vedantic Movement 
iii. Sanskritisation Movement 
The Alternative movements are also sub-divided into the following; 
i. Proselytization Movement 
ii. Secular Movement 
Bhakti Movement (12"' to 18* centuries) attempted to purify Hinduism of its evils 
and fought against the tyranny of caste system. This movement, after Buddhism, left a 
great appeal for the establishment of an egalitarian society and produced saints like 
Chokhamela and Eknath, whose poetry became instrumental in the Dalit awakening. 
Both of them offered models for contemporary change with regard to untouchability. 
The lives of both are known by legend; their songs are sung by devotees on the 
pilgrimages and in bhajan sessions. Chokhamela was a Mahar, the only important 
Bhakti figure in Maharashtra from an untouchable caste. Eknath was a Brahman from 
the holy city of Paithan who wrote about Chokhamela, ate with Mahars, allowed 
Untouchables into his bhajan sessions and wrote poems in the persona of a Mahar 
who was wiser in spiritual matters than the Brahmans. 
Saint Chokhamela was bom in the second half of the thirteenth century, 
probably about the time that Dnyaneshwar, who is considered the founder of the 
Bhakti sect in Maharashtra, was bom. He died in 1338 in Mangalvedhem, a town in 
Sholapur district. Chokhamela and his family seem to have followed the traditional 
duties of a Mahar. 
There is an inherent element of protest against the concept of untouchability in 
Chokhamela's Bhakti songs, though his songs also reveal the traditional devotion and 
piety of the Bhakta . Chokhamela questioned the very basis of the caste system, which 
preached purity: 
The only impurity is in the five elements. 
There is only one substance in the world. 
Then who is pure and who is impure? 
The cause of pollution is the creation of the body. 
In the begirming, at the end, there is nothing but pollution. 
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No one knows anyone who was bom pure. 
Chokha says, in wonder, who is pure? 
Abanga 11 m Chokhamela Abhang Gatha, 1950. 
The central argument of Chokhamela's poetry was protest and question, 
though he lived his traditional role as a Mahar and with its traditional limitations. The 
spirit of most of the abhangas is delight in the Lord, delivery from life's sufferings 
through devotion. Even though agony is there, the central message is that Chokha, 
even though a Mahar, could experience the grace of God. 
The next important figure of the Bhakti movement is Shri Eknath Maharaj 
(1533-1599), whose background was completely different from that of Chokhamela. 
He belonged to a Brahman family of considerable fame and the political world around 
Eknath was also dissimilar to the fourteenth century world in which Chokhamela 
lived. Eknath's most important contribution of Bhakti tradition is for the 
Untouchables. He wrote some three hundred bharuds, drama poems meant to be acted 
out, and of these almost fifty are written as if an Untouchable were the author. Forty-
seven bharuds seem to come from the mouth of Mahar men or women; one is written 
in the name Mang, one of the important Untouchable castes. 
The poems in which the Mahar is the speaker are Johar poems, beginning with 
the greetings used by Mahars to their superiors. Most are very different from the 
poems of Chokhamela; in Eknath's bharuds, the Mahar not only preaches to others 
about morality, the necessity of a Guru and the company of the Sants, but also of the 
calamity of the rebirth that is inevitable for those who do not follow the Bhakti path, 
and of the false lives of the pseudo-pious. 
Eknath's writings make it clear that there is no caste distinction in the sight of 
God, as he puts in the following song: 
God baked pots with Gora, 
Drove cattle with Chokha, 
Cut grass with Savata Mali, 
Wore garments with Kabir, 
Colored hide with Ravidas, 
Sold meat with butcher Sajana, 
Melted gold with Narahari, 
Carried cow-dung with janabai, 
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And even became the Mahar messenger of Damaji.^^ 
Chokhamela and Eknath belonged to Sagun tradition prevalent in Southern 
and Western India. Sagun Bhaktis were less confrontational and maintained a 
commitment to traditional belief and worship. 
Thus with the growth of nationalism and the awakening interest in the 
upliftment of the depressed classes, Bhakti movement, still very much alive, came to 
serve a new purpose. Mahadev Govind Ranade, a member of the reformist religious 
group, the Prarthana Samaj, as well as a leading nationalist, wrote in 1900 of the 
historic importance of the Bhakti movement: 
.... Like the Protestant Reformation in Europe in the sixteenth century, there 
was a Religious, Social and Literary Revival and Reformation in India... This 
Religious Revival was not Brahminical in its orthodoxy; it was heterodox in 
its spirit of protest against forms and ceremonies and class based on birth, and 
ethical in its preferences of a pure heart, and of the law of love, to all other 
acquired merits and good works. This Religious Revival was the work also of 
the people, of the masses, and not of the classes. At its head were saints and 
prophets, poets and philosophers, who sprang chiefly from the lower orders of 
society- tailors, carpenters, potters, gardeners, shop- keepers, barbers, and 
even Mahars- more often than Brahmans.'^ ^ 
In Northern India, there was a Bhakti resurgence from the late nineteenth 
century. In this period Untouchable ideologues, who spearheaded social movements 
against caste distinctions, challenged, in particular, social division of labour based on 
ritual status- this, they argued, prevented occupational diversification and in turn 
precipitated material deprivations, powerlessness and lack of education. In the early 
twentieth century, adherence to Bhakti tradition and veneration of Kabir and Ravidas 
became widespread among the Untouchables in Uttar Pradesh. 
The temper of Chokhamela and Eknath is comparatively less radical than that 
of Kabir and Ravidas, both practitioners of Nirguna Bhakti. The Nirguna stream 
represented a more thorough going rejection of traditional worship and beliefs, 
including the worship of idols. God was conceived to be without form, to be 
approached without aid of physical props. Kabir who was a great Nirguna Bhakti saint 
from Varanasi region is understood to have belonged to a family of untouchables-
Muslim Julaha or weaver, was a ferocious voice against the hegemony of 
Brahmanism and against the practice of untouchability. 
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Another reformative social movement was Neo-Vedantic Movement. It 
attempted a reinterpretation of the doctrine of Hinduism so as to cleanse it of its evils 
and render it back to the original priestly purity. Exponents, like Dayanand Sarswati 
and Vivekanand, played an important role during this period. These movements 
attempted to remove untouchability by taking it into the fold of caste system. 
According to the pioneers of these movements, untouchability was not an essential 
part of Hinduism, and for that matter, of the caste system. Dayanand Sarswati, the 
founder of the Arya Samaj, believed that the caste system was a political institution 
created by the rulers. He said, 'in fact, any Brahman, who is disqualified for his work, 
becomes at once a Sudra de jure and a Sudra, who qualifies for it becomes at once a 
Brahman de Jure...' the Arya Samaj started various educational and welfare 
programs for the upliftment of the Scheduled Castes. 
Thus seen the Neo-Vedantic movements and non-Brahmans movements 
played an 'important catalystic role' in developing anti-caste or anti-Hinduism Dalit 
movements in the country. The Satyashodak Samaj and the Self Respect movements 
in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, the Adi-Dharma and Adi-Andhra movements in 
Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, are important anti-untouchability movements which 
were launched in the last quarter of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth 
century. We also get scattered references on the Adi-WmdvL and Nama-Shudra 
movements. Mark Juergensmeyer's book 'Religion and Social Visional982) deals 
with the Adi-Dharma movement against untouchability in twentieth century Punjab 
which began in 1920s . The raison d'etre of this movement was that the Untouchables 
constituted a Quam , and their Quam existed in India from times immemorial, i.e., 
before the Hindu arrived. According to Mark Juergensmeyer, " it had established a 
fact which previously had been unproved: that the Untouchable castes were capable of 
mobilizing for their own benefits, and of organizing in ways that permitted them to 
compete under the conditions that governed the socio-political area at length." 
Later on, in the late forties the movement was absorbed in Ambedkar's Scheduled 
Castes Federation. 
Struggle for higher status in the caste hierarchy was also laimched through 
'Sanskritization movement'. The movement was launched by a section of 
Untouchables who could improve their economic condition either by abandoning or 
continuing their traditional occupations. M.N. Srinivas, the founder of this concept 
defines 'Sanskritization' as follows: 
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The caste system is far from a rigid system in which the position of each 
component caste is fixed for all time. Movement has always been possible, 
and especially so in the middle regions of the hierarchy. A low caste was able, 
in a generation or two, to rise to a higher position in the hierarchy by adopting 
vegetarianism or teetotalism, and by Sanskritising its rituals and pantheon. In 
short, it took over, as far as possible, the customs, rites, and beliefs of the 
Brahmans and the adoption of the Brahmanic way of life by a low caste seems 
to have been frequent, though theoretically forbidden. This process has been 
called 'Sanskritization."^' 
In this way, the lower castes followed Sanskritic norms and rituals. They tried 
to justify their claims to a higher social status in the caste hierarchy by inventing 
suitable mythologies. The Sharar or Nadar of Tamil Nadu have crossed the boundary 
of untouchability. The Eravas or Ezhavas of Kerala have also blurred if not 
completely destroyed the line of untouchability. The Nadar organized movements in 
the late nineteenth century against the civic disabilities they suffered. They entered 
the political system by first supporting the Justice Party in the early 1930s and later 
the Congress Party. They have moved firom the lower rungs of the ritual hierarchy to 
"a position of status and power". Similarly, the Ezhavas formed their caste 
organization in 1903, known as SNDA Yogam (Association for the Maintenance of 
Dharma founded by Sri Narayana). The Association launched activities for 
Sanskritizing norms and customs of the Eravas. They launched a Satyagraha for 
temple entry in 1920s, as well as bargained with the government for economic 
opportunities and political positions, thus, improving their status. 
Therefore it becomes clear that in pre-Independence period Dalit movement 
had achieved a respectable status. The Bhakti movement, the Neo-Vedantic 
movements and the Sanskritization movement though reformative in character have 
contributed much in Dalit awakening and it can be said that these movements laid the 
firm foundation for the Dalit liberation movement whose agenda include recognition 
of human existence, social mobility, political participation, social change and 
establishment of an egalitarian society. Now we will discuss the alternative 
movements. 
Through conversion movement, Dalits offer a new alternative religion, 
Buddhism, in negation of Hinduism. It started with Ambedkar's personal conversion 
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announcement in 1935 which was followed by a Mahar Conference in 1936 where 
Ambedkar declared: 
Religion is for man; man is not for religion, 
If you want to gain self-respect, change your religion. 
If you want to create a co-operative society change religion. 
If you want power, change your religion. 
If you want equality, change your religion. 
If you want independence, change your religion. 
If you want to make the world in which you live, happy, change your 
- I T 
religion.... 
Religious persecution of this major chunk of population had to be countered 
by another religious ideology with elements of anti-segregation which would maintain 
larger social harmony without prejudicing any commitment to the motherland. Their 
belief in being the original inhabitants of this land led them embrace a religion that 
had its roots in India. Buddhism offered scriptural justification for worth achieved by 
mind and action, not by birth. So in 1956, Ambedkar took Diksha from the oldest 
Buddhist monk in India before a large audience in Nagpur and set in motion the 
conversion process that brought over three million Indians into the Buddhist fold in 
the next few years. The conversion movement gave new, changed identity, as 
professor Gangadhar Pantawane, stated: 
Bhimrao had placed us in the lap of a life giving religion and so has awakened 
psychological independence....this is the religion of Gautam, who with love 
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won the world, and the spine of this religion is humanity. 
Commenting on the conversion, Namdeo Dhasal said. 
Conversion to Buddhism...freed the Scheduled Castes from mental and 
psychological enslavement... Religion has an attraction for the common man 
and it was not easy to change his attitude towards it... The Buddhists have 
liberated themselves from old ideas of Karma and destiny and from worship of 
Hindu gods. To the extent this facilitated their adopting rational attitudes to 
their conditions in society, the chance of their actively striving to change their 
conditions were better.^ "* 
Hinduism was rejected by the Dalits because of its several faults which have 
inflicted pains and atrocities on them. They embraced Buddhism and thus Dalit 
"liberated themselves from old ideas of Karma, destiny and from Gods" .^ It was the 
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conversion movement, that "galvanized Dalits throughout India and it was the choice 
of Buddhism that lay down the challenge for an alternative Indian identity".^^ 
The conversion movement, therefore, left an enormous appeal to the Dalits, 
though its benefits are mostly limited to psychological relax but its otherwise impact 
is remarkable. It rejected Hinduism, hence, the caste system. Nonetheless, the 
conversion was only one aspect of a multi-level effort. Economic improvement of the 
masses, liberation from village harassment and urban prejudice etc. all must come 
through some other path. The conversion seems to have helped to create the will to 
probe every possible means to pressure group unity. It also hailed the vision for an 
alternate society where all people are equal and enjoying a dignified life. 
In the Secular movement, which includes economic issues also, we find an 
attempt to build an alternative socio-cultural identity for the oppressed classes. During 
this movement, Dalit literature flourished well and people started propagating their 
ideas by publishing original literature such as poems, stories, plays which are used as 
a means of protest against Hindu intellectual tradition, the Hindu religion and Hindu 
ethics. 
There occurred land grab movements in the late sixties where Dalit 
agricultural laborers participated at a number of places in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil 
Nadu, Kamataka, Kerala, Bihar, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh. These movements 
are still alive in the numerous villages of the country. They have contributed in 
generating class consciousness among the people living in a caste-structured society. 
Some of the movements have seen violence also whereas others are being fought with 
the changed socio-politico-economic context. These movements are also helping to 
develop consciousness among the oppressed classes regarding the socio-economic 
structure and cultural reality which keeps them subjugated. 
Thus, all these movements have provided "ample evidence of a Dalit movement 
prior to the enactment of the 1919 constitution, growing in size and political 
significance through the 1920s and 1930s. Dalits may not have had a single 
organization parallel to the Muslim League or Hindu Mahasabha, but they did have 
grassroots organizations, a recognized leadership, pre-eminent among whom Dr. 
Ambedkar; and a common demand for political recognition, for representation of their 
own, as well as for dignity, equality and justice".^^ 
Study of the awakening of the Dalits from the 20* century onwards can be sub-
divided as: 
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A. Era of struggle for the recognition of human existence and socio-poHtical 
rights till independence (1920-1950). 
B. Era of restructuring through social mobility and political participation (1950-
1984). 
C. Era of actual sharing or exercise of power (1984 onwards). 
As it is evident from the earlier analysis that long before the era of struggle for 
recognition of human existence and socio-political rights, attempts were made to 
liberate Untouchables from the shackles of upper castes exploitation and degradation 
by various saints and social reformers. But they tried to do so on the basis of 
philosophical, ethical and religious grounds, but failed as they connived at the 
continuation of the Varna system. Basic challenge to this oppressive system came 
from the conversion movement which rejected the philosophical tenets of the caste 
system. Another powerful challenge came from the advent of Islam in India which 
had both material and spiritual aspects. But reform movements within the Hindu 
society continued to keep Untouchables at the mercy of goodwill of the upper castes 
people. None of them made any effort to encourage these depressed and distressed 
people to stand on their own feet and assert as human beings. From this point of view, 
they had no idea to make the Dalits politically conscious of their rights and privileges, 
however, some of them did succeed in making them socially mobile. It was only 
during the freedom movement that these castes were trained to think in terms of 
socio-political awakening based on social mobility. 
Analyzing the phases of the Dalit movement from the twentieth century, one 
finds that the level of socio-cultural awakening and consciousness was raised in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, and with the arrival of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 
(1891-1956), this movement reached its zenith. The years between 1930 and 1936 
acted as watershed in the history of Dalit movement in India because of certain 
historical events and political maneuverings. These years witnessed the All-India 
Depressed Classes Conference at Nagpur in 1930; Ambedkar's attendance at the First 
Round Table Conference; clash between Gandhi and Ambedkar before and at the 
Second Round Table Conference, culminating in the Poona Pact of 1932; and the 
famous conversion announcement in 1935. 
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I have been bom a Hindu but I will not die a Hindu. 
The events of this period led to Ambedkar's final disillusiorunent with 
Hinduism and with the Congress leadership. At the same time these events revealed 
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the power represented by Ambedkar and by the Daht movement which had risen with 
him as an unparalleled leader of the Dalits, forcing the Congress leadership to deal 
with his demands. 
Dr. Ambedkar, therefore, played three important roles during his lifetime: 
first as a caste leader, then of an Untouchable spokesman, and finally a national 
statesman. In his first leadership role, he was guide, guru and decision maker for his 
own caste, the Mahars of Maharashtra, from the mid-twenties of the twentieth century 
until his death. In his second leadership role fi-om the early 1930s onwards he was the 
chief spokesman of the Untouchables. In his third role as a well-established national 
statesman, he spoke on all phases of India's development, worked on problems of 
labour and law as a member of the government, and even put aside some of his own 
theories to help create a viable, generally accepted Constitution. 
It was at the time of Simon Commission that Dr. Ambedkar came forward 
with his demands categorically. Simon Commission, a Royal Commission, which is 
also known as Indian Statutory Commission, was appointed by the British 
government under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon to review the political 
changes shaped by the Act of 1919 and improve it accordingly, in order to ease the 
troubled situation in India. The Simon Commission came on its first visit, and landed 
at Bombay on February 3'^ '' 1928, to commence the work of re-examination of the 
Indian problem as declared in the Act of 1919. To cooperate with the Simon 
Commission the central Government appointed a committee for the entire British 
India, and every Legislative Council elected its Provincial Committee to work with 
the Simon Commission. The Bombay Legislative Council which appointed Bombay 
Provincial Committee selected Ambedkar along with other members in the 
Committee on August 3,1928, to work with Simon Commission.'*" 
The proceedings and tours of the Simon Commission lit up the Indian political 
firmament, and along with other forces it brought to the front, force, intellect and 
vitality of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. The Committee, which was appointed by the Bombay 
Legislative Council to cooperate with the Simon Commission after hearing both 
official and non-official evidence relating to the constitutional problem, submitted 
their report on May 7, 1929.^ *' Dr. Ambedkar, however, differed fiindamentally with 
the committee and did not sign the report. He submitted, on behalf of the Depressed 
Classes of Bombay, a statement''^ for asking some guarantees before Simon 
Commission, which are mentioned here under: 
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i. That the education of the Depressed Classes shall be recognized as the 
first charge on the revenues of the province and that an equitable and just 
proportion of the total grant for education shall be earmarked for the 
benefit of the depressed classes, 
ii. That the right of the depressed classes to unrestricted recruitment in the 
army, navy and the police shall be recognized without any limitation as to 
caste, 
iii. That for a period of 30 years the rights of the depressed classes for 
priority in the matter of recruitment to all posts, gazetted as well as non-
gazetted, in all civil services shall be recognized, 
iv. That the right of the Depressed Classes to effective representation in the 
local bodies shall be recognized by the Provincial Government. 
v. That the right of the depressed classes to appeal to the Government of 
India in cases of violation of these rights by the Provincial Government 
shall be recognized and the Government of India shall be given the power 
to compel the Provincial Government to confirm to the law in these 
matters. 
Thus, the Dalits were becoming politically conscious at the time of the Simon 
Commission as they started agitation for the recognition of their socio-political rights. 
During the Simon Commission, it was announced that after the work of the 
Commission was over, the representatives of India would be assembled for discussion 
on the future Constitution of India, the background of the three Round Table 
Conferences, which took place in London from 1930-32. Dr. Ambedkar along with 
M.N. Srinivasan of Madras attended the First Round Table Conference in 1930 to 
represent India's Untouchables. 
The Round Table Conference was indeed a great event in the history of both 
India and England. But to the Untouchables in particular it was an epoch-making 
event in their history; it was this conference that brought in other Indians with the 
right to be consulted in the framing of the constitution for India. Their voice was to 
echo for the first time in the history of two thousand years and more so in the 
governance of their motherland, this Round Table Conference was a major platform 
from which Ambedkar deployed his learning and his ability to think on his feet to 
supreme effect. He advanced alternative documents for possible constitutional 
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reforms in India, and several suggestions voiced and expressed in these documents 
were to be incorporated in the Government of India Act, 1935. 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar put his viewpoint in the planar session of the First Round 
Table Conference, which was held on 20"" November 1930. Speaking on behalf of the 
Depressed Classes he said that: "The Depressed Classes form a group by themselves 
which is distinct and separate from the Muhammadans and, although they are 
included among the Hindus, they in no sense form an integral part of that community. 
Not only have they a separate existence, but they have also assigned to them a status, 
which is invidiously distinct from the status occupied by any other community in 
India. There are communities in India, which occupy a lower and subordinate 
position; but the position assigned to the Depressed Classes is totally different.'*'^  He 
was unequivocal about the need of political power for the Untouchables and equally 
defined that this could only be gained within the framework of an Independent India. 
He stated: 
The point of view I'll try to put as briefly as I can. It is this, that the 
bureaucratic form of Government in India should be replaced by a government 
which will be a Government of the people, by the people and for the 
people...'*^ 
Arguing that the goodwill of the British is irrelevant, he went on: 
The Government of India does realize the necessity of removing the social 
evils which are eating into the vitals of Indian society and which have blighted 
the lives of the downtrodden classes for years. The Government of India does 
realize that the landlords are squeezing the masses dry and the capitalists are 
not giving the laborer a living wage and decent conditions of work. Yet it is a 
most painful thing that it has not dared to touch any of these evils. Why?... 
These are some of the questions raised by the depressed classes... we feel that 
nobody can remove our grievances as well as we can and we cannot remove 
them unless we get political power in our own hands. No share of this political 
power can evidently come to us so long as the British Government remains as 
it is. It is only in a Swaraj Constitution that we stand any chance of getting the 
political power in our own hands. Without which we cannot bring salvation to 
our people....'*^ 
At the conference, Ambedkar advocated for a Unitary state and Adult suffrage 
with safeguards and reserved seats for the Untouchables. Here, it should be noted that 
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it was this conference that shaped the Government of India Act, 1935: A Federal 
Constitution in which the Princely States could enter as autonomous units; a slightly 
expanded electorate but hardly adult suffrage; and responsible government at the 
Provincial level highly qualified by residual powers given to British-appointed 
governors. 
Before the conclusion of the first session of the Round Table Conference the 
reports of both the committees were placed and passed by the Conference. It will be 
noticed that although agreement on details was lacking it was unanimously accepted 
that the Untouchables were entitled to recognition as a separate entity for political and 
constitutional purposes. However, the attitude of the Indian National Congress was 
not known because it did not attend the First Round Table Conference and was busy 
in confronting the British through civil disobedience. By the time of the second 
session of the Round Table Conference, there was an agreement between the British 
Government and the Congress, the 'Gandhi-Irwin Pact' of 1931, and as a result of 
which the Congress agreed to participate in the Second Round Table Conference, 
which was held on 17"" September 1931. 
At the Second Round Table Conference, Ambedkar confronted Gandhi, who 
not only refused to consider separate electorate for the depressed classes but also 
opposed any form of special representation involving reserved seats. The two men 
had met for the first time in Bombay just before the Second Round Table Conference 
and this meeting ended in distress, hence, this unsatisfactory meeting and the basic 
disagreement between two on the issue of special representation for Untouchables, 
made negotiation during the Second Round Table Conference session difficult. The 
situation was exacerbated by Gandhi questioning of Ambedkar's bona fides: "I say 
that it is not a proper claim which is registered by Dr. Ambedkar when he seeks to 
speak for the whole of Untouchables of India...! myself in my own person claim to 
represent the vast mass of the Untouchables..."'*^ 
In the Round Table Conference there were nine Committees, among them 
Minority Committee was the most important which was dealing with the rights of 
Untouchables and other Minority Communities. But, because of Gandhi's strong 
opposition the committee could arrive at no decision. Due to these developments 
British Prime Minister, Ramsay Mac Donald dissolved the Minority Committee and 
said that he will take a decision, which would be acceptable to all and received 
signatures from all except Ambedkar, who categorically refused. 
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Thus, after the Third Round Table Conference, during which Gandhi was in 
jail, the British government announced a decision regarding representation, which it 
was hoped, would effect a compromise between the Congress and Ambedkar. The 
British Government on 1?"^  August 1932 armounced "Communal Award". The 
communal Award allocated seats through separate electorates to the different 
commimities in each province. This Communal Award gave the depressed classes a 
double vote, one in special constituency for a modest number of reserved seats, and 
another in general electorate. The communal Award in relation to the Depressed 
Classes may be summed up as follows: 
"Members of the Depressed Classes qualified to vote will vote in a general 
constituency. In view of the fact that for a considerable period these classes 
would be unlikely, by this means alone, to secure adequate representation in 
the legislature, a number of special seats will be assigned to them as shown in 
the table. These seats will be filled by election from special constituencies in 
which only members of the Depressed Classes electorally qualified will be 
entitled to vote. Any person voting in such special constituency will, as stated 
above, be also entitled to vote in a general constituency. It is intended that 
these constituencies should be formed in selected areas where the Depressed 
Classes are the most numerous, and that except in Madras, they should not 
cover the whole area of province. In Bengal it seems possible that in some 
general constituencies a majority of the voters will belong to the Depressed 
Classes. Accordingly, pending further investigation, no number has been fixed 
for the members to be returned from the Special Depressed Class 
constituencies in that province. It is intended to secure that the Depressed 
Classes should obtain not less than ten seats in the Bengal legislature 
The precise definition in each Province of those who (if electorally qualified) 
will be entitled to vote in special Depressed Classes constituencies has not yet 
been finally determined. It will be based as a rule on the general principles 
advocated in The Franchise Committee's Report. Modification may, however, 
be found necessary in some Provinces in Northern India, where the application 
of the general criteria of untouchability might result in definition unsuitable in 
some respects to the special condition of the Province. His Majesty's 
Government do not consider that these Depressed Classes constituencies will 
• be required for more than a limited time. They intend that the constitution 
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shall provide that they shall come to an end after 20 years if they have not 
previously been abolished under the general powers of electoral revision"../^ 
Thus in the history of India Untouchables were for the first time given 
independent political existence and legal rights to shape the ftiture of motherland. It 
was a victory of Ambedkar's ideology of uplifting Untouchables.'*^ 
The Award was a cruel shock for Gandhi. As the Congress representative at 
the Second Round Table Conference, he had valiantly fought against the recognition 
of the Untouchables as a separate element. Gandhi's response to Communal Award 
was to enter a "fast unto death" on September 20, 1932. He hardly cared for the fact 
that he was a signatory to the requisition and, therefore, was bound by the award. He 
said that 'the fast shall continue till the British Government on its own or under 
pressure of public opinion revise their decision and withdrew the scheme of 
communal electorates for the Depressed Classes.''^ '^  
Ambedkar in a statement to the press, on 19 September 1932, was extremely 
critical of the fast. He argued: 
"It passes my comprehension why Mr. Gandhi should stake his life on an issue 
arising out of the communal question which he, at The Round Table 
Conference, said was one of a comparatively small importance. Indeed, to 
adopt the language of those of Mr. Gandhi's ways of thinking, the commimal 
question was only an appendix to the book of India's Constitution and not the 
main chapter. It would have been justifiable, if Mr. Gandhi had resorted to this 
extreme step for obtaining independence for the country on which he was so 
insistent all through Round Table Conference Debates, it is also a painfiil 
surprise that Mr. Gandhi should single out special representation for the 
Depressed Classes in the Communal Award as an excuse for his self-
immolation"." ' 
The threatened fast of Gandhi created a very hostile environment for 
Ambedkar. It had put him into an unenviable position. Moreover, the onus of possible 
death of Gandhi lay directly on Ambedkar's shoulder. A vicious campaign was 
launched against Ambedkar. He was labeled as a monster, a traitor and a hireling. As 
the confrontation had stirred up serious controversy in every nook and comer of India, 
People from all comers of the country appealed to him to reconsider the issue. 
Ambedkar was on the homs of dilemma. Whether to protect the rights of the 
Untouchables, or to save the life of Gandhi, was the paramount question before 
Ambedkar. He responded to the call of humanity and saved the life of Gandhi by 
agreeing to alter the Communal Award in a manner acceptable to Gandhi. This led to 
a compromise between Gandhi and Ambedkar known as the Yerveda or the Poona 
Pact, 1932. 
Ambedkar had some reason to be satisfied with the final outcome; the seats 
reserved for the Dalits were nearly equivalent to their proportion in the population. 
Beyond this, however, the whole process brought out another reality. While the 
compromise agreement was hammered out with Ambedkar, the final agreement, the 
'Poona Pact', was between Ambedkar and Gandhi- Gandhi as a representative of 
Caste Hindus, Ambedkar as a representative of the Dalits. What Gandhi had sought to 
deny at the Round Table Conference and what the Congress and Hinduist leaders 
were continually denying in their propaganda- Ambedkar's position as the 
unchallenged Dalit leader was in practice confirmed. 
Despite the accord, sharp differences still persisted on both the sides. The 
storm was far from over. The differences between Gandhi and Ambedkar surfaced 
again, as soon as Gandhi started his League Against untouchability (which was to 
become Harijan Sevak Sangh) and Ambedkar attempted to intervene. There were two 
important issues: whether the League/ Sangh would be controlled by caste Hindus or 
the Dalits would have at least a share in control; and whether it would seek only to 
'abolish untouchability' or aim at the abolition of Chaturvarna itself. Gandhi firmly 
held out for caste Hindu control on the grounds that since untouchability was an 
"evil" of Hinduism that had to be purged, Hindus themselves must do this; he also 
stressed that he was not against Chaturvarna as a system. In this way, it became 
impossible for Gandhi and Ambedkar to work together on the issue of Dalit 
emancipation. 
Another important contribution which needs serious attention is the political 
initiatives taken by Dr. Ambedkar, who was instrumental in establishing three 
political parties; Independent Labor Party (ILP) in 1936, Scheduled Caste Federation 
(SCF) in 1942, which led to the formation of the Republican Party of India (RPI) in 
1956. These were the attempts to join Untouchables to larger group or in a solid mass 
to seek political power. The Program" of the ILP was "mainly to advance the welfare 
of the laboring classes" and the party accepted with socialist flavor, the principle of 
state management and state ownership of industries wherever it may become 
necessary in the interests of the people". Aid to agriculturalists through land mortgage 
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banks; co-operative and marketing societies; technical education and the promotion of 
new industries; reform of the tenets system, free and compulsory education and a 
pledge to bring about a fair mixture of caste in the administration were planks of the 
platform. This party was able to secure 14 seats out of 18 it contested in the 1937 
elections. Eleanor Zelliot writes on this: 
With the conversion announcement in 1935, the establishment of a political 
party in 1936, and to considerable success in 1937 elections, the shift from 
attempting to gain status in matters of religion to organizing political activity 
was nearly complete."'' 
Then, in July 1942, the All-India Depressed Classes Conference was held at 
Nagpur which brought the ILP to an end and constituted SCF before a mass of 70,000 
of which one third were women. There were two specific demands; one, for "separate 
village settlement of entirely Scheduled Castes villages", away from and independent 
of Hindu villages" and the other was renewing the demand for separate electorates. 
Aside from this, the SCF maintain most of the other specific demands of the ILP. In 
1956 Dr. Ambedkar made an attempt to transform the SCF into a party which would 
speak for all the 'dispossessed' and thus, the RPI was created which, later, put its 
Charter of Demands'^ ^ in details, some of the demands are as follows 
1. A portrait of Dr. Ambedkar as 'Father of the Indian Constitution' in the 
Central Hall of the Parliament. 
2. The Nation's land given to the landless tiller. 
3. Idle and wasteland given to landless labour. 
4. Full implementation of the Minimum wages Act, 1948. 
5. Extension of Scheduled Castes privileges to the SCs members who have 
embraced Buddhism. 
6. Full justice under the Untouchability Offence Act. 
Ambedkar, therefore, was confirmed in his belief that the caste system was 
exploitative and that autonomy was necessary. 'Untouchability' was not just a 
peripheral will that could be removed without basic changes in the system; the system 
was inherently exploitative. Since only the exploited can remove the exploitation by 
destroying a system and fighting their exploiters, autonomy was necessary; 'the 
emancipation of Dalits had to be the act of Dalits themselves'. 
Thus, Ambedkar's contribution to the Dalit Movement is most precious. His 
was a committed personality for the emancipation of Dalits in particular and for the 
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nation-building and social transformation in general. His writings are full of serious 
analysis of the caste-ridden Indian society and of the Hindu social system. He also 
gave the most desired direction for modernization and development by framing the 
Constitution of independent India and served as the first Law Minister for some time 
in the Nehru Cabinet. Finally, he offered an alternative vision of religion by 
embracing Buddhism. 
On the basis of this historical analysis, we can identify some of the trends in 
Dalit Movement in India, that: 
The Dalit Movement in the begirming, was a Reformative movement which 
attempted to purify Hinduism of its evils and fought against the tyranny of the caste 
system. During this period. Saints like Chokhamela, Eknath, Kabir and Ravidas 
played a very important role in the awakening of the Dalit consciousness. 
Second, with the Reformative movement, there were alternative movements 
too, which attempted to create an alternative socio-cultural structure where caste 
domination is illuminated and every person can live with self-dignity. 
Third, the Dalit movement did not emerge only in Maharashtra as a result of 
Ambedkar's leadership, there were similar trends, though of varying degree of 
strength, in all regions. 
Fourth, the movement was genuinely anti-caste, not merely a caste reform 
movement. Internal reforms, like giving up drinking and rejecting customs which 
marked the caste as 'low' in a Brahmanic hierarchy, were themes everywhere, along 
with demands of education and entry into employment and political institutions. 
Fifth, Dalits as exploited workers, peasants and agricultural laborers were 
involved with economic or class issues everywhere, and these were expressed in 
demands, like land grab movement, made in all regions. 
Sixth, Dalit Movement emerged as a great political force but much weaker in 
organizational strength and financial resources. 
Seventh, Dalit Movement has come up with new identity, rejecting Hinduism 
and embracing Buddhism to build an alternative equitable and egalitarian society. 
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Finally, in the last century, "Untouchables of India had themselves chosen a 
new identity, that of Dalits - to indicate their lack of belief in being polluting, their 
sense that their condition was the fault of the caste system and their inclusion in the 
Ambedkar movement"."^^ It is also evident that during the course of the Movement the 
connotations of the word "Dalit' is broadened and now it is not confined only to the 
"ex-Untouchables' but it refers to those also who are deprived of their socio-economic 
and cultural rights. 
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CHAPTERS 
POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND DALIT MOVEMENT IN 
UTTAR PRADESH 
With a total population of 19, 95, 81,477, Uttar Pradesh (UP) is the largest 
state, in terms of population of the Republic of India. The biggest district of the state, 
in terms of population, is Allahabad 5,959,798 followed by Moradabad 4,773,138 and 
Ghaziabad 6,661,542 while Mahoba stands the smallest one with a population of 
876,055. The Literacy Rate of the state is 69.72 per cent. The total Scheduled Castes 
(SC) population of the state is 41357608 which is 20.7 percent of the total population. 
Thus, Uttar Pradesh is one of the states in the Indian Union in which Scheduled 
Castes constitute more than 20% of the population, ranking fourth after Punjab (31.9 
percent), Himachal Pradesh (25.2 percent), and West Bengal (23.5 percent).' 
Politically, the state of Utteir Pradesh has been the most important state in 
India. It's conspicuously vast and fertile Gangetic Plains attracted foreign invaders 
from West and Central Asia, and in many ways the history of Uttar Pradesh became 
history of India. The impact of Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Rule was most 
penetrative in this region. The Revolt of 1857 remained largely confined to the plains 
of Uttar Pradesh and later, a great number of most important leaders to the freedom 
struggle were drawn from this state. Paul Brass contends that "The roots of many 
developments in twentieth century Indian politics lie not in nineteenth century 
Calcutta or Bombay but in the nineteenth century Benaras, Allahabad and Aligarh".^ 
The introduction of democratic politics after 1947 has further increased its importance 
as it elects one out of every six members to the Parliament. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize at the outset that Uttar Pradesh with 
its existing boundaries and structure owes its existence to the British. They 
amalgamated various districts, areas, and territories to carve out a single 
administrative entity. Until the coming of the British in the mid-eighteenth century, 
Uttar Pradesh did not possess a common structure or history. Different kings, rulers, 
governors, and chieftains had over the course of history controlled different parts of 
its territories. Political or administrative unity under a single political authority had 
been extremely rare, if not altogether absent. The beginnings of British interference in 
the affairs of Uttar Pradesh, which they then called 'Upper India', from their location 
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in Calcutta (now Kolkata), changed the situation completely. It inaugurated a process 
of conquest and amalgamation, which changed the political geography of Northern 
India.^ 
The political consciousness and the participation of the 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) in Uttar Pradesh in the politics of the state 
have been traditionally low. Uttar Pradesh did not witness anti-caste 
Dalit movements in the colonial period unlike the Southern and 
Western parts of India.'' There were diminutive and less influential 
streams of lower caste agitations, not necessarily violent, during the 
colonial period in Uttar Pradesh (then United Province). It was only in 
the immediate post-colonial period that a small upwardly mobile 
section of the community, influenced by the ideas of Dr. Ambedkar, 
under the Republican Party of India (RPI) was able to mobilise the 
Dalits for a short period of time. Then, since mid-1980s a new wave of 
caste-based mobilization in North India has brought the Dalits into 
politics in the state under the leadership of the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP) formed by Kanshi Ram. In this chapter we will discuss the 
emergence of political consciousness since the colonial period, political 
participation which culminated in the formation of the Bahujan Samaj 
Party, and electoral politics of the BSP with an attempt to understand 
the Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh in the light of changing political 
and economic landscape of India. 
According to the 1931 Census, the Scheduled Castes constitute 
21% of the population as Table 1.1 shows standing second after the 
intermediate cultivating castes who comprised 41.9%, while elite 
castes together comprised about 22.1 percent.^ Since then this 
demographic distribution into various caste and ethnic groups in the 
state has more or less remained the same. However, two important 
features of the geography of the castes and particularly of the Dalits in 
Uttar Pradesh should be noted as they help in explaining the role of the 
Dalits in politics: (1) No single caste group in Uttar Pradesh has a 
numerical majority in the total population; (2) there is no regional 
concentration of any caste group in the state. 
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TABLE 1.1 
Castes in the United Provinces in 1931 
Caste Category 
A. Upper elite non-cultivating castes 
B. Elite cultivating castes 
C. Intermediate cultivating and other 
backward groups 
D. Scheduled Castes 
1. Chamars 
2. Pasis 
3. Dhobi 
4. Bhangi 
5. Others 
Total 
E. Muslims 
Percentages in the total population 
20.0 
2.1 
41.9 
12.7 
2.9 
1.6 
1.0 
2.8 
21.0 
15.0 
Source: Census of the United Provinces, 1931. 
Thus, Uttar Pradesh is a multi-caste state and is probably the most extensive 
area of India without clearly dominant castes. This multi-caste character of Uttar 
Pradesh goes deep to the level of districts and even villages although there are some 
predominantly single caste villages. There would be some 15 to 20 castes representing 
the population of an average village. Due to this diversity of population on the caste 
lines, the mobilisation of a single caste across the state by any political party becomes 
difficuh. 
This division of population becomes more stratified and complex as each caste 
group is further divided both horizontally as well as vertically into several sub-castes. 
This intra-caste differentiation tends to foster unequal mobilization as the dominant 
sub-castes with relative economic well-being are well placed to exploit the available 
material opportimities. Among the Dalits, the Chamars, knovm as Kureels in Central 
Uttar Pradesh and Jatavs elsewhere, account for about 10-12 % of the total population 
in the state, more or less the same as the Yadavs. They have been active in politics in 
parts of the state as a dominant group since 1920, though internal differences have 
been an important hurdle in political mobilisation of Scheduled Castes in Uttar 
Pradesh. The 1911 Census shows that the Chamars were scattered fairly even over the 
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United Provinces, numerically strong in Gorakhpur and Basti but also found in large 
numbers in Saharanpur and Meerut. A study in the 1960s which attempted to map the 
distribution of castes in the Northern plains showed that Chamars are the most 
numerous caste in six out of seven regions in which the Uttar Pradesh plains were 
divided.^  However, nowhere was their plurality very large, and over no extensive tract 
did they constitute over a fifth or less than an eight of the total population. The three 
areas of Uttar Pradesh, viz, Rohilkhand, Agra, and Eastern Plains constitute the high 
concentration areas of Chamar population and domination. These are the same areas 
where Scheduled Castes parties have been able to build a strong base. The Pasis 
represent the second most numerous groups among the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh who 
occupied the central part of the state, thus separating the regions of the Chamars' 
dominance of Eastern and Western Uttar Pradesh. 
The Dalits constitute one of the poorest and marginalized sections of the 
population in Uttar Pradesh. Their socio-economic exclusion from the productive 
sources has made them to suffer from the trauma of social inequality, economic 
backwardness and psychological inferiority. However, the condition of Dalits has not 
remained that pathetic and horrible as it was once. Improvements have been made in 
their conditions in more recent years although the pace of change has been slow and 
poverty and exploitation remains. The new employment opportunities in both public 
and private sectors have minimised their dependence on landowner thereby altering 
the nature of old patron-client relationship. Culturally, the Scheduled Castes have also 
improved their conditions. The catalyst for change has been education and spread of 
electoral process. A small urban elite has also come up within the Dalit commimity in 
the Post-Independence period, particularly among the Chamars. They were the first to 
avail the education facilities and were consequently placed to avail the benefits of the 
reservation policies some of them have prospered in their traditional leather business. 
This has equipped them to form the vanguard of the new Dalit assertiveness since the 
mid-1980s. An emerging Dalit middle class comprising the academicians, Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS) officers, engineers, journalists and nascent but 
prospective entrepreneurs is beginning to shape the fixture discourse of Dalit politics. 
40 
II 
Colonial Period 
Uttar Pradesh, contrary to the Southern States, did not experience any large-
scale anti-caste movement during the colonial period. The reasons lie in the rigid and 
unchanging character of the social structure in the state, the nature and form of 
mobilization experienced during the national movement and thirdly, the impact of Dr. 
B.R. Ambedkar was felt much later than in Maharashtra. A brief comparison with 
Maharashtra is instructive in understanding the delayed development of political 
consciousness among the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh. 
The geographical diversity and socio-cultural variation between the North and 
South India resembles in the nature of their caste system also. The caste structure in 
North-Indian plains differs from that of the South in a fundamental respect, that in the 
South Brahmans were the only representatives of the twice-born castes and there 
being no equivalent of North Indian castes, such as, Rajputs, Kyasthas and Banias. 
This created a steep ritual pyramid increasing the social distance from the 
Untouchables at the bottom of the caste hierarchy leading to an oppressive system in 
the parts of the peninsula. Conversely, in the Uttar Pradesh plains there is a greater 
continuity in the ritual ranking of castes which led to a better sharing of social status 
and political power. Anti-Brahmanism seems to have developed in the regions with 
steep and discontinuous traditional social hierarchies. "Regions with relatively higher 
proportion of twice-born castes and having more gradual and continuous hierarchies 
seem to be less susceptible to horizontal mobilization from below comprising ritually 
deprived castes seeking opportunities to improve their status and political power".^  
Secondly, the rigidity of caste system in Maharashtra was very strict and 
carried to its extreme creating hardships for those at the bottom of the caste hierarchy. 
This prejudicially compartmentalized system in turn contributed to the feelings of 
anti-Brahmanism. Maharashtra also experienced many anti-caste movements 
beginning with the Mahanubhava Saint Chakradhar in 1196, and the Bhakti 
movement imder Janeshwar, Chokhamela and Eknath. Jyotiba Phule was also 
instrumental in awakening and raising the Dalit consciousness. His Satyashodhak 
Samaj attempted its best to provide a non-Brahman social order.^  The absence of such 
movements in Uttar Pradesh plains meant the lack of any widespread anti-caste 
ideology and passive acceptance of the inegalitarian socio-political system. Further 
41 
anti-colonial movement or the national liberation movement in Uttar Pradesh was 
more influenced by the Indian National Congress with its charismatic leader Gandhiji, 
whereas in Maharashtra, though the Indian National Congress played an important 
role, it was profoundly influenced by Dr. Ambedkar. 
In the United Provinces both during the Kisan Sabha Agitation in 1920-21 and 
the Civil Disobedience and Rent Campaign in 1930-31, lower caste tenants and 
labourers participated in large number and even threw up a Scheduled Castes leader-
Pasi Madari. The Congress leadership under Gandhi recognized the political 
importance of mass mobilization of the peasantry by supporting their grievances as 
part of the freedom struggle. However, once the movements acquired a degree of 
autonomy throwing up peasant leaders and incorporating some of the basic 
contradictions of the Indian society, such as the unequal caste system, the leadership 
made a conscious effort to separate the 'political' and 'social' issues and called off the 
movements. In contrast, the Mahars had alternative path of mobilization under the 
leadership of Dr. Ambedkar. They used 'political means' consistently and unitedly in 
their attempt to ameliorate social conditions and participated in the political process in 
order to acquire political skills and develop behaviours and responses favourable to 
their assimilation in the broader political mainstream. Dr. Ambedkar provided a 
specific focus in the political movement by the establishment of the Independent 
Labour Party (ILP) in 1936; the rejection of Hinduism in 1935; and the formation of 
the Scheduled Castes Forum/Federation (SCF) in 1942. 
The differences between Gandhi and Ambedkar helped to shape different 
identities among the Dalit community in Uttar Pradesh with different levels of 
consciousness and it was only in the 1940s that a section of the Dalits in parts of Uttar 
Pradesh rejected the Gandhian framework and adopted the ideas of Dr. Ambedkar. It 
is from such areas that the Republican Party of India (RPI) emerged in Uttar Pradesh 
in the Post-Independence period. This development is best traced in Agra district 
where the Chamars in 1901 made up 19.13% of the total population.^ 
It is a fact that the movements of Dalits in Uttar Pradesh were limited in 
comparison to those in South and Western India. Very limited historical material of 
these movements is available. However, two prominent movements, which threw 
some kind of independent Dalit leadership before Ambedkar came on the Dalit 
liberation horizon, were Jatav movement of Agra and Adi-Hindu movement in some 
parts of Uttar Pradesh viz. Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi, and Lucknow. Though 
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initially religious in nature, both these movements had later raised important socio-
political issues related to the Dalits.'° 
The Jatavs of Agra influenced by the teachings of the Arya Samaj from the 
late 1800s began a process of Sanskritization in order to gain respect and higher status 
in the caste system but later on they were disillusioned from Arya Samaj, also. This 
breaking away of Dalits from the Arya Samaj has been effectively highlighted by 
Nandni Gooptu who says that, "From the early 1920s in the aftermath of the Khilafat 
movement, in response to the religious ferment it generated among Muslims, and in 
an attempt to strengthen the Hindu community, the Arya Samaj stepped up its Shuddi 
or reclamation activities for the inclusion back into the Hindu fold, of lower caste and 
Hindu converts to Islam. The Samaj, in this period, increasingly found itself drawn 
into political action in defence of Hinduism. The growing emphasis on the Vedas by 
the Arya Samaj, however implied the fortification of caste distinction This 
gradually disillusioned the Untouchables who had joined it, especially because the 
Samaj did not accord them equality of status even though it admitted lower castes to 
Hindu hierarchy through Shuddi. The distinction between high caste Hindus and the 
purified low castes had remained.... The untouchables Arya Samajists gradually 
became convinced that Samaj acted as the 'army of high caste Hindus' whose only 
intention was to rally the Hindu community against Muslims, and that the Samaj's 
attempt to uplift the lower castes was merely a part of this strategy. They argued that 
the Samaj did not aim to eradicate untouchability and that the Shuddi was cunning 
ploy to perpetuate the hold of higher castes over the Untouchables"." 
Soon after their break-up with the Arya Samaj in the early 1920s, the Dalit 
leaders began to propagate the concept of an Adi-Hindu (original race) and the Bhakti 
as their separate, Pre-Aryan religion. They organized intra-region conferences to 
spread the Adi-Hindu ideology. It is during this period that the Adi-Hindu movement 
of Uttar Pradesh came in contact with Ad-Dharm of Punjab and Adi-Hindu movement 
of Andhra Pradesh. An inter-region conference was convened by Swami Acchutanand 
in Delhi in early 1926. The leaders of Ad-Dharm, of Punjab attended the meeting.'^  
The purpose of this meeting was to unite the Dalit forces from different parts of the 
country. 
The Bhakti resurgence gave rise to the Dalit leadership, which was more 
religious in nature. It tried to project the Dalits as adherents of Bhakti (reverence). 
Caste Panchayats (caste councils) were reconstituted in urban neighbourhoods, which 
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dealt with internal disputes among the members of caste groups and stipulated the 
social and religious practices to be observed by them. This movement gave Dalits a 
new identity as Bhagats, often added with the terms like Kabirpanthi, Shivnaryani or 
Ravidasis after their names to indicate the gurus they revered.'^ 
In different parts of Uttar Pradesh, specially Lucknow, Kanpur, Allahabad, 
and Varanasi (then Benaras) temples dedicated to Bhakti Gurus were erected. Such 
temples were financed by small donations from members of the caste groups and by 
holding religious ceremonies and congregations where small subscriptions were 
offered by the devotees. By the 1920s, the organization of processions and 
celebrations on the birth armiversaries of the Bhakti Gurus had started. Religious 
congregations, Satsangs and Bhajans were held regularly in the masses. The 
important Dalit leaders who made some significant impact were Baba Sita Ram Das 
Sant, Gopi Dom, and Swami Shiv Narayan etc. In the early 1920s, the adherents of 
this ideology argued that the Bhakti was the religion of the original inhabitants and 
rulers of India and hence, they gave it a shape of religious movement. The movement 
sought to preach caste equality but it could not question the caste structure.''' 
The other stream of Dalit leadership that simultaneously emerged in the social 
context of urbanization and Dalit assertion was more political in nature though it had 
a definite ideological plank and intellectual fervour to counter the suppression, 
oppression and exploitation of the Dalits. This leadership constructed a theory of the 
ancient racial origin of the Dalits known as 'Adi-Hindu' theory according to which 
the Adi-Hindus were the original inhabitants and rulers of India from whom the 
Untouchables or Dalits had descended. This argument sounded the contention of 
Jyotiba Phule who stated that the Dalits are the original inhabitants' of India and the 
caste system and the untouchability has been imposed upon them by the foreign 
Aryans. The persuasion of this theory took the form of Adi -Hindu movement and the 
two most important leaders of this movement were Swami Acchutanand (1879-1933) 
of Lucknow and Baba Ram Charan Das of Kanpur. Swami Acchutanand was bom in 
a Chamar family in Farrukhabad district. Supported by several DaUt leaders, he had 
published a small newspaper in Hindi entitled 'Adi-Hindu.' More significantly, he 
had testified and submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1928 asking 
for separate status and rights, and representation to be given to the Dalits. According 
to Lynch, the Swami also preached in Agra but because of his radical doctrines the 
leaders of the Jatav Kshatriyas movement drove him out.'^ Baba Ram Charan Das, 
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another Adi-Hindu leader of Lucknow was bom in a slum at Gwaltoli in Kanpur. He 
worked in the Railway Audit office and took a law degree. Afterwards, he shifted to 
Lucknow and spend the rest of his life in the social amelioration of the Dalits. 
Although the Arya Samaj failed to eradicate the feelings of caste 
discrimination, because of its domination by the Brahmans and the people from other 
upper castes, it certainly brought about a significant change among the Jatavs by 
imparting them the upper caste values of acknowledged Sanskritic symbols, rites and 
beliefs. It played an important role in convincing some of the Dalits of the mobility 
within Hindu society. The younger generation of Jatavs got education from the 
Missionary Schools, Arya Samaj, and the government schools. Equipped with 
education in 1917, they formed the Jatav Men's Association (Jatav Vir Mahasabha). 
Later in 1924 the Jatavs formed another group called Jatav Propaganda Circle (Jatav 
Pracharak Mandal) to bring about social reforms among them and propagate their 
new identity of Jatav. Thus, through association and society the Dalit leaders 
succeeded in motivating the Jatavs towards achieving education, Sanskritization, and 
changing of their identity fi"om Chamar to Jatav. 
Besides undertaking to change and uplift the social status of their community 
by using Sanskritic values, rituals and behaviour patterns this new generation of Dalit 
leaders also took to politics for this purpose. The Jatavs became politically conscious 
of action from 1920s when they started demanding rights for their community. 
Lynch'^  narrates, "Thus in 1920, a Bohare Khem Chand was appointed a member of 
the Legislative Council of Uttar Pradesh, in which he served two terms. After his 
appointment, Bohare Khem Chand proposed in the Council that one member of the 
Jatav community be appointed to each district board in Uttar Pradesh....He ftirther 
proposed that one member of his community be appointed to every municipal board, 
town area, and notified area committee in the state of Uttar Pradesh." These statuses 
including political positions held by the Dalits made them conscious of their position 
in the power structure. More importantly they became aware of political 
instrumentalities. These educated Jatavs formed the Jatav Youth League in 1930, 
which supported Ambedkar claims for representing Dalits in Round Table Conference 
in London against Gandhi,'^ Which by 1941, had branches in Rajasthan, Punjab and 
Madhya Pradesh. 
As Adi-Hindu movement was simultaneously in progress, Ambedkar declared 
his intentions of leaving Hinduism in 1935.^ ^ With this the so called process of 
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Sanskritization came to an abrupt halt. "By 1940 they (Dalits) were drawn into 
Ambedkar movement. Outside Maharashtra, it was the North Indian Chamars who 
provided the strongest base for the Scheduled Castes Federation.^ *^ Then in 1944-45, 
the Scheduled Castes Federation of Agra was formed which was affiliated to All-India 
Scheduled Castes Federation of Dr. Ambedkar.^' 
The transitional period of 1945-50 saw a marked change led by the newly 
educated elite among Jatavs. By becoming a part of the All-India Scheduled Castes 
Federation, their self-identity underwent a change. Their reference group of identity 
now became the Scheduled Castes with whom they identified as a part of the 
oppressed, deprived and 'Untouchable' section of the population. Independence 
brought with it Parliamentary democracy, a constitution and Universal Suffrage with 
other protective measures. All this emerged as a functional alternative to 
Sanskritization and a better means for entering the new power structure. 
After this the attempts to realize the status of citizens based on a secular axis 
became the agenda of Dalit mobilization in the state. With the new democratic 
institutions functioning in the society, power base shifted from religion to politics. 
The political participation appeared to be the way out for Dalits. 
Two other major events in the 1950s were the 'Conversion Movement' and 
formation of the Republican Party of India (RPI) in 1956. Substantial numbers of 
Jatavs in Agra, Scheduled Castes in Aligarh and other districts of Uttar Pradesh 
followed Ambedkar into Buddhism, which was an indigenous but non-Hindu tradition 
and presented an alternative to the caste-system within which the Scheduled Castes 
had failed to rise. Thus, these two events were put in complimentary relations. The 
principles of equality enshrined in the constitution, in Buddhism and in the ideology 
of RPI were described as virtually the same and allowed an appeal to both the 
religious and traditional and the revolutionary and secular groups among the 
Scheduled Castes. 
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Post-Independence Period 
Sudha Pai^ '* has divided the history of the post-independence Dalit movement in Uttar 
Pradesh into three phases. The first phase ranges from 1956-1969, when Dalits 
decided to form their own political party, the Republican Party of India, under the 
leadership of DR. Ambedkar. The second phase is about the failure of Dalit political 
parties that enabled the Congress to secure Dalit support under the leadership of Ms. 
Indira Gandhi by the sharing in the consensus on 'Garibi Hatao'. The third phase 
begins from the early 1980s when the Dalit movement entered into competitive 
Democratic politics. This phase saw the emergence, expansion, and consolidation of 
the BSP with the criticism that Dalit Movement had distanced itself fi-om the 
initiatives for social transformation and focused only on political motives and goals. 
In the first phase (1956-1969), the presence of a well-organized Dalit 
movement in Uttar Pradesh was not strongly felt. This period was replete with 
political and economic turbulence created by the land reforms. Though, the vigour of 
the Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh was not impressive, Dalit issues got 
predominance in the interpretation of the effectiveness and impact of land reforms in 
Uttar Pradesh. Several agrarian reforms were introduced in the post-colonial period 
with a view to bring about social and economic equality and equity within the 
fi-amework of the socialist pattern of Indian society, to improve the quality of life of 
the depressed classes, which of course is reflected in the constitution of India. The 
outcome of these agrarian reforms, however, did not prove fruitful for the target 
groups. Many scholars called the agrarian reforms as a 'failed task' or 'a fiasco'.^^ A 
study of the agrarian reforms in Basti, a district in Eastern Uttar Pradesh, shows that 
the Untouchable class got very little or nothing fi-om the Zamindari Abolition Act of 
1954.^ ^ 
The real beneficiaries of these land reforms were the tillers of the land. 
Landovmers did not till their land, but the intermediate castes (Now OBCs) tilled the 
land and took their share. After the introduction of the Zamindari Abolition Act of 
1954, landowners, who were mainly from the upper castes, had to forfeit land in 
excess of 10 acres. Before the act could actually impinge on their vast tracts of land. 
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these landowners started selling their lands. Dalits and other depressed classes had no 
purchasing capacity to buy this land. Therefore, the intermediary castes who tilled the 
land purchased those lands.^^ However, lack of purchasing power was not only reason 
that prevented the Dalits from taking the benefits of land reforms; it was more a 
matter of deprivation of the entitlement. Omvedt and Patankar^^ have discussed it at 
length. 
According to Omvedt and Patankar, two parallel hierarchies developed in the 
caste system of India. One hierarchy developed in the domain of agrarian relations 
ranging from landlords to independent peasants to tenant-cultivator to field servant. 
The last comprised the untouchables- a form of semi-slavery. The parallel hierarchy 
developed in the field of services, ranging from priest at the top to the goldsmith, 
barber to washer man and leather worker. The entire land policy evolved in the 
colonial period and during the freedom struggle was focused on the ideology of 'land 
to tillers' which excluded the lowest hierarchy in the agrarian system i.e. the 
untouchable field servants. The failure of the land reforms in bringing about equality 
among the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh was enough to encourage them to launch the Dalit 
movement. This was not a tough task because the contemporary Dalit movement had 
a strong presence in the political and social spheres in other parts of the country. 
Surprisingly so, it did not happen. The Dalits continued to keep their faith in the 
Congress, which was the chief articulator of land reforms. For the Dalits, snatching 
away land from the upper caste land owners was a crucial development. Land owning 
capacity of the upper castes enabled them to exercise the power over the deprived 
classes. Therefore, taking away land from the landlords was a historical development, 
even if it proved less beneficial for the Dalits. Thus while the failed land reforms 
should have galvanized the Dalits to strike while the iron was hot, this whole 
phenomenon cemented their trust in the Congress which was also enjoying the 
reputation it had earned throughout the freedom movement as 'protector of the 
nation'. The nationalist sentiments also protected the political interests of the 
Congress and the upper caste people who were then largely associated with it. 
In Uttar Pradesh the social structure is largely comprised of Hindu traditions 
and beliefs which obstructed any initiative towards organizing the depressed classes 
on the part of the Dalits. The values and norms of Hindu society to a great extent 
determine the distribution of opportunities to ownership of land and they have 
influenced the economic and political relation of people in Uttar Pradesh. Although 
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Dalits have rejected social and economic relationships based on the religious 
interpretations they were deeply internalized by them. The second important reason 
was that Dalits, floating from bondage from one landowner to others could not 
develop a solid base in rural Uttar Pradesh. This restricted the ability of the Dalits in 
raising and maintaining a movement against the well-established social hierarchy. 
Under the leadership of Ambedkar, concern over Dalits interests was raised at 
different forums at the national level in public and private, during the second quarter 
of the 20"' century. A leader of national stature as he was, Ambedkar had an impact 
across the nation. When Ambedkar was very influential in national politics no second 
line leadership emerged in Uttar Pradesh to carry on the legacy of the Dalit movement 
established by him. In the first couple of decades after independence, the Dalits in 
Uttar Pradesh could not mobilise themselves socially or economically; thus, 
undermining their capacity to mobilise on political grounds. Table 1.2 shows that 
during the early decades in post-Independent India, political parties representing Dalit 
interests were less influential. The All India Scheduled Castes Federation (SCF) failed 
in finding any political room in the state. In the 1951 state Assembly Elections, the 
SCF was not prepared to contest for all the 347 seats. It could only muster 32 
candidates out of which 20 lost their deposits. The SCF was the first all-India political 
party formed exclusively for Dalits. The party was the outcome of Ambedkar's efforts 
to create a separate political party for Dalits. In first two Lok Sabha elections (1951& 
1957), the SCF could not win any seat from Uttar Pradesh. 
In 1957, the SCF had to wind up and turned into a new political party- the 
Republican Party of India (RPI). The formation of the RPI inaugurated a new phase in 
the Dalit Movement in Uttar Pradesh, but it proved to be short lived. After its 
formation, the RPI contested elections to Lok Sabha and the State Assembly in the 
Third General Elections in 1962. It contested 68 Parliamentary and 301 Assembly 
seats all over the country, winning only three in the former, all in Uttar Pradesh; and 
11 in the latter, 3 in Maharashtra and 8 in Uttar Pradesh. Hence, it performed better in 
Uttar Pradesh than in Maharashtra, but it rapidly declined after the 1967 elections 
when it gained 10 Assembly seats. Table 1.2 shows the rise and decline of the RPI in 
the electoral scene in Uttar Pradesh during the 1960s. The party could not gain more 
than about 4% of the total votes and disappeared after 1969. This is a very low 
percentage considering that the Scheduled Castes constituted 20% of the total 
population of Uttar Pradesh. In 1974, 1977, and 1980 elections in Uttar Pradesh, the 
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party put up a total of 52, 11 and 2 candidates respectively in the state but could not 
win a single seat. However, in the 1962 and 1967 elections, the party performed well 
and got most of its seats in Agra, Allahabad, Rohilkhand and Meerut division, i.e., in 
the doah and plateau regions. The party's performance was poor in the Central and 
Eastern Uttar Pradesh except in Lucknow and Gorakhpur. These were the areas in 
which the Scheduled Castes had undergone a modicum of political mobilisation 
during the colonial period. Starting from these bases, before it could improve its vote 
share or spread into new areas, the party disappeared. 
TABLE 1.2 
Performance of Lower Caste Parties in UP State Assembly elections (1951-1969) 
Year Seat 
Contested 
(total seats) 
Won Deposit 
Lost 
Vote % of 
total 
Polled votes 
Vote % in 
seats 
Contested 
All India Scheduled Castes Federation (SCF) 
1951 32 (347) 0 20 1.49 8.48 
Republican Party of India (RPI) 
1962 
1967 
1969 
123 (430) 
168 (425) 
172(425) 
8 
10 
1 
97 
139 
146 
3.74 
4.14 
3.48 
12.32 
10.08 
8.26 
Source: Election Commission of India 
The success of the RPI in small pockets of Uttar Pradesh in 1962 and 1967 
elections can be attributed to two reasons; one, the poor performance of the Indian 
National Congress after its early success in the 1952 and the 1957 elections. In 1962 
the Congress vote fell to 36.33% from a high of 47.93% in 1952. By the early 1960s, 
the discontent with Congress policies began to emerge and its ftiU impact was felt in 
the 1967 elections when the party gained only 32.20% of votes, small parties, such as, 
RPI was able to cut into the vote share of the Congress in the pockets of the state; the 
second reason was an electoral alliance between the Jatavs of the RPI and the 
conservative Muslims in the western districts of Uttar Pradesh, particularly, Agra, 
Aligarh, Moradabad and Badaun. This alliance was a reaction to the Hindu-Muslim 
riots in 1961.^ ° In areas where the alliance was in operation passions were aroused. In 
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Agra slogans were used which described Jatavs and Muslims as brothers and attacked 
Hindus specially Brahmans. In Aligarh, the RPI under the leadership of B.P. Maurya, 
appealed, very specifically, to the antagonism of lower caste groups to upper castes 
specially Brahmans. 
The RPI had two clear goals; one was to defeat the Congress, which was 
dominated by Brahmans and the second was to improve the condition of the 
Scheduled Castes. The RPI, however, faced major failures in bringing this agenda to 
the political front. This failure was laid in the nature of the Uttar Pradesh society and 
politics during that period. '^ The leaders within the party could not arrive at a 
consensus on how to achieve these two goals. Some of them wanted to seek support 
from the Congress while others favoured a separate identity. Therefore, the RPI 
could not stand up to the strong organized structure of the Congress which was built 
at the local level by Brahmans, Rajputs, Scheduled Castes and Muslims. The 
Congress could manage the Dalits by making them as the stable electoral base of the 
party despite the fact that it was highly reluctant to put them in the party structure. For 
example, in 1968, there was not even one representative from the lower castes and 
only one Scheduled Caste member among the presidents of its branches at district or 
town level.''^  Thus examined, three factors were responsible for the brief existence of 
the RPI in Uttar Pradesh; first, the lack of dynamic leadership; second, division 
among the Dalit leadership over the strategy to consolidate the community and its 
development; and third, the ability of the Congress as a broad-based dominant party to 
attract the votes of a majority of the Dalit commimity. 
The hegemony established by the Congress in the post-Ambedkarite period 
was one of the important reasons for the poor influence of the Dalit movement in 
India in general and in Uttar Pradesh in particular. This hegemony was strengthened 
by the reputation that the Congress enjoyed throughout the freedom struggle and later 
by its accommodative politics. The Congress was successfril in accommodating 
vibrant forces, which were expected to create political turbulence for the party and 
provide what they wanted. The Congress paid compensation to the Zamindars to 
compensate for their losses due to land reforms legislations, set up special agencies to 
assist small farmers, supported the minimum wage policy of the landless, and provide 
reservation in educational institutes and administrative services for Scheduled 
Castes.^ '* The Congress was also aware of the Muslim votes. The party appealed to 
51 
Muslims by offering them positions in party and government organisations and by 
giving their candidates party tickets to contest elections. 
Therefore, the Congress, managed to pass itself off as a non-ethnic, umbrella 
party, while catering expressly to upper castes in Uttar Pradesh. The Congress 
integrated the Dalits vertically into political structures dominated by the upper caste 
landlords, offering them material patronage, but no leadership options. This vote bank 
politics of the Congress, whereby the party mobilized Dalit votes without offering 
them political representation, is described well by Paul R. Brass in his 1960s study. In 
all four rural districts that Brass studied in the state, "the leadership and the major 
sources of support for the local Congress organizations" were "drawn from the high 
caste ex-tenants of the zamindars and talukdars and from the petty and middle ex-
zamindars, "^^ in other words, from "the locally influential communities in the 
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villages,....those who control the land". This upper caste leadership. Brass argues, 
facilitated the attainment of additional support from other subordinate castes that were 
economically dependent on them, which made "electoral support for the Congress" 
far "broader than its leadership," with the Dalits forming the most reliable 
constituencies of the party. 
The Congress dominance in Uttar Pradesh was challenged in the 1960s and 
1970s by a farmers' movement that condemned the party of harbouring an urban bias; 
pointing to the over-representation of upper castes in the Congress, this movement 
also criticized the party for blocking the upward mobility of backward caste groups. 
The 1960s had seen the bourgeoning of a class of landowning peasants in Uttar 
Pradesh, whose growth resulted from "two cumulative phenomena," i.e., land reform, 
and the Green Revolution. Land reform, "even though it had remained incomplete, 
enabled many [former] tenants to become peasant- proprietors" ; with most tenants 
coming from backward castes, it served in easing dovra material dominance of upper 
castes, who constituted the vast majority of the old landowning class, in the rural 
areas. The Green Revolution, on the other hand, stemmed "from the introduction of 
high-yielding seeds between 1965 and 1966," and "from the development of irrigation 
and the use of chemical fertilizers"; it thus "served the interests of those among the 
landowners who had some mvestment capacity. 
The Green Revolution also increased the "inequalities and disparities... 
between the wheat growing western region and the rice growing eastern region," as 
"rich and middle level peasants" in Western Uttar Pradesh, taking frill advantage of 
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the opportunities that it presented, doubled " their output and increased their income 
in many cases by 70 percent."'*^ Foremost amongst the agricultural castes whose 
economic well-being the Green Revolution facilitated were the Jats in the West. The 
farmer's mobilization that began in the 1960s and was anti- Congress in tone was thus 
led by a Jat leader, Charan Singh, who left the Congress on account of its refiisal to 
accommodate his constituency, comprising upwardly mobile agricultural 
commimities, and most importantly, his own caste. 
However, Charan Singh was very careful in exercising his Jat identity while 
seeking to construct a "rural" coalition; his need to attract small farmers led him to 
appeal to a peasant identity instead.'*' Charan Singh, indeed, succeeded in evolving a 
broad agrarian platform, largely on account of the cooperation of Ram Manohar 
Lohiya, a socialist leader with a substantial credibility amongst the cultivating 
sections of backward castes, and landless labourers, in Eastern Uttar Pradesh. Ram 
Manohar Lohiya shared Charan Singh's goal of overthrowing the Congress, and of 
reversing upper caste dominance in state politics, which led to the merger of Lohiya's 
party, the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), with Charan Singh's own party, the 
Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) and the formation of the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), in 
1974.'*2 
Charan Singh, therefore, while using the SSP's appeal amongst small peasants 
and landless labourers, from both backward caste and Scheduled Caste communities, 
pursued the interests of large farmers from backward castes to expand his electoral 
base. Thus in his scheme of politics, the poorer sections of the peasantry served only 
as a vote bank, who were vertically integrated into structures dominated by rich 
farmers, with the benefits of mobilization accruing only to the latter. It follows from 
this that the BLD's treatment of the agrarian poor was quite similar to the Congress's, 
the only difference being that the BLD represented the interests of rich backward 
caste, rather than upper caste groups. The Dalits, on the other hand, who were either 
petty tenants or landless agricultural labourers, were not able to improve their 
economic or political position. As a result of these changes, a new rural landed elite, 
majority of whom were from the middle and backward castes, emerged in parts of 
Uttar Pradesh and caste-conflict in the countryside increased and assumed a new 
dimension, now being more between middle and lower castes. At the same time 
Congress after 1969 adopted a spate of measures such as 'Garibi Hatao' and the 20 
Point Programme (which constituted one pillar of the populist shift effected by Indira 
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Gandhi whereby she sought to establish direct ties with the masses) to defend its low 
caste base. These policies were specifically perceived as a left-oriented Congress 
politics which was successfiil in persuading Cheddi Lai Sathi, B.P. Maurya and Ramji 
Ram and many others to join Congress. The most important of these measures was 
the distribution of surplus land freed up through the implementation of ceilings, and 
rural house sites, to the landless Dalits.'*'' This policy facilitated the integration of 
Dalits into the Congress fold. So, during this period independent and autonomous 
political mobilization of the Dalit community was not very high and successfiil, 
rather it was during 1980s, that the Dalits asserted to their best which may be 
attributed to the second wave of caste-based mobilization in North India, the first 
being in the mid-1960s that brought the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) into politics. 
DALIT PANTHERS AND FACTIONALISM 
Significantly, in the early 1970s Maharashtra witnessed an emergence of the 
Dalit Panthers movement. The name with its insurrectionist symbolism was borrowed 
from the Black Panthers of the United States. Ideologically, the Dalit Panthers 
emphasized class-based Dalit political activism. Rise of Dalit Panthers movement 
coincided with wide spread famine, pervasive student activism and a non-party 
opposition politics in India. But the Dalit Panthers proved unable to build coalition 
with broader leftist politics. The movement was more riven by ideological and 
personality differences. The core ideological split was publicly evident by 1974, and 
was personified in its two pre-eminent leaders of the movement, Namdeo Dhasal and 
Raja Dhale. For Dhale's faction, the agenda of the movement was to deepen and 
widen Buddhist consciousness as the defining moment in Dalit history was the mass 
conversion to Buddhism under the leadership of Ambedkar. This faction decried any 
engagement with secular politics. Namdeo Dhasal, on the other hand, represented a 
more orthodox leftist position and reduced caste to class. This faction accorded both 
Ambedkar and conversion movement less of defining role. Later on Indira Gandhi 
was successfiil in extracting support of the Dhasal faction on the plank of poverty 
amelioration programmes. On balance, the Dalit Panthers had failed to organize 
properly, both ideologically and as a political party. Lack of strategy and factionalism 
doomed this radical movement to insignificance. 
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The trajectory of the DaHt Panthers movement in Uttar Pradesh was not very 
impressive which can be attributed to the growing ideological schism within the 
movement itself. Vivek Kumar explains the origin and decimation of the Dalit 
Panthers movement in these words: 
"On 5 December, 1980, the Dalit Panthers movement was bom in Lucknow 
besides in Kanpur. Shyamlal of Jaunpur was its president and D.K. Anand of 
Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow was its General Secretary.... The Dalit Panthers in 
Uttar Pradesh were militant and specially rose against the atrocities on the 
Dalits specially after the 1980s when the Congress Government came to 
power again after a brief gap of two and half years of the Janta Party 
Government. The main demands of the Panthers were that, "in case of a death 
of the Dalit due to atrocity, he should be paid Rs. 5 lakh as compensation 
along with 5 Bighas of land, one weapon (a pistol or gun) and service to one 
person in the family." There is no evidence to prove at this stage whether they 
had succeeded in forcing the government to pay such compensation. But one 
thing is clear that the demands itself looked impractical and the Panthers were 
not in good numbers to exert the required pressure on the government for 
getting their demands realized....Later on, the General Secretary of the 
Panthers was booked under the National Security Act (NSA) because of his 
provocative speeches and violent demonstrations organized at the district 
head-quarters in 1986. Thus, with his arrest, the Panthers movement faded out 
paving the way to the gradual emergence of the BAMCEF in 1979 in 
Lucknow, the Capital of the State."''^  
Hence, the decade of 1970 was important not only because of the demise of 
two major organized Dalit political attempts through the RPI and Dalit Panthers, but 
also because of the emergence of an extraordinary Dalit literary movement. The void 
left by the demise of the RPI and the Dalit Panthers has been filled by two 
complimentary developments: (a) Literary Dalit movement, (b) Emergence of Kanshi 
Ram and Ms. Mayawati as new Dalit icons. Here we will discuss the unprecedented 
mobilization of the Dalits in UP under the iconic leadership of Kanshi Ram. 
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A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF KANSHI RAM 
Before discussing the emergence and development of the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP), it is pertinent to give a brief account of the BSP founder Kanshi Ram. Kanshi 
Ram is popularly known as 'Dadasaheb' or 'Mannyavar' among the BSP cadres and 
bahujan masses. But the origin and social background of Mannyavar Kanshi Ram has 
somewhat got mystified, some people saying he was a civil servant and so on and so 
forth. To do away all these mysteries surrounding Kanshi Ram, BSP's central office 
released a pamphlet on his life. According to this pamphlet, Kanshi Ram was bom on 
15 March 1934, in Khawaspur, Ropar District, Punjab.'*^ Kanshi Ram completed his 
early education in his Village Khawaspur, later on, he completed his B.Sc 
(Graduation) from Ropar District in 1956. In 1957, he qualified a competition for 
'Geological Survey of India' (GSI) and took the training, but he resigned from the job 
because of the condition of 'service bond'."*^ Then he moved to Pune in Maharashtra 
and joined the Explosive Research and Development Laboratory at Kirkee, where he 
was exposed to the bad breath of Hindu social order i.e., terrible caste system. 
After joining the Explosive Research and Development Laboratory of Kirkee 
near Pune as a Chemist, Kanshi Ram faced caste discrimination for the first time,''^ 
During this period in Maharashtra, particularly in Pune, society was sharply polarized 
between Dalits and the upper castes leading various types of Ambedkarite 
organizations, and the upper castes, who remained conservative and Brahminical in 
outlook.^ *^ Kanshi Ram could not tolerate the humiliation which had become the 
destiny of the Dalit employees all across India. His assertive personality forced him to 
resign from the job in 1964, in fact he sacrificed his job while fighfing for the rights of 
his colleague.^' 
After resigning from the Government service, Kanshi Ram got involved in 
reading Dalit literature with a view to discover the root cause of Brahminical social 
order. In this process, the journey of Kanshi Ram and his movement of socio-cultural 
revolution and economic emancipation of 'Bahujan Samaj' started fi-om 1964 
onwards. Kanshi Ram took inspiration from Ambedkar's thoughts and innovative 
ideas by reading "Armihilation of Caste", and he travelled the whole of Maharashtra 
to explore Ambedkarism. He joined number of organizations prevalent in 
Maharashtra at that time, such as People's Education Society, Buddha Club, etc. The 
RPI was the major Dalit political organization prevalent in Maharashtra and Uttar 
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Pradesh. However, Kanshi Ram was not attracted to it, though he worked for four 
years. He feh it was a stooge of the Congress. Nor was Kanshi Ram attracted to the 
radical DaHt movements emerging in various states, such as the Dalit Panthers in 
Maharashtra, or the Dalit Sangharsh Samiti in Kamataka. 
In 1971 Kanshi Ram and his colleagues established the Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Minorities Employees Welfare 
Association, which was duly registered under the Poona Charity Commissioner. The 
primary objective of this organization was, to subject problems of close scrutiny and 
find out quick and equitable solutions to the problems of injustice and harassment of 
the Dalit employees in general and the educated employees in particular. Thereafter, 
an important event in the history of the Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh was the 
creation of an "All India Backward and Minority Communities Employees 
Federation" (BAMCEF), on 6™ December 1978, the death anniversary of Ambedkar. 
This organization was formally launched with a rally at the Boat Club lawns in New 
Delhi." 
ALL INDIA BACKWARD AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES 
EMPLOYEES FEDERATION (BAMCEF) 
All India Backward and Minority Communities Employees Federation 
(BAMCEF) is an organization of educated employees of oppressed and exploited 
communities among the Indian society. This organization stands for a purposeful 
social cause and it is a movement of the educated employees, by the educated 
employees but not for the educated employees. And this organization is considered as 
a 'Think Tank' and a financial bank of the Bahujan Samaj.^ "* The main objective of 
this organization is "Pay back to the Society". It is a non-religious, non-agitational, 
non-political organization to uproot Brahmanism. It seems that the organization was 
formed as a long term supportive and parent organization for the fiirther political 
thrust.^ ^ 
BAMCEF's ideology is based on the principles of Mahatma Phule, Shahuji 
Maharaj, Periyar, Narayan Guru and Ambedkar etc. The organization's major 
contribution in terms of its goal has been in producing cadre camps to create "Bahujan 
Activities of Conviction", the members of the group work for addressing the 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and also Religious 
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Minority masses in the villages, urban localities and in the government offices. Now 
these organizations have the mass based as well as cadre based activists to take ahead 
the caravan of Phule-Ambedkar movement in India. Though, Kanshi Ram established 
BAMCEF network of the Dalit educated employees first in Maharashtra and 
adjoining areas i.e., Nagpur, Poona, Jabalpur, Bhopal etc. Later on once he moved to 
Delhi he extended the network in Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya 
Pradesh etc. In terms of mobilization, at the outset the leaders of BAMCEF started 
mobilizing the Dalit employees. It was done with the aim to ask the Dalit employees 
to 'pay back' the community as they have benefited by the policy of protective 
discrimination, because of their community. ^ ^ 
Kanshi Ram was very much aware that as the influence of BAMCEF will 
grow the Government of the day will not spare its members and can penalize them by 
transferring them to remote places or by suspending them from the services. 
Therefore, he along with other members decided not to get the organization formally 
registered and kept the organization without any formal structure.^^ But BAMCEF got 
fragmented within six years of its establishment when Kanshi Ram launched Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP) in the year 1984 though its formal division can be ascertained with 
the formal registration of another faction in the year 1987 with the Registrar of 
Societies, Delhi under registration No 17809.^ ^ Since then one group of BAMCEF 
that was associated with Kanshi Ram was converted into a shadow organization 
helping BSP in electoral mobilization for the party. ^ ^ Dr. Vivek Kumar contests the 
argument made by Sudha Pai when she claims that the BAMCEF was a 'shadow' 
organization since its inception. Vivek Kumar argues, "Though the fact is BAMCEF 
became shadow organization after the formation of BSP with a deliberate attempt of 
Kanshi Ram who was by then more interested in party politics. But he also knew the 
importance of BAMCEF, as it was the main stay of his movement in terms of, 'Man, 
Money, and Mind power"'.^° But the leaders of BAMCEF were, handicapped of a 
political forum, which could mobilize other sections of the society for other issues of 
the Dalits and could take direct actions such as demonstrations,^' to fill this gap, DS-4 
was formed. 
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DALIT SHOSHIT SAMAJ SANGHARSH SAMITI (DS-4) 
Kanshi Ram was eager to launch a grassroots struggle to challenge the upper 
castes. Since the Indian democratic system does not permit the goveniment employees 
to engage in political activities, an organization made by bureaucrats was limited in its 
actions. Kanshi Ram began to plan the formation of an organization that would be 
able to mobilize a larger section of the Dalits into political activities. As a prelude to 
the formation of a political party, to prepare mass base for political activities, the DS-
4 came into being. This organization was formed to include and mobilize other 
sections of the society besides employees. Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti i.e., 
DS-4 was established on 6 December 1981. The main aim of this organization was 
to highlight the grievances of the oppressed Dalits and to educate them about their 
rights. It was not a political outfit; in fact it served as a link between Kanshi Ram's 
trade union organization BAMCEF and his yet to be formed political party, the BSP. 
In North India, right since the formation of the DS-4 the momentum for 
political mobilization picked up. Since the DS-4 was a quasi-rather than full-fledged 
political party [partly because government servants were forbidden to take part in 
political mobilization process], the DS-4 made little concrete progress. Unlike 
BAMCEF, which was more oriented towards urban Scheduled Caste elites, the target 
of the DS-4 was rural Dalits. The DS-4, because of its aggressive posture in 
agitational campaigns made quick inroads in North Indian villages. Between 15 
March and 17 April 1983, the DS-4 organized a 3000 km cycle procession covering 
seven states in order to educate the oppressed and the exploited people that they need 
to build up their own organization and an independent movement.^ ^ 
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THE RISE OF BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY (BSP) AND ITS 
LEADERSHIP 
Soon after independence, the constitutional revolution sought to build up a 
new social order with dynamic changes in the Indian society through democratic 
means. Democratically elected governments were left with the responsibility to 
achieve the unfinished agenda of social revolution or social democracy as emphasized 
by constitution's architect Babasaheb Ambedkar in his last speech in the Constituent 
Assembly. Today it is a fact that Bahujan Samaj Party with a firmly deep ideological 
foimdation of Mahatma Phule, Periyar, Narayan Guru and Babasaheb Ambedkar, is a 
socio-political power at national level and has occupied a central place in the Indian 
Politics. Undeniably, this journey is of a super strategy masterminded by BSP 
leadership. The Bahujan Samaj Party has become the symbol of self-respect for 
Dalits, Backwards and Minorities in the country. 
The ground work done by Kanshi Ram through BAMCEF, DS-4 and Media-
'The Oppressed Indian', 'Bahujan Times', 'Bahujan Sangathak' etc, gave him 
substantial mass base to launch a fiill-fledged political party. Hence Bahujan Samaj 
Party was launched on 14"" April 1984 on Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar's 83'"'' birth 
anniversary. The BSP is the political expression of the changing socio-political 
context of Uttar Pradesh. In contrast to the other Dalit organizations its formation 
appears "deliberate and not reactive" ^^  , emerging almost twenty years after Kanshi 
Ram's resignation from the govenmient job. It has consistently refiased a reactive 
agitational stance and a reformatory agitation as well. It is in fact, a political 
organization with an aim to capture power and use it to elevate the conditions of the 
Bahujan Samaj. 
The BSP obtains its name from the Hindi term Bahujan, meaning "majority of 
the people," and claims to represent the Bahujan Samaj, or "the community of those 
who constitute the majority." The BSP depicts the Bahujan Samaj as a coalition of 
Hindu low castes and religious minorities,^^ with this depiction turning on a binary 
that sees Hindu upper castes as constituting its political and ideological "other". 
In adopting the raoXii oi bahujan for mobilizational purposes, Kanshi Ram was 
prompted by both tactical and ideological considerations. Kanchan Chandra argues 
that "the Scheduled Caste population [alone] was not sufficient to put a new political 
party in power in any state in India in 1984 [the year of the BSP's birth], with three 
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exceptions: Haryana, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. And even in these states, the 
Scheduled Caste population was large enough not necessarily to assure victory, but to 
barely permit a political party with Scheduled Caste support to cross the minimum 
threshold necessary..." given this limitation, it made strategic sense for Kanshi Ram 
to "enlarge the definition of his 'own' ethnic category." Winning elections, 
therefore, was an important consideration that guided Kanshi Ram's choice of name 
for his party. ^ ^ 
The theme of the 'Bahujan Samaj' also allowed the BSP to communicate its 
social justice agenda to its target constituency. Kanshi Ram would often employ a 
discourse of "85 percent versus 15 percent," where 85 percent represented the 
bahujam, and 15 percent the higher caste groups. Though imprecise, these figures 
were effective in conveying the injustice that the BSP saw as characterizing the Indian 
political situation, in which the minority ruled over, oppressed and exploited the 
majority. The discourse of injustice, and the pressing need to quash it, took on a 
peculiar potency when symbolized through the simple "metaphor of the ball-pen, 
repeated endlessly by Kanshi Ram on platforms or before the cameras," the top of the 
pen representing the upper castes who, despite being in a minority, rule the country, 
with the pen itself representing "the remaining 85% who have to become aware of 
their fate and of their numerical strength." 
This majoritarian and polarizing discourse was a remarkable feature of the 
BSP's early politics, with Kanshi Ram often beginning "his public speeches with an 
injunction to the upper castes.... [Present] to leave the meeting place."^' This 
discourse also informed the slogans engineered by the BSP in the 1980s and early 
1990s: Jiski Jitni sankhya bhari, uski utni bhagidari (For everyone's 
representation/participation should be on the basis of his numbers or according to 
percentage of population); and 85 par 15 ka raj nahi chalega nahi chalega (The rule 
of 15 percent over 85 percent cannot last, cannot last).^ ^ 
According to Kanshi Ram, the BSP doesn't regard any difference between the 
philosophy of Ambedkar, the emancipation of the Dalits and the ideals enshrined in 
the constitution. But, this principle is seemingly, not fully realised in practice when 
Kanshi Ram first took outside support of the Bahartiya Janta Party (BJP) to install 
Ms. Mayawati as the Chief Minister in Uttar Pradesh and since then, this process of 
alliance formation and alliance diversion, where by the BSP not only entered into 
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coalitions with both the Congress and the BJP, but also gave party tickets to the upper 
castes, notably, Brahmans, in order to strengthen its electoral base. 
ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE OF THE BSP IN UTTAR PRADESH 
When the BSP entered the electoral arena, it immediately targeted the 
Congress Party as its main, historical enemy. Kanshi Ram even considered that his 
party had to contest elections because of the Congress attitude towards the Dalits. On 
the eve of the SO"* anniversary of the 1932 Poona Pact, which the Congress was about 
to celebrate with great pomp, Kanshi Ram published a booklet, "the Chamcha Age", 
when he denounced this "agreement" as sealing the political fate of the Dalits. He 
argued that the system of reserved seats that had been forced on Ambedkar- who 
favoured a system of separate electorates- had helped the upper castes to dominate 
Congress and to co-opt Dalit candidates who were mere sycophants (Chamchas) or 
yes- men {Ji hazuri) since the Dalits did not form a majority in a single reserved 
constituency. Facing such a situation, the BSP had to contest elections. It was the only 
way out since 'A tool, an agent, a stooge or Chamcha is created to oppose the real, the 
genuine fighter"^'' 
The BSP entered electoral politics soon after its formation and has been 
steadily building up its strength at the state and national level. The Party contested the 
Lok Sabha elections in December 1984 and the Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections in 
March 1985. It lost all the seats contested in both the elections but secured around 10 
lakh votes throughout India, however mostly in Uttar Pradesh. Around 50 Assembly 
seats were won by non-Congress parties because of the presence of BSP. The BSP 
altogether polled around 7 lakh votes in the Assembly elections of Uttar Pradesh in 
1984.'"' With the committed cadre camps by BAMCEF and huge rallies organized by 
DS-4 throughout this period, BSP was able to mobilize and convince some Dalits into 
its fold. In the Bijnor Lok Sabha by-election in December 1985, the prestigious 
candidate from the Congress, Meera Kumar, could barely win the seat with only five 
thousand margins over the BSP candidate, Mrs. Mayawati, who captured around 18 
percent of votes. It may be noted that the Congress's victory margin in Bijnor a year 
back, had been 95,000 votes.^^ Throughout this period the party and the DS-4 were 
organizing huge rallies, and its support base among the Dalits and backward classes 
particularly the government employees, was growing. 
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The BSP emerged as an important party in Uttar Pradesh due to its impressive 
performance in the by-election held in 1987 for one Lok Sabha and three State 
Assembly seats. In the Hardwar Lok Sabha constituency, the BSP leader Ms. 
Mayawati again emerged as the runner-up, while Paswan stood fourth and lost his 
deposit.^ ^ In the Assembly by-elections, the BSP polled 26.3% of the votes, the 
Congress 33%, while the other parties obtained only a total of 2 percent. 
The 1987, Allahabad Parliamentary by-election occupies an important place 
in the history of the evolution of BSP. This by-election saw the founding father of the 
BSP, Kanshi Ram himself contesting where his opponents were Sunil Shastri, 
Congress nominee and ex-Congress Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri's son, and 
V.P. Singh, the joint candidate of the opposition to the Congress. V.P. Singh won 
expectedly by a heavy margin, but it was a victory to which Kanshi Ram contributed 
in no small measure, having diverted not less than 71,586 votes away from the 
Congress.^ ^ Thus, by 1989, the BSP emerged as the second most important party in 
Uttar Pradesh by making inroads into the Congress traditional vote banks consisting 
of the SC's, a section of the BCs and the Minorities, even though it did not won a 
single seat. As Kanshi Ram, at this point asserted, "We may not win even a single 
seat, but we are going to demonstrate our strength". It was only following such a 
demonstration, he predicted, that electoral success would come. 
He was proved right; the BSP won 13 seats in the state Assembly elections, 
and 2 seats in the Parliamentary elections, held in 1989. It also won 13 seats in the 
State Assembly elections of 1991, and 1 seat in the Parliamentary elections held that 
year. Its performance in the 1991 Assembly elections was especially remarkable, 
given the BJP's massive attempts to polarize the electorate on religious lines. 
Pre-Electoral Alliances 
For the BSP, power seemed to be a means by which the party could expand its 
support, and enhance its strength. Thus, it did not make sense for the BSP to wait till 
it had won a significant number of seats before making a bid for power; rather, its 
philosophy dictated that it use whatever strength it commanded to participate in 
government at the earliest possible juncture. 
It was this understanding which guided the BSP's seat-sharing arrangement 
with the Samajwadi Party (SP), forged prior to the 1993 State Assembly elections. 
The SP won 109 out of a total of 425 seats, while the BSP won 67.*' While the 
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resultant SP-BSP government was seen in most quarters as a secular alliance (it was 
propped up by the Congress, who saw this as the best way to keep the BJP, the party 
of Hindutva, at bay), Kanshi Ram made it clear that he had joined forces with the SP 
only to be able to get a hold on power/^ 
This coalition, formed between SP and the BSP under the Chief Ministership 
of Mulayam Singh Yadav, was the first government in Uttar Pradesh in which a 
Scheduled Caste party participated, but this coalition was beset with a series of crises 
and problems since its inception and lasted for only eighteen months, the BSP 
withdrew from the government on June 1st, 1995 and made government of its own 
headed by Ms. Mayawati, on June 3^^ 1995, with outside support of the BJP. 
Two factors led to an unending acrimony and exacerbation in the relationship 
between the SP and the BSP; the clashes between the workers and supporters of the 
two parties (between the backward and the lower castes), and the sustained efforts of 
Mulayam Singh Yadav to expand and consolidate the base of the SP at the expense of 
the BSP. This may be analysed through the by-election results. In the by-elections the 
SP had progressively made inroads into the OBC-Dalit constituencies and increased 
its support. In the first by-elections for six Assembly seats held on June 1st 1994, the 
SP-BSP alliance performed well gaining 4 seats- the SP 3, the BSP-1 while the BJP 
obtained 2 seats. In the second by-elections held on May 28* 1995, the SP won three 
seats and the BJP one but the BSP did not win any seat. The Panchayat elections 
which were held in four phases between 7 and 21 April, 1995, also put the alliance in 
an imbroglio. The SP out-performed the BSP by a significant margin in these 
elections,*^ but was reported to have frequently passed off its candidates as belonging 
to the BSP, in an attempt to take advantage of the loyalty the BSP commanded 
amongst the Dalits at the grassroots.^ "* Mulayam Singh Yadav, the Chief Minister and 
the SP leader, also engineered the defection of BSP legislators to his own party at 
regular intervals, in an attempt to undermine the BSP's position within the 
government.*^ 
In June 1995, Kanshi Ram finally withdrew support and soon after, accepted 
the BJP's offer to prop up a BSP-led government on June 3'^ 1995 which lasted only 
for a short period of four and a half months. It was observed that BSP took the outside 
support of the BJP to oust Mulayam Singh Yadav but it went in 'opposite alliance' 
with an upper-caste and Manuvadi party, as Kanshi Ram characterised it. Kanshi 
Ram's reaction to the outcry was that the two parties had no understanding on issues, 
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and no common minimum programme, and that his primary concern in having 
accepted the BJP's offer was to advance the BSP's ovra agenda.^' 
Mayawati, upon acceding to the post of Chief Minister in 1995, played a 
critical role in consolidating the Dalit, and significantly, the Chamar, support. To 
the dismay of its coalitional partner Mayawati, immediately after forming the 
government, started many subaltern specific programmes like the renaming of 
districts and universities after low caste leaders, construction of statues and parks to 
commemorate them, transferring Dalit officials to critical administrative posts, and 
the implementation of the Ambedkar Village Programme (AVP). The BSP predicted 
that it would not take the BJP long to withdraw support, once it realized that the 
BSP's politics was hurting its own upper caste constituency. 
The BJP, as predicted, withdrew support in October 1995, leading to the 
collapse of the government. In the run-up to the 1996 State Assembly elections, the 
Congress approached the BSP with an offer of seat-sharing arrangement. The 
Congress-BSP coalition that ensued was a highly symbolic one, with the congress 
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playing the role of a jimior partner in an alliance with a Scheduled Caste party. But 
like all of the BSP's alliances, this one too was concluded on strategic grounds, with 
the BSP anticipating that the alliance would allow it to form the government, and 
capture the Congress's remaining Scheduled Caste vote.^ *^  But no party coalition won 
an absolute majority in the elections, following which President's Rule was imposed 
in Uttar Pradesh in October 1996.^ ' 
This alliance helped BSP in understanding the limitations of pre-poll alliances; 
where the party candidates could not campaign in the areas where the coalitional 
partner was supposed to contest the polls, which demoralized cadres, and dampened 
enthusiasm. It also helped them realize the reluctance of the upper caste base support 
to the candidates running on the BSP's ticket. Its earlier experience with the SP had 
also driven home one fiirther disadvantage of pre-electoral alliance to the BSP; since 
seat-sharing schemes did not allow the party to make the most of its organizational 
strength, and win as many seats as it could have otherwise, it served to reduce its 
bargaining power within a coalition, and hamper its ability to implement its subaltern 
agenda.^ ^ All these considerations, taken together, informed the BSP's decision not to 
enter pre-electoral alliances again. 
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Post-Electoral Alliances and Non-Bahujan Nominations 
March 1997 saw the formation of a second BSP-BJP alliance, with the BJP 
accepting the BSP's offer to form a coalition "with any political force willing and able 
to allocate the chief Ministership to Mayawati."^^ A power rotation scheme was 
devised; it was decided that each party would "form the government for six months 
under its own leader, supported by the other party from outside."^* Thus, on March 
21, 1997, nearly six months after elections resulted a hung Assembly in the State, 
Uttar Pradesh got a popular government led by a combine of the BSP and the BJP, 
which had conflicting political philosophies- of Dalit assertiveness and Hindutva 
respectively and divergent support bases. 
The BSP leadership calculated the BJP's thirst for power so it insisted on 
forming the government first. This calculation was predicated on the BSP's 
realization of the desperation the BJP was in, after the electoral stalemate, which 
would prevent it from withdrawing support during the first six months, since it was 
only after this period that the BJP would be able to rule. This would give the BSP 
enough time to implement its own agenda, and moreover, allow it to bring the BJP 
government down, should it adopt any measures that threatened the interests of the 
BSP's subaltern base. 
Assured that it would be in power for six months, the Mayawati government 
adopted certain measures in the material realm that were bolder than those taken 
earlier. The BSP government undertook to implement the most controversial 
programme of handing over of the possession of plots to the subalterns, forcibly taken 
over by the landed castes. The BSP's other measure that provoked the wrath of upper 
caste communities was its strict implementation of the SC/ST Act (Prevention of 
Atrocities Act). Apart from helping the BSP to consolidate subaltern support, these 
measures also had the effect of alienating the BJP's upper caste base from that party. 
However, following six months of the BSP rule, Kalyan Singh, the BJP Chief 
Minister, in order to save the face fi-om the upper castes, amended the provisions of 
the SC/ST Act, after he assimied power. The BJP's argument was based on the notion 
that Dalits were using the Act to harass the upper castes, and that the charges they 
brought were often fabricated, with Dalits ftirthermore using the Act to benefit from 
the financial compensation that it provided to them.^ ^ The BSP's response was 
prompt; Mayawati immediately withdrew support. Having completed its six months 
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term, and accomplished what it had to do, the BSP saw no reason to back the BJP as it 
turned its back on subalterns. 
The results of the 1998 parliamentary elections were, however, disappointing 
in that the BSP's performance improved only marginally, relative to its showing in the 
parliamentary elections of 1996.^ ^ The results indicated that any further expansion of 
the party would depend on the action taken on the programmatic front, which implied 
that the party had to win a majority, or at least, emerge as a dominant coalition 
partner, with the arithmetic in its favour. It is against the background of this dilemma 
that we need to understand the BSP's non-bahujan turn. The nomination of the non-
bahujans into the party was seen as the only strategy that would allow the party to 
increase its numbers, in the immediate term. 
The 1999 parliamentary elections thus saw the BSP adopt the slogan of the 
Sarvajan Samaj (the all-inclusive community), to signal its readiness to widen its 
platform beyond lower castes. Out of 85 tickets the BSP awarded in 1990, 10 went to 
upper castes, 38 to OBC's, 17 to Muslims, and 20 to SCs. "The basic strategy was to 
evolve a constituency-specific 'winning caste combination,'" i.e. Nominate non-
bahujan candidates were the non-bahujan commimity in question had a substantial 
presence, so that their votes, combined with the bahujan vote, and the Chamar vote in 
particular, would suffice to see the candidate through.^^ This strategy, together with 
Mayawati's aggressive campaigning, yielded rich dividends; the BSP increased both 
its vote share (22.1 percent) and number of seats (14), relative to 1998. 
In the 2002 State Assembly elections, the BSP nominated a large number of 
non-bahujan candidates (it granted 91 tickets to upper castes, and 126 to OBC's; of 
the remaining 184 tickets, 86 went to Muslims, and 98 to SCs), and made an 
improvement upon its performance in the 1996 State Assembly elections (it increased 
its vote share from 20 percent to 22.8 percent, and number of seats from 67 to 98).^ ^ 
This improved performance allowed the BSP to dominate its ensuing alliance with the 
BJP, which had won 88 seats, and emerge as the senior partner in a coalition for the 
first time. That way the non-bahujan nominations may be understood to have 
achieved their purpose. The coalition however, could not sustain for long due to 
BSP's pushing of the land distribution agenda which worried the BJP of its upper 
caste electoral base and ended in August 2003, following the initiation of corruption 
charges against Mayawati, and her consequent resignation.^^ 
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The BSP's programmatic record, and the sympathy evoked by the attack 
against Mayawati, led to a massive consoHdation of Dalit votes behind the party in the 
2004 parliamentary elections.'^" The BSP's nomination of non-bahujans (the party 
awarded 20 tickets to upper castes, and 28 to OBC's, with Muslims and SC's 
receiving 18 and 14 tickets each) also facilitated gains amongst OBC's and upper 
castes.'^' The BSP's share of the Brahman vote, in particular, rose as well,"^ ^ though 
the decisive shift of Brahman support was to occur only in 2007. 
In the 2007 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections, the BSP awarded 86 of its 138 
upper caste nominations to Brahmans, with Thakurs and Banias receiving 38 and 14 
nominations respectively. The BSP also targeted the OBC's, awarding this 
community with 110 tickets, with Muslims and SC's being awarded 61 and 92 tickets 
each. The BSP won the largest vote share of all parties, i.e. 30.46 percent, and an 
absolute majority, i.e. 206 out of a total of 402 seats. The BSP remained committed to 
the bahujan project was clear from the following slogan, crafted specifically for the 
2007 election: jiski jitni taiyari, uski utni bhagidari (representation of castes on the 
basis of their ideological preparedness to accept the BSP). This means whenever 
elections are held next, whether in the state or for the Parliament, party tickets will be 
distributed to candidates keeping in mind the allegiance of their castes to the BSP. 
Further, to attract larger numbers of the upper castes into its fold, the BSP has 
constituted Bhaichara Baraho Committees (develop brotherhood committees) at every 
Vidhan Sabha constituency to forge an alliance directly with the castes/communities 
without intervention by any mediator from any political party.'°'^  
The elections to the 15' Lok Sabha which were held in 2009, did not measure 
up to the political ambitions of the then UP Chief Minister, Ms. Mayawati. In the 
2009 Lok Sabha elections, the BSP won 20 seats, increasing its tally of 19 in the 2004 
Parliamentary elections by just one seat. The outcome signalled the resurrection of the 
moribund Congress as it swept aside all projections to record its best performance in 
an election in the state in the last 20 years. The tally of 21 seats was more than double 
its number in 2004 Lok Sabha polls when it won 9 seats.'°'* 
According to the analysis available from the Election Commission of India, 
the BSP, which won 20 seats, had a lead in only 100 Assembly segments. Yet the 
party's vote share in Uttar Pradesh was the highest at 27.42 percent. The BSP's main 
adversary, the SP took the lead position in 118 Assembly segments, though its vote 
share declined to 23.26 percent.'°^ It also demonstrated that the BSP was no longer 
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the invincible force it once was in the reserved constituencies. Of the 17 reserved 
constituencies, the BSP won 2 (Lai Ganj and Misriksh), while the SP won 10, 
including seven that the BSP had won in the 2004 Lok Sabha election. 
In her first reaction on the BSP's performance in the elections, Ms. Mayawati 
said the Congress and the SP spread the canard during the polls that since the BSP had 
thrice formed the government in Uttar Pradesh with the BJP's support, it would 
support the latter if it was in a position to form a government at the Centre. Mayawati 
concluded that this resulted in the Muslims supporting the SP on seats where it was 
strong and supporting the Congress where it was strong with a view to prevent the 
communal forces from taking over. Thus the Muslim vote got divided between the 
two parties. It was a result of this conspiracy that the Muslims voted less for the BSP. 
Despite, all these odds, Ms. Mayawati said the BSP put up a strong 
performance and was placed second in about 50 seats. The BSP's vote share also went 
up to about 27 percent as compared to 24.67 percent in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. 
On the national scale, the BSP emerged as the third largest National Party with 6.22 
percent polling percentage after the Congress and the BJP.'°^ 
The 2012 State Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh aroused unprecedented 
interest and anxiety about its outcome that remained uncertain till its end. A seven 
phased election for 403 Assembly seats in Uttar Pradesh was held from 8* February 
to 3 '^' March 2012. This election will be remembered for the failure of the Bahujan 
Samaj Party to resolve the contradiction between means and ends: the Party's much 
hyped social engineering agenda as a means to achieving the end of inclusive politics 
by getting a legislative majority.'''^ The BSP contested all the 403 seats wiiming only 
80 seats with a vote share of 19647303. The percentage of votes polled by the BSP 
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vis-a-vis other parties was 25.91 per cent. 
The final outcome, a clear mandate for the SP and a substantial decline of the 
BSP, was widely seen to be a surprise. With a share of 224 seats, the SP recorded its 
best-ever performance, thereby increasing 127 seats to its previous tally of 80 seats 
won by the party in 2007 Assembly elections, and secured 29.15% of the vote, a gain 
of nearly 4 percentage points since 2007. The BSP, on the other hand, that went to the 
elections as an incumbent party failed to impress the electorate, more particularly its 
committed constituency of the Dalits. From the 2007 high of 206 seats, the BSP 
crashed to just 80 seats, a massive drop of 126. The party secured almost 26% of the 
vote, down 4.5 percentage points since 2007."^ 
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The electoral trend in favour of SP was so strong that the BSP was pushed to 
the margins even in the reserved Scheduled Caste constituencies (which tend to only 
marginally have a higher proportion of SCs). SP won 58 of the 85 SC seats on offer, 
leaving the BSP, which is considered to have an advantage in such seats, with only 
15. This is a significant turnaround considering that in 2007 (pre-delimitation), the 
BSP had won 61 of 89 reserved SC seats and the SP had been reduced to just 13 
seats."" 
A remarkable polarization of Jatav votes that was witnessed in favour of BSP 
in 2007 came down this time, with 62% of Jatavs voting for the Bahujan Samaj Party, 
a drop of 24 percentage points. The party's votes declined by 29 percentage points 
among Balmikis, and 19 percentage points among Dhobis."' While the BSP lost a 
significant proportion of its core, it seems to have held on to some of its gains among 
upper castes and Muslims in 2007. However among lower OBC's which had also 
given BSP an advantage in 2007, the party lost 11% votes."^ 
In other words, Mayawati was successful only in Western Uttar Pradesh, in 
garnering support from the Jat-Jatav sections that she had pirmed hopes on. However, 
a closer look at the caste profiles of the BSP voters provides a more nuanced reading. 
Mayawati's social engineering project in order to win votes was not a complete 
failure- the BSP still registered cumulative increase in vote share in almost all social 
groups except for the most backwards (a drop of 15%) and her core Dalit base among 
the Jatavs (a drop of 23%). Since these two groups numerically constitute the large 
constituency and most significant social base of the party, the drop in vote shares 
affected the party drastically. Yet the party managed to win support fi^om the "add on" 
sections such as the upper castes. 
The sarvajan agenda, which had contributed in widening the social base and 
enabled the party to form a majority government for the first time in 2007 with the 
support of the upper castes, led to an internal alienation within the most significant 
constituent parts of the BSP. Mayawati's social engineering brought more Brahmins, 
upper castes and Muslims into the party fold even as Dalit elites in party and 
government were displaced and felt threatened at the shrinking political space for 
them in the BSP. In the welfare sphere as well, Mayawati Government failed to live 
up to the Dalit expectations. The Balmiki community-many of whom are engaged in 
jobs such as scavenging and sanitation- felt betrayed by the government's policies, 
such as those related to government recruitment for such jobs, of which 25% were 
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provided to Brahmans and other upper castes (who in turn outsourced to the Balmiki, 
paying them miserly sums). Survey results showed that the Balmiki community's vote 
share for the BSP dropped 40% since 2007. In fact, Dalits from every class segment, 
irrespective of gender, age or attained levels of education, voted against the BSP.""* 
The Backward Classes, along with Dalits, too formed an integral aspect of the 
Bahujan ideology. Mayawati, however, could not succeed in getting the votes of these 
MBC's (Most Backward Classes). This was attributed to the expulsion of Babu Singh 
Kushwaha, a MBC leader who was the minister of health and family welfare earlier in 
Mayawati's cabinet, following his involvement in a National Rural Health Mission 
(NRHM) related scam. Kushwaha, the BSP's "most backward" face since the days of 
Kanshi Ram was known for his organizational skills and hold over large sections from 
Kushwaha, Maurya, Pal, Shakya, Saini and Kachi and other communities which 
constituted close to 9-10 percent of the electorate. It was not a surprise that the drop in 
vote share among these conmiunities for the BSP was about 9 percent."^ 
The 2014 Parliamentary elections exposed the shortcomings of the socio-
economic coalition between the Dalits and the upper castes that Mayawati had 
successfully forged in the 2005-07 period. This coalition which was based on the 
ideological plank of Sarvajan Samaj, which catapulted the party into power in the 
2007 Assembly elections in the state, fell short of holding the peoples trust for a 
considerable time period. In this election, the hot right nationalist wave which 
successfully caught the voter imagination, (shaped substantially by Muzaffamagar 
riots and Modi wave) and converted it into tangible electoral gains for the BJP had an 
immense impact on metamorphosing the party's political agenda. 
The elections to the sixteenth Lok Sabha in Uttar Pradesh were held between 
April lO"* and 12* of May 2014 for 80 Parliamentary constituencies. The people's 
fervour to have a firm and decisive Prime Minister resulted in a landslide mandate in 
favour of BJP. The BJP led NDA polled 42.30% vote share, which is 24.80% up from 
its previous record in 2009. In this election, the BJP won 71 seats, an increase of 61 
seats. The Samajwadi Party (in coalition with the Third Front) had to face the brunt of 
anti-incumbency and managed to win only 5 seats with 22.20% of votes. The Indian 
National Congress, which had strongly signalled its comeback in the 2009 
Parliamentary elections as a resurgent political force in Uttar Pradesh with 21 seats, 
failed to register a significant achievement in these elections. The party won only 2 
seats, 19 seats less than its previous outing, with a poll percentage of 7.50%, which is 
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10.75% less than the tally it had in 2009. The BSP which had gone to the elections 
with high expectations »-but apparently less vigour miserably "sfiowed a dismal 
performance. The party secured 19.60 % votes- nearly 8 percentage points less and 
did not win a single seat. In this election too, Mayawati gave tickets to 20 Brahmans 
and 19 Muslims as part of her "social engineering" project. But this did not work. 
Apart from upper castes, nearly 60 Dalit and most marginalized communities, which 
felt neglected by the BSP, voted for the BJP."^ 
In an apparent bid to revive the party in the state, the BSP supremo, Ms. 
Mayawati has decided to discard the 'Social Engineering' project and signalled a 
return to the'Dalit Backward Agenda'. She removed the coordinators and 
several district chiefs of the State unit and appointed new faces. There is no Brahman 
face in the new list of State Coordinators, who are considered to be 'very important' 
in the party organization. This new list of coordinators has a large number of Dalits 
and members of Most Backward Communities. In the same vein both the Dalits and 
Backwards have also found place in large numbers in the list of the newly-appointed 
district unit presidents of the party. 
Addressing a press conference a day after the results were out, Mayawati said 
her party suffered in the elections for supporting the United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) Government as the people were angry at "the policies and failures" of the 
Congress-led coalition. She also claimed "communal polarization" in Uttar Pradesh 
made most of the Muslims side with the Samajwadi Party and most of the upper 
castes and OBC's with the BJP. 
The assessments made by the party insiders suggest that the party leadership 
lost several opportunities to stem this downturn and reinvigorate the party 
organization. These opportunities had presented themselves most forceftiUy in Uttar 
Pradesh. One such opportunity came during and after the Muzaffamagar riots in 
August 2013. Allegations were widespread during the riots, which continued in spurts 
for as long as a month and a half, that both the Hindutva-oriented BJP and the ruling 
SP were involved in stoking communal passions. The BSP was expected to take a 
firm position in support of the minority Muslim community, which suffered the most 
in the riots and after. However, no such initiative came fi-om Mayawati. According to 
sources in the BSP, Mayawati was diffident because sections of the Dalit vote base 
had also become communally polarized in Muzaffamagar and other parts of Western 
Uttar Pradesh."^ 
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The BSP's prospect to turn the public mood in its favour by forging an 
alliance with Congress for the Lok Sabha elections was also lost because of stiff 
resistance from the Congress Party in letting the BSP contest the elections in South 
India as its coalitional partner. Negotiations were held between the two parties in 
December 2013 and January 2014. Apparently, the BSP wanted seat adjustments in as 
many as 10 States, including Southern States such as Kamataka and Andhra Pradesh. 
The Congress, for its part, wanted to have the alliance confined to four North Indian 
States- Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Delhi. The talks failed even 
though the public opinion in Uttar Pradesh, particularly among the Muslim 
Community held both the BJP and the SP responsible for the communal polarization 
1 1 D 
and this section would have naturally moved towards a Congress-BSP alliance. 
There was a conflict between dominant Dalits and the most marginalized Dalit 
castes, which the RSS had been trying to bring into the BJP fold through its "social 
harmony campaign". The BJP, by giving tickets to Pasis, Sonkars and Rawats, tried to 
woo the most marginalized Dalit castes away from the BSP. It tried to convince voters 
that Mayawati had not done anything constructive for Dalits. The party also invoked 
Ambedkar and other Dalit heroes, promised a Bharat Ratna for Kanshi Ram and 
organized political meetings in Dalit hamlets with the help of RSS-affiliated social 
organizations.''^ 
The Bahujan Samaj Party was also unable to keep up with the changing 
aspirations and mindset of Dalits and backwards. An impressive middle class, who 
used social media, had already emerged in the backward castes. The Bahujan Samaj 
Party was unable to accommodate and integrate this group while the BJP and 
Narendra Modi were adroit at such outreach. In this election, the BSP contested from 
many parts of the country and Mayawati concentrated more on them than on Uttar 
Pradesh, which she may have taken for granted. Her campaign in Uttar Pradesh also 
started late. The grass roots Dalits have become disillusioned with the party because 
the BSP has not launched a big political movement among them for some years 
now. 
Therefore, the BSP's loss was the resuU of a combination of Narendra Modi's 
backward caste card and the aggressive campaigning by the RSS-BJP combine. 
Thanks to Hindu polarisation and the mirage of development, a Modi storm was 
created in Uttar Pradesh, because of which the BSP lost its traditional voters.'^' 
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Despite all these odds, there are several constituencies where the Party is 
putting up a significant fight on account of the expanse and strength of its Dalit vote 
base. This committed constituency also attracts a significant segment of the minority 
voters since they consider a secular party with a sizeable vote base of its own as the 
best option to counter the Hindutva-oriented BJP. These seats include Ghaziabad, 
Bijnor, Meerut, Moradabad and Amroha in Western Uttar Pradesh and Khushi Nagar, 
Ambedkar Nagar, Jaunpur, Lai Ganj, Bhadohi, Ghosi and Basti in Central and Eastern 
Uttar Pradesh. 
Under these circumstances, the task before the BSP is to reorganize itself for 
the forthcoming 2017 elections. The party supremo Ms. Mayawati has already 
dissolved all committees of the BSP in Uttar Pradesh except the state committee. But 
she should establish a direct contact with grass roots Dalits and win back their 
confidence and support. She should also understand their changing needs and explore 
new ways of communicating with middle class Dalits, who are emerging as opinion 
makers on social media networks. The laidback attitude of the party has to go. The 
party members should reinvigorate and recharge themselves for the forthcoming State 
Assembly elecfions which are scheduled to be held in 2017. 
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Chapter-IV 
Dalit Leadership in Uttar 
Pradesh 
1^ 
CHAPTER 4 
DALIT LEADERSHIP IN UTTAR PRADESH 
Functioning of an effective political formation or movement depends on 
several factors like the social content of its programme, its election performance, the 
network of various alliances and linkages, its social base and recruitment policy, its 
formal and informal organizational structure, and the social background of its 
members. In a developing society like India, both the forces of tradition and 
modernization are at work, therefore, making the role of the political leaders still 
more difficult. They have to articulate, and harmonize the diverse and complex 
demands of several competing groups in society. Many recent theorists argue that the 
changing social characteristics of political leaders provide an index of the changing 
distribution of power within a society. This view has been most clearly expressed by 
Harold Lasswell in the construction of his elite theory. These studies may give us new 
insights into the nature of political change. 
An adequate explanation of the behaviour of political leaders can be obtained 
by considering their biographical factors and social milieu in which they operate. As 
David B. Trvmian points: "The politician legislator is not equivalent to the steel ball in 
a pinball game, bumping passively from post to post down an inclined plane."' He is a 
human being involved in a variety of relationships with others in society. In his role as 
leader his affiliation to various groups is affected by the whole series of relationships. 
Equally important is the fact that a leader's values and personal convictions 
are heavily influenced by his environment and early life experiences. Group 
membership and identifications are thus, crucial to a fiill understanding of his 
behaviour in public office. Social characteristics of political leaders can also be used 
to determine their position in a society. Several recent theorists have suggested that 
political leaders tend to be chosen fi"om near the top of a society's prestige hierarchy. 
In such a situation the society's class or caste system may have as much to do with the 
nature of a nation's political leaders as electoral system, political parties, and other 
formal devices for the choice of leaders. Political leaders are usually treated as a 
special class of persons set apart fi-om others. Despite their official distinction 
however, these leaders remain members of the society, subject to all the laws and 
principles applicable in the society. It seems obvious therefore, that much of the 
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leader's behaviour will be guided by his own qualities and social characteristics. 
Therefore, an inquiry into the legislative behaviour of a political leader must be 
understood in the light of certain behavioural characteristics which vary from 
individual to individual according to their socio-political and psychological 
background. 
Different backgroimd characteristics like occupation, age, caste, education, 
religion, special interest, and similar other characteristics of the leaders testify to the 
enormity with which it has been assumed that the leaders' behaviour is influenced by 
their social background. However, it is impossible to say what difference it makes 
unless one has some notion of how different personal backgrounds affect the political 
orientation of a leader. An apparently common assumption is that social class 
conditions a person with determinate ideological biases so that he will carry with him 
the conceptions of the goals and means which he acquires from his social origin. 
An attempt is made to study the nature of Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh 
with a view to probe into the dynamics of interaction between the society and polity. 
The issues raised by the Dalit leadership and their style of functioning both before and 
after the Indian independence finds a special mention in this chapter. The last segment 
of this chapter is devoted to the understanding and analysis of political ideologies of 
Kanshi Ram and Mayawati, the two iconic Dalit leaders who successfully organized 
and transformed the Dalit movement into a political force, well capable to upset the 
upper caste hegemony. The pros and cons of their policy measures which though 
consolidated the Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh by establishing the Bahujan Samaj 
Party, failed to impress upon the Dalits living in other states of North India. 
The contemporary leadership of Dalits in Uttar Pradesh more particularly the 
leadership of the Republican Party of India (RPI) and the Bahujan Samaj Party), 
emerged as an inherent outcome of a much broader ongoing Dalit movements in 
different parts of India, including the state of Uttar Pradesh. For our convenience, we 
have divided the Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh into several phases. However, these 
phases overlap into one another as they are interrelated and therefore, influence each 
other in more than one ways. Here we have divided the Dalit leadership in Uttar 
Pradesh into the following phases or epochs- before 1920, 1920-1937, 1937-1947, 
1947-1970, 1970s onwards and the era of Kanshi Ram and Mayawati. In the first 
phase before 1920 prior to Babasaheb Ambedkar, there were no social, political and 
economic rights accorded to the Dalits. Though they had got some social rights 
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because of the British intervention, they were not consulted for bringing any reform in 
their community. Politically they were represented by the upper castes in the 
legislative councils at the centre and state level. This w^ as equally applicable in the 
case of the Madhya Desh or Central Provinces of Agra and Oudh, the present day 
Uttar Pradesh.^ 
As the leaders in the modem sense of the term were lacking during this phase, 
the traditional caste panchayat leaders organized and raised certain issues related to 
the Dalit community. The notions of social status and socio-cultural practices within 
the Dalit community were the core issues. The caste leaders banned against the eating 
of carrion beef, boycott of meat and liquor, and motivated people for sanskritising 
their ways of life and change their identity. 
But during the second epoch, Dalits started consolidating their strength with 
their different types of organizations and socio-political groups. Some Dalits were 
nominated to the Central Assembly and councils in different presidencies. The most 
important event of this epoch was the emergence of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the 
horizon of Dalit liberation who had testified before many British Commissions and 
committees constituted to safeguard the interests of the Dalits and suggested various 
ways and means for their upliftment. Ambedkar had organized and energized Dalit 
masses by waging a number of movements. Not only that, but he also won a number 
of economic and political rights for them. For instance, he had won the separate 
electorates for the Dalits which were changed to the reserved constituencies in the 
joint electorate system, under the Poona Pact in 1932, through his forced negotiation 
with Mahatma Gandhi. With his highest level of education, vision, tactical moves and 
dedication, he became the true and sole representative of the Dalits in India.^ 
This had also influenced the Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh. Dalits in the 
state started recognizing him as their leader. According to Lynch, "The struggle 
between Ambedkar and Gandhi over the issue of separate elections for untouchables 
was known to the Agra Jatavs. They along with other untouchable groups wired 
London to insist that Ambedkar, not Gandhi, was their leader. The political 
importance of this telegram was tremendous. It signalled that Jatavs had become 
aware of national implications of their problems and activities through a process of 
analogical identification. That is, their problems, in so far as they were matters 
peculiar to Agra, were local and unique; but in so far as they were a matter of 
Untouchability; the problems were national and general."'' In 1936, Ambedkar 
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established the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and directed its campaign against the 
Indian National Congress for its lip services to Dalits. He had thought of the ILP to be 
the vehicle through which the constitutional and political provisions for the benefit of 
the depressed classes would be realized.^  
As stated earlier, the Dalits had limited electoral rights during 1920-1937 
because the electoral system was closely limited by the criteria of property and 
education.^  Hence, very few lower caste people were entitled to vote. Later on, when 
the Dalits got the voting rights under the Government of India Act, 1935, they had to 
wait till 1937 general elections to use that and only after their use of the adult 
franchise, the consciousness started dawning on them to make its use to gain political 
power. ^  
During the third epoch, the Independent Labour Party contested the Bombay 
Legislative Assembly elections as per the Government of India Act 1935. For the first 
time in Indian society, a political party established by Dalits had won 15 out of 17 
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seats. With these elections, a new phase of Dalit leadership ushered, as under the 
Poona Pact seats were reserved for the Dalits and only they could contest elections 
from the reserved constituencies. As pointed out earlier, it became mandatory for 
every political party to provide representation to Dalits, which was a new experience 
to both Dalits and upper castes. Many Dalits contested Assembly elections for the first 
time in the Indian electoral politics. "Manik Chand Jatav (1897-1956) contested as an 
independent candidate and won the elections from Agra constituency, Karan Singh 
Kane contested as a Congress candidate and won. Shyamlal (1894-1959) from 
Allahabad and Khemchand Bohare from Agra contested independently but both got 
defeated.' 
It is, however, evident that the Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh, in this phase, 
had no independent political organization, which could have given to the Dalits a 
networking throughout the state. Ambedkar however, established the Scheduled 
Castes Federation (SCF) in Maharashtra in July 1942 which had also influenced the 
Dalit leadership of Uttar Pradesh particularly the leadership of the Jatavs in Agra. "In 
1944-45.... The formation of the Scheduled Castes Federation (in Agra) was linked to 
Ambedkar's All India Scheduled Castes Federation. It was a major turning point in 
the Jatavs' definition of their social situation. Consequently, their reference group of 
identification now became the Scheduled Castes with whom they identified as the 
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oppressed, unenlightened and deprived section of the population. These 
characteristics of the Scheduled Castes became the basis of new Jatav self-image."'" 
This organization tried to unite the Dalit leadership in different regions of 
Uttar Pradesh under one umbrella. The splintered Dalit leaders got one platform and 
one leader in Ambedkar. The Dalit leadership, thus, moved steadily from indirect 
political influence to the direct or active political participation. During this phase of 
the Dalit leadership, the Dalit leaders also raised the issue of reservation being given 
to Dalits in the government jobs, which was altogether a new type of demand added in 
the armoury of the Dalit leaders. But it was heard more in Western Uttar Pradesh. The 
second important issue for the Dalit leaders during this phase was the denunciation of 
Poona Pact. Ambedkar interpreted the Pact as a betrayal of the Dalits by Gandhi, an 
interpretation which was and still is accepted by a sizable number of Dalits in the 
state." 
The fourth phase commenced with the political independence of India in 1947. 
The Dalit masses were also full of expectations along with the socio-political and 
economic rights bestowed on them with the constitutional safeguards. The changes 
started occurring at a relatively faster speed. The number of Dalit leaders had 
increased by now raising the issues related to the wretched conditions of the Dalits. 
Acharya Moti Ram Shastri, Ramdhan, Gajadhar Prasad Sankatha Prasad Shastri, 
Narendra Kumar Shastri, Changur Ram Chaudhary, Shyamlal, etc. were key leaders 
in the early 1950s. It is worth mentioning here that these leaders were active mainly in 
the rural areas of Azamgarh, Varanasi, Ghazipur, Jaunpur, Allahabad, Akbarpur and a 
few other districts in the eastern region. Occasionally, they visited the districts like 
Lucknow, Unnao, Sitapur, Bareilly, Barabanki, etc. in central Uttar Pradesh and made 
their presence felt by the Dalit masses. Besides, the Dalit leaders like Manik Chand 
Jatav, Sundar Lai Sagar, Chaudhary Nandlalji, Dharm Prakash, Babu Ram Chandraji, 
Mahadev Prasad, etc. were prominent leaders who led the Dalit masses in their 
struggles mainly in districts of Agra, Meerut, Bulandshahar, Kanpur, Ghaziabad, etc. 
in the Western Uttar Pradesh.'^ 
The social issues raised by the Dalit leadership during this epoch were not 
very different from those raised in the earlier periods. These included abolition of 
untouchability, leaving the eating of carrion, giving up the Hari Begar (the mandatory 
unpaid or under-paid works demanded by the Thakurs), giving up the Dai Janai or 
Nar Biana (asking Dalit women to assist upper caste women at the time of their 
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delivery and cleaning their dirt), raising their voice against the atrocities committed 
on the Dalits, demanding their rights to enter temples and other public places, 
attending the common educational institutions, using public wells, etc.'^ 
These disabilities faced by the Dalits as mentioned above gave ample scope to 
their leaders to wage a multi-dimensional struggle for improving the status of their 
masses. The successful use of the political power acquired by the Dalits during this 
epoch started with the passing of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1947 which 
replaced the officially appointed Panchayat members. Now, members of the Gaon 
Sabha (village coimcil) and Panchayati Adalat (rural court) were to be elected through 
the universal adult suffrage. The Dalits organized themselves to oust the dominant 
caste Thakurs and other castes and captured power in certain areas.''* 
After the first General elections in 1952, after independence, a change ushered 
"in the social psychology of people and their social, cultural and political self-
awareness. Social scientists have rightly called the elections in India as a measure of 
'silent revolution'. It activates new social solidarities, structuration of people's 
aspirations... It also subordinates the administrative and professional authority to the 
authority of people's representatives, making the system more responsive to needs."'^ 
This whole process of people's representatives with the political patronage and formal 
institutions of power to cater to the demands of the people relegated the social 
reformers to the peripheries. Dalit society was no exception to this phenomenon and, 
hence, the socio-religious Dalit leadership was completely replaced by the Dalit 
political leadership. The Dalit political leadership was mainly represented by the 
Scheduled Castes Federation in the state but some of the Dalit leaders were also in the 
Congress party as stated earlier.*^ 
By now, the charisma of Ambedkar's leadership of Dalits had become well 
known all across the country. The pan-Indian character of his leadership is well 
depicted by his pivotal role in the framing of the Constitution. He also became the 
first law minister of the country in the Nehru's cabinet but resigned in 1951 in 
absence of the assured support for adoption of the Hindu Code Bill piloted by him in 
the parliament. But the most dramatic event of this epoch came when Ambedkar 
converted to Buddhism along with lakhs of his followers on 24* October 1956. These 
changes affected greatly the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh also. In the words of Lynch, "First 
of all in 1956, most of the Agra Jatavs followed Dr. Ambedkar in to 
Buddhism...Buddhism presented an alternative to the caste system in which Jatavs 
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attempts at social mobility had been unsuccessftil."'^  It is also true that this process of 
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conversion to Buddhism was rampant in other parts of the state. 
Moreover, Ambedkar's sad demise on 6* December 1956 also occurred 
during this period creating a scarcity of All India Dalit Leadership. This crisis threw 
Jagjivan Ram, a Dalit leader from Bihar, as the dominant Dalit leader of the Indian 
National Congress. In fact, he had opposed Ambedkar during this period on the issue 
of latter's conversion. He went to Agra in 1956 and tried to persuade the Jatavs for 
not converting to Buddhism and remain in Hinduism and with the Congress Party.'^  
But contrary to his plans, it was during this epoch that the Scheduled Castes 
Federation, which was electorally unsuccessful in 1946 and 1952, was transformed by 
the Dalit leaders into the Republican Party of India (RPI) after the Lok Sabha 
elections of 1957.^ ° The RPI, according to Ambedkar, was to be a political party 
based on the principles of "liberty, equality and fraternity" , and was to represent the 
downtrodden and disadvantaged class of Indian society irrespective of caste or region. 
The formation of the RPI in Maharashtra yet again influenced the Dalits of 
Uttar Pradesh as they were already in contact with the SCF. Hence, the Republican 
Party of Agra was formed in 1958 as a branch of the Republican Party of India 
confirming the belief in the leadership of Dalit leaders in Maharashtra. By 1962, the 
Agra branch of the Republican Party of India, realized that Dalits could be electorally 
successfril if they organized themselves well. In the city of Aligarh B.P. Maurya, a 
firebrand leader from the Jatav community, who was later imprisoned under the 
Defence of India Rule (DIR) at the time of Chinese intrusion into India, won the 
Parliamentary elections from a general constituency. Along with him an RPI also won 
the Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) seat. This means that the Dalits 
independent organizing was taking its roots at least in the western part of Uttar 
Pradesh.^ ^ 
However, the independent organizing of the RPI could not prove long-lasting 
and in the 1967 General elections and the 1969 mid-term elections for the state 
Assembly, the party miserably failed.^ '* The RPI became a tale of splits and 
factionalism engineered by the Congress Party, sometimes on the issue of its 
membership, sometimes on the clash of interests in leadership especially between the 
older and the younger generations and sometimes because of its support extended to 
the Congress Party.^ ^ Yet, it is a fact that the Republican Party of India Agra branch 
was always aware of the programmes of the RPI and its leaders had participated in the 
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struggle launched by the latter at the national level. Further split in the RPI took place 
in 1969, which weakened it more as many of its leaders including the RPI leaders in 
Agra joined hands with the Congress Party. The Congress even highjacked the issues 
of the RPI and the latter became an appendage to the former. Hence, the Dalit 
leadership in the state got divided into two streams: those of the dependent and 
independent Dalit leaders. This was practically the end of the fourth epoch of the 
Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh. 
With the demise of the Republican Party of India, a new era of the Dalit 
leadership emerged which was dominated by the Dalit leaders of the Congress Party. 
More particularly in the Eastern Uttar Pradesh, the Congress leadership gave 
prominence to the Chamar caste and leaders like Ram Dhan, Ganpat Ram, Jai prasad. 
Ram Pyare Suman, Baddal Ram, Mata Prasad, Dharamveer and Mahasay Masuriya 
Din emerged on the scene. Similarly, in the Central Uttar Pradesh, Kanhaiyalal 
Sonkar, Ram Kinkar, Gaya Prasad Prashant, Tilak Chand Kureel, Chaudhry Buddha 
Dev, Bhagauti Prasad Kureel and Mewalal Sonkar were leading the Dalit movement 
under the influence of the Congress party. Consequently, in Western Uttar Pradesh 
also the Jatav leaders like S.P. Gautam, Ram Lai Rahi, G.L. Azad, Kamal Dariyabadi, 
B.P. Maurya and Chaudhry Dharam Singh, with the exception of Rameshwar Dayal 
Valmiki led the Dalit movement.^^ 
The fifth phase of the Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh was marked by the 
emergence of the Dalit Panthers in the 1970s which continued till 1984 with the 
emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). Moreover, the begirming of this epoch 
coincided with the hectic social engineering done by the then Prime Minister of India 
and the leader of the Congress Party, Indira Gandhi. Before going into the General 
Elections in March 1971, she took many left-oriented decisions to woo the Dalits. For 
instance, "in the fall of 1969, Buddhists became eligible for Scheduled Caste post-
metric scholarships. In December the Constitution was amended again, by unanimous 
vote, to extend reserved seats for another ten years. In January 1970, government 
proposed to stiffen the untouchability (offences) Act. In April, reservations for direct 
recruitment to the central services were raised from 12.5 to 15 percent for Scheduled 
Castes."^^ Due to these radical measures, Indira Gandhi successftiUy won the support 
of the Dalits and led her Congress Party to an overwhelming victory. Moreover, with 
these steps, she left the Dalit leadership without any significant agenda. The RPI 
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leadership in Uttar Pradesh was also absorbed by the Congress Party, which created a 
vacuum in the Dalit leadership. 
The Dalit Panthers movement did galvanize the Dalit masses in Maharashtra 
during 1972-1979 but it also succumbed to the divisive tendencies inherent in the 
organization besides failure of its leaders in organizing the masses in the rural areas. 
A good proportion of the Panther leaders got reabsorbed into the Congress Party. 
A new beginning of the Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh was made with the 
formation of the Backward and Minority Commvmities Employees Federation 
(BAMCEF) on 6* December, 1978. This period was marked by the emergence of 
Kanshi Ram as an important Dalit leader. He wanted to develop the BAMCEF as the 
major support organization for a political unit to be set up later. Later on, he 
established the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti (DS4) again on 6 December, 
1981. Not satisfied with these organizations, he launched the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP) on 14"^  April, 1984 with a clear political identity, Dalit base and militant 
ideology.^' This period was marked by the emergence of the rightist forces, as the 
Congress Party during this period was on the decline. Another significant aspect of 
this epoch was that, unlike the previous movements, which rose in Maharashtra and 
then came to Uttar Pradesh, this time Uttar Pradesh provided the leadership. And till 
date, the Dalit leadership of the Bahujan Samaj Party is dominant in Uttar Pradesh 
changing the course of Dalit action and assertion. Further, several other important 
events occurred during this period which affected the Dalit leadership in Uttar 
Pradesh also. For instance, the BSP started contesting elections on its own or in 
alliance with a few other political parties in Uttar Pradesh and neighbouring states. 
"BSP contested Lok Sabha elections in December 1984 and Uttar Pradesh Vidhan 
Sabha elections in March. From then onwards, it has been progressing in positive 
direction in terms of percentage of its votes, number of seats won both in the 
Parliament and State Assemblies. The greatest loss in terms of the support base in 
Dalits and minorities in Uttar Pradesh was suffered by the Congress Party with such 
progress of the BSP"^^ 
In this last phase of the Dalit leadership since 1984 till date, the BSP has 
established and consolidated itself as the single major Dalit political party in Uttar 
Pradesh and a few neighbouring states. It has indeed established itself as one of the 
major players in deciding the framework of national politics. It has become a hallmark 
of the Dalit leadership in Indian polity also as it has established itself as a national 
91 
political party. The BSP in Uttar Pradesh has been in the government for four times 
(1993, 1995, 1997 and 2007). It has also created history by elevating Mayawati, a 
Dalit woman, to the Chief Minister ship in the most populated state of the coimtry 
(Uttar Pradesh) for three times (June 1995, April 1997 and 2007). Not only that, every 
political party - the Samajwadi Party (SP), the Bahartiya Janta Party (BJP) and the 
Congress (I) Party have been forced in the recent years to enter in the electoral pact 
with the BSP. This indicates a positive change in the democratisation of the polity of 
the state as well as in the Dalit politics. The other two important events of this epoch 
are that the space vacated by Congress Party in the country as well as in Uttar Pradesh 
has increasingly been filled in by the BJP through the communal mobilization of the 
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voter's. . Secondly, the Other Backward Castes or Classes (OBCs) have also come in 
the dominant political position. It has been pointed out that "OBC driven political 
change has radically altered the framework of super-ordination subordination in UP's 
power structure...The trend towards greater representation of the OBCs is strikingly 
manifested in the 1991, 1993,1996 State Assemblies" '^* 
Hence, all the six phases or epochs have remained eventful in the context of 
the Dalit leadership both at the national and regional levels which have directly or 
indirectly affected the nature of the Dalit leadership, the issues pursued and the 
strategies adopted by it for achieving its goals. Therefore, it is essential to 
contextualize the Dalit leadership in Uttar Pradesh in the existing socio-political 
reality to understand and analyze the various moves made by the leadership in the 
different epochs. As a corollary to this, an attempt is being made to comprehend the 
contemporary Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh by briefly discussing and analysing 
the leadership roles of both Kanshi Ram and Mayawati. 
KANSHI RAM, THE ARCHITECT OF DALIT ASSERTION IN UTTAR 
PRADESH 
'Kanshi Ram, visionary Dalit activist and organizer who single handedly 
changed the idiom of Dalit politics; in fact, he may well have altered the language of 
Indian politics forever. BSP today is a formidable force due to the initial momentum 
created by Kanshi Ram in the organizational sense as well as the strategic direction he 
gave it. Much before his activist carrier, Kanshi Ram remained as unarmed prophet'. 
Kanshi Ram was quite different from average Dalit leaders and his message 
was also unique. 
92 
'When Kanshi Ram entered the scene, Dalit leaders came in two models. One 
was the wild-eyed radical who spoke of blood on the streets in a language 
close to Naxalite groups and their message of armed revolution by wretched of 
the earth. In sharp contrast were SC leaders who had joined the mainstream-
mainly the Congress and the affiliated organizations. Kanshi Ram rejected the 
revolutionary methods though he admired the idealism and fire of young Dalit 
radicals who followed the example of the Black Panthers in the United States, 
organized themselves as the Dalit Panthers in 1972. According to him their 
agenda was risky and wdll not work in a stable democracy like India. He 
proposed the third path. BAMCEF was seen as a necessary launch pad in 
preparing a mass movement of the lower castes across the country'. 
Kanshi Ram has very bluntly pointed out that in a caste ridden society, in 
which everything is decided through caste-angle, forgetting ones caste can prove 
suicidal. Forgetting ones caste in a country like India is like losing one's identity. 
Kanshi Ram, who gets the credit of effectively developing the strategy of using 'caste 
to kill casteism'^ ^ at least in North India was well aware that this was not possible by 
shouting from the Manch (stage) nor by discussions in air conditioned rooms, for this 
he had to mobilize the people of the villages where discrimination is more compared 
to urban area. It was not easy for a man, who had not faced caste discrimination and 
insult in his life, to think like him, for he had an amazing capacity of thinking big. He 
scoffed over other Dalit leaders in sharper intellect and larger vision which prepared 
him to appear big on national stage. He chose Dr. Ambedkar as his idol in politics, 
took him from Maharashtra to all over the country and especially where he was 
needed more. Nearly every party fi-om Congress to BJP to Communists today carries a 
picture of Dr. Ambedkar in their posters and hoardings.^ ^ 
Kanshi Ram did not have any political lineage but his political manoeuvre 
became his strength. Although he believed in the dream of a just and equitable society 
for the oppressed, however, he kept his eyes close to the ground. He was always on 
the outlook for opportunities that came his way. He made opportunism his weapon 
and said that there is no harm in being opportunist as our people hardly get 
opportunities in life. The result of this opportunism was that in 1993, BSP was able to 
form government in Uttar Pradesh with the help of SP, which ultimately facilitated a 
Dalit woman's rise to the Chief Minister ship in any state of India. 
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Kanshi Ram views Brahmanism as the root cause of the present-day unequal 
social structure, which occupies central position within Hinduism. He describes the 
social structure in India as Aryan in origin and based on 'Sanatan Dharma'. The caste 
system is like a pyramid with the Brahmans at the simimit and vast majority of the 
Dalits at the bottom. For thousands of years, Hindu society has been divided into two 
basic groups: first is the sawarnas, or the upper castes, who on the basis of their birth 
have occupied a privileged socio-economic and political position in the society. These 
so-called upper castes enjoy the fruits of the labour of the lower caste Shudra and Ati-
Shudra, who occupy menial position in the society. Kanshi Ram believes that the 
Dalits formed the Mool Nivasi (original inhabitants) of the land, before it was 
occupied by the Aryans. The history of the ancient India witnessed this brutal tragedy 
when the Aryans overpowered the indigenous Indians and reduced them to 
untouchables. Since then caste system has been the reality.^^ 
'According to Kanshi Ram, there are five sources of Brahminical power in 
India today: (a) politics, (b) custom and tradition, (c) religion and culttire, (d) 
economic policy and (e) officialdom. Brahmanism has succeeded in dividing the 
majority of the bahujan, into innimierable caste groups and entering and dominating 
all aspects of life, despite the fact that the Brahmans constitute hardly 15% of the 
population. He was of the view that religion should propagate the equality of all 
human beings. But Hinduism, he argued, is not a religion, but an ideology. Kanshi 
Ram asserted that there has never existed a Hindu commimity, every caste has its own 
samaj or community, particularly the Dalits, then how can the upper castes include 
the Dalits in the All India Hindu culture and civilization. He fiirther argued that the 
upper caste rulers have never accorded any importance to past history of the lower 
castes. The Pasis were the medieval kings or soldiers of Rajput kings. Folk tales of 
the martial achievements of Maharaja Bijli Pas, Raja Madari Pasi tells of the bravery 
of the Pasis.''*" 
Kanshi Ram argues that all the leaders and political parties in the coimtry are 
the product of Brahmanism or Manuvad, which acts as a major stumbling block 
towards bringing any social change. The Indian states according to him are imder the 
control of Brahminical leaders, who propagate the Brahminical ideology even through 
educational system, by teaching the younger generation of Dalits to accept the system 
based on inequality. He described Congress with its upper caste leadership as a 
Manuvadi party. It promised to establish a state that would respect all religions and 
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provide justice to all Dalits. But this party failed to keep the promise. Under such 
circumstances the establishment of a secular state in India was not possible, unless a 
party of lower castes comes in power and destroys this hierarchical Brahminical 
order. He contends that the principle of equality followed in India is useless as all the 
policies of the government after the independence are based upon Manuvadi thinking, 
stemming any upliftment of the Dalits. According to Kanshi Ram, independence was 
gained by the sawarnas (upper castes) because in the colonial period the British rulers 
treated the Dalits relatively better. 
The era of stooges or what in common usage is called 'the Chamcha Age' is 
the book written by Kanshi Ram to describe the denigration and degeneration of the 
educated officers and politicians. He pointed in his book how the 'Poona Pact' of 
1932 had been responsible for manufacturing these 'Chamchas' (sycophants) in our 
society. He lamented on the use of educated Dalit leaders by the Manuvadi forces 
which relegated the Ambedkarite movement to a standstill.'" He drew a line between 
a 'missionary worker' and 'a stooge' and tried to explain to the employees that a 
missionary is always dedicated and obedient to the cause where as a stooge is 
subservient who gives unwanted respect to his master. According to him the 'Poona 
Pact' had destroyed the self-respect of the Dalits and had made them meek and 
toothless and had given the upper castes an upper hand in keeping the downtrodden 
subjected. Through the 'Poona Pact' he wanted to create a feeling of self- respect 
among the lower castes.''^ 
Kanshi Ram gave the nomenclature 'BAHUJAN' to Dalits, OBCs and 
Minorities. He also floated the argument that the 'Bahujan Samaj" constituted 85 
percent of population of India. He propounded the formula of 15 percent upper castes 
verses 85 percent Bahujan."*^ Kanshi Ram candidly pointed out that in a caste ridden 
society, in which everything is decided through caste-angle, forgetting one's caste can 
prove suicidal. Forgetting one's caste in a coimtry like India is synonymous to losing 
one's identity because our identity is not by being the member of Indian society, but 
being the member of a particular caste. He observed that caste is a diabolic social 
phenomenon used by one social group to subjugate the other. As the profits and 
privileges have united the upper castes, similarly the oppression and exploitation of 
the lower castes should also unite them. 'He introduced the category "bahujan" which 
he defined as an inscriptive category consisting of collection of castes which were till 
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now considered separate from the upper three castes, Brahmans, Banias and 
Kshtriyas. 
'The Satyashodak Samaj used the term bahujan to refer majority of Hindu 
castes, including untouchables, who were not Brahmins and not merchants. By 1984, 
the 'Satyashodak Samaj' no longer existed, and the term bahujan had fallen into 
disuse. Kanshi Ram popularized the term and at the same time redefined it to refer not 
only to the subordinate Hindu castes in Maharashtra but to groups defined by caste, 
religion, and tribe, whom he described as being united in sharing a history of 
humiliation at the hands of upper caste Hindus. In other words Bahujan Samaj is 
comprised of Scheduled castes. Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and 
converted Minorities.''*'' Explaining this idea further he argued that uniting the 85 
percent Bahujan Samaj will definitely result in wrestling the power structure. The 
Dalit population is dispersed across both Parliamentary and Assembly constituencies 
in India. It typically constitutes not more than third of the electorates. Moreover Dalit 
population was not sufficient to put a new political party in power in any state in India 
in 1984. Manufacturing this new category was not an easy task. 'The term ''Bahujan'" 
had no political resonance in India in the 1980s. A further difficulty lay in the socio-
economic, cultural, and historical disparities between the various groups that Kanshi 
Ram grouped together under the label 'Bahujan Samaj'. To bridge these disparities by 
creating a common history of the "Bahujan Samaj', drawdng on personalities and 
symbols from across the categories included under a label.'*^ 
From the beginning, Kanshi Ram's dream was not only the participation of 
Dalits in politics, but he wanted them to come forward and capture political power. 
However, he was aware that these castes are incapable of doing this alone, that's why 
he took Muslims and backward classes with him from the time of BAMCEF. 'The 
dream of capturing of power by the Dalits was same as was seen by Lohiya, but 
Kanshi Ram followed a difficult path, the one which was almost forgotten by most of 
the political leaders after independence. First making the oppressed class realize its 
oppression, then converting this realization into class consciousness, giving class 
consciousness an ideology, transforming this ideology into an organization, making a 
political party of the organization and in the final stage converting the political party 
into power. The freedom struggle of India also followed the same course.''*^ Though 
on the national platform Kanshi Ram did not succeed but in Uttar Pradesh he 
successfully converted the Dalit consciousness into political power. This was his 
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greatest achievement in Indian politics. Kanshi Ram was the one who started from 
zero to reach the zenith in Indian politics after independence. 
Kanshi Ram remained away from any post in government. He entered into 
alliance with Congress, BJP and SP when BSP was in need and broke the alliance 
when not necessary. He said that everything is fair in politics. He was of the view that 
every opportunity should be used in politics. His goal was the acquisition of political 
power for the Dalits. He used to call himself ""Maha Avsarwadi' (opportunistic). 
Kanshi Ram considered the political instability in Uttar Pradesh as fruitful for 
'Bahujan Samaj'. With every election, the BSP emerged even stronger and its vote 
share increased substantially. 
Kanshi Ram was knovm for his verbal attacks on his opponents. He called the 
BJP 'cobra snake' and communists as 'green snake' and forceftilly attacked the other 
Manuvadi Parties.'*^ He was of the view that for the Dalits, 'majbor sarkar' (unstable 
government) was good than stable government for protecting the rights of the 
oppressed. More than four decades Congress gave stable government but, except 
Babu Jagjivan Ram, no Dalit got a position more than a worker. In such situation how 
can Dalits believe that Congress intend to think of their welfare? Kanshi Ram 
reversed the scenario by his foresightedness and organizational acumen. 
Kanshi Ram did not restrict himself with the mass contact programmes only, 
but he also tried to reach out to the masses through printed media. He realized that the 
media is dominated by the upper castes/class that does not highlight the issues related 
to Dalits. In the words of Kanshi Ram, 'all efforts of the oppressed Indians made 
through the length and the breadth of the country would have resulted into a big solid 
organization of these people, but the blacking out of the news keeps them isolated and 
in dark. An efficient news service owned and operated by the oppressed Indians 
would have removed such darkness and ended isolation.'''^ 
The growing awareness among Dalits for studies and improvement in their 
economic conditions encouraged them to start newspapers and magazines. Kanshi 
Ram once wrote, '50 years back there was hardly any education amongst the 
oppressed Indians. Today there are four lakh students in the colleges and more than 
20 lakh educated are gainfiiUy employed in the public sector. Emergence of these 
oppressed elite offers opportunities of our own readership, high class journalistic 
ability and above all our own funding capacity.^° 'The Oppressed Indian' was the 
monthly magazine printed and published in English by BAMCEF. Kanshi Ram 
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himself wrote the editorials. 'Bahujan Times' was the Dalit newspaper started from 
New Delhi. Both died out because of resource crunch and lack of readership. 
'Bahujan Sangathak' is the only weekly newspaper still in publication and is regularly 
published in many languages Hindi, Marathi, Bengali, Telgu etc., from New Delhi 
and other places. These newspapers and magazines helped Dalit masses to know 
about the views of their leaders. One more purpose they solved was letting out the 
suppressed feelings of Dalits against the social, economic, and political exploitation 
of the Dalits in the society.^' 
Kanshi Ram always saw the big picture and constantly thought of tricks to 
spread the movement across the country. He wanted to make BSP a national party. He 
wanted that the party should contest elections in every state of India. His brain was 
the databank of the various political parties. He was never satisfied with simple 
explanation of things, and exhausted himself in finding out solutions to problems in a 
different manner. ^ ^ 
Thus, it becomes clear that Kanshi Ram by organizing the Dalits changed the 
discourse of politics in India, turning the old assumptions upside down and 
restructuring power equations entrenched for centuries, if not millennia. Working on 
Babasaheb Ambedkar's slogan of education, organization and agitation, he formed 
Bahujan Samaj Party, the most successfiil Dalit Party in Uttar Pradesh, by mobilizing 
the underprivileged classes through grassroots level efforts. As the country's most 
successful Dalit leader after Ambedkar, he has given unprecedented political profile 
and clout to a community crushed under social prejudice. Through outfits like 
BAMCEF and DS-4 he prepared the ground for the launching of BSP in Uttar 
Pradesh, by mobilizing the deprived and depressed of the country. Following 
Ambedkar's ideology of 'political power is the key of all locks', Kanshi Ram made 
Mayawati thrice the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. 
MAYAWATI AND BSP'S TRANSFORMATION INTO MULTI- ETHNIC 
OUTFIT 
Amongst the number of contemporary politicians who have succeeded at a fast 
pace during last couple of decades, Mayawati, the associate of late Kanshi Ram may 
be amongst the foremost of them. While she inherited the movement built by Kanshi 
Ram, she also allowed her mettle to come to capture the seat of power in the 
challenging arena of politics. Her Prime Ministerial ambitions at the moment are not 
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very vocal, though immediately after securing the absolute majority in the 2007 Uttar 
Pradesh assembly elections she projected the same as a 'Dalit hi beti' (Daughter of a 
Dalit) as Prime Minister. 
Mayawati was bom on January 15, 1956, into a relatively poor family of 
Jatavs, a community whose traditional occupation was skinning animals and working 
with leather. She was bom in Delhi where her father Prabhu Dayal was employed as a 
supervisor with the Department of Posts and Telegraphs; his family traces its roots to 
Badalpur village in what was then the district of Bulandshahr (now Ghaziabad) in 
Uttar Pradesh. The national capital was also where Mayawati received much of her 
education- she completed her bachelor's degree as well as a degree in law from 
Kalindi College, University of Delhi; later she eamed a degree in education from the 
same university. As a student, she was active as a public speaker who would often 
participate in debating contests. She taught in various schools run by the Delhi 
administration between 1977 and 1984 before associating herself with Kanshi Ram, 
who had by then floated the non-political organization, BAMCEF.^ "* 
In an 'Abolish Caste Conference' organized by the Janta Party, she vocally 
objected to the use of the word Harijan. She was then approached by the Dalit 
leaders, among whom she able to establish contact with Kanshi Ram. When she met 
Kanshi Ram, for the first time, before he became her political mentor, Mayawati was 
studying to appear for the examinations held to select civil services when Kanshi Ram 
reportedly told her that she should instead join him because he would make her a 
'queen' who could control and decide the fates of IAS officers. Her political carrier 
formally began with the establishment of the Bahujan Samaj Party in 1984.^ ^ 
Interestingly, Mayawati lost the first three elections she contested as a BSP 
candidate- for the Lok Sabha constituency of Kairana (a part of Muzaffamagar district 
in western UP), in December 1984 and then, two Lok Sabha by-elections fi-om Bijnor 
and Hardwar. While she was contesting the Lok Sabha by-election from Bijnor in 
1985, her opponents in Bijnor included Ram Vilas Paswan, and Meira Kumar, 
Jagjivan Ram's daughter representing Congress. Meira Kumar won the seat because 
Raju Gandhi was at the height of his popularity in view of a favourable emotional 
wave in the wake of assassination of Ms. Indira Gandhi. But this defeat did not deter 
Kanshi ram as he had been impressed by Mayawati's aggressive and provocative 
oratory.^ *^  
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She was elected to the Lok Sabha for the first time in 1989 from Bijnor. 
Thereafter, in 1994, she was elected to the Rajya Sabha. As already stated, the BSP 
supported the SP in Uttar Pradesh in 1993 and on June 3, 1995, in the wake of the 
incidents leading up to the 'guest house incident', she and her party parted ways with 
Mulayam Singh Yadav and joined hands with the BJP for the first time. When she 
became Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh the following day, she was only 39 years old, 
the youngest ever head of India's most populous state and the first Dalit to hold the 
post.^ ^ This was probably the first indication that she had acquired a political stature 
independent of her mentor. While Kanshi Ram remained the party supremo, it had 
become evident that she had all but taken complete charge of the party in Uttar 
Pradesh. Her first stint as Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister lasted a few months and ended 
m October that year with the BJP-BSP alliance abruptly unstuck. Soon after the fall 
of the government, Mayawati declared: My biggest achievement has been 
consolidation of the Dalit vote bank.^ ^ For most Dalits she became a source of pride 
and a new Dalit icon ever since. 
In her bid towards consolidating the Dalit vote bank she took the advantage of 
the Ambedkar Village Programme (AVP) for the benefit of the Dalits in villages since 
all roads, hand pumps, houses and the like were built in their bastis. Grants were 
allocated for Dalit children to attend classes between levels 1 to 8; those for Bhangi 
children were doubled.^" Muslim children were to receive same scholarship as 
provided for the Scheduled castes. She also set up the Minority Welfare Department 
for the welfare of the Muslim community.^' Mayawati also started administrative 
reforms in order to invoke a sense of pride among Dalit officials and a sense of 
security among Dalit masses. For example, the high caste incumbents in the Chief 
Secretary and the Chief Minister's principal private secretary positions were both 
replaced by the Scheduled Caste officers. Even more radically, a number of Dalit 
officers were given fast promotions. This process allowed her to post Dalit District 
Magistrates at the helm of almost half of the districts. Thus the BSP Government led 
by Mayawati appointed its supporters in key administrative jobs; more than 1500 
transfers took place in Uttar Pradesh during the 136 days of Mayawati Government. 
By the end of her first regime Mayawati was able to bring a charisma and 
liveliness to the hustling that Kanshi Ram himself lacked. She had represented a 
novelty- a direct and forth right Dalit woman with courage sufficient to run hard 
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against the institutions oppressive to the Dalits. Now, Mayawati had reached an iconic 
popularity and an important political leader to reckon with. 
In 1996 elections to the Uttar Pradesh Assembly, she contested and won from 
two seats, Bilsi in Badaun district and Haraura in Saharanpur district; she retained her 
later constituency. A new alliance between the BSP and BJP was struck under which 
it was decided that each party would have its own Chief Minister for six months at a 
stretch. Mayawati was sworn in as Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister for the second time in 
March 1997, becoming the first woman to have a second term as the head of Uttar 
Pradesh government. She continued with her early policy measures viz., 
administrative reforms, name politics, working for Muslim minorities, and extending 
minimum benefits from the Ambedkar Village Programme to Dalits. After six months 
in the office she relinquished the office for Kalyan Singh but soon after she withdraw 
from the coalition government on the ground that her partners in the BJP were not 
cooperating with her party's attempts to rigorously implement the SC/ST (Prevention 
of Atrocity) Act, aimed at prevention of atrocities against those belonging to the lower 
castes.^^ 
Mayawati won both the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections from Akbarpur 
constituency that was reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates. Her decision to 
contest from this constituency was significant in that Akbarpur is in Eastern Uttar 
Pradesh whereas all the constituencies she had contested from earlier (during 
Assembly and Lok Sabha elections) happened to be in the western part of the state. 
This was indicative of her confidence in the BSP's ability to gamer votes all across a 
state that was then geographically larger than the whole of Western Europe.^ 
Mayawati's third stint as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh lasted just over a 
year, from May 3, 2002 to July 25, 2003. The BJP withdrew support to her 
government soon after her decision to build a commercial corridor near the Taj 
Mahal. The move generated a major controversy and allegations of corruption were 
levelled against several ministers in her government and bureaucrats who were 
supposed to be close to her. She was accused of approving a project in violation of 
laws that protect the famous monument. The Supreme Court ordered an investigation 
by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into the case and also ordered a probe 
into allegations that she and her family members had acquired assets disproportionate 
to known sources of income.^^ 
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Mayawati won the Ambedkamagar Lok Sabha seat in 2004 but resigned the 
following year to become a member of the upper house (Rajya Sabha) of Parliament. 
In 2007 state Assembly elections her party had been classified among the losers in 
most of the post-electoral press reports. However, to the surprise of all, the BSP 
gained absolute majority for the first time in its history. The party won 206 seats with 
30.46 percent of valid votes in Uttar Pradesh. The BSP's success in this election was 
due primarily to its embracing of political rationality, i.e., the need to win. The results 
of the 2007 Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh therefore reflect not only the 
emergence of political rationality which was long suppressed by parochial 
consideration of caste as the basic principle of political support mobilization and 
political dominance. However, as long as this consideration remained upper most, the 
distribution of caste groups in Uttar Pradesh prevented not only a durable cross-caste 
alliance, it also thwarted, for a considerable period of time, the emergence of electoral 
verdict that could have made majority rule possible. The caste and political divide had 
its effect on voter's electoral performance, which when expressed fi-eely, yielded only 
a fragmented electoral outcome. 
The BSP's victory in this election was indicative of the acceptance of its social 
engineering project by the previously incompatible social forces. It is this meeting of 
the opposites that was dialectically instrumental in producing a verdict of majority 
rule. This 'Sarvajan' agenda was predicated on the notion of catapulting the party into 
power, which it thought to be the only way to implement Dalit oriented policies and 
programmes. This election furthermore enormously influenced the BSP's fijture 
course of action and its performance both as a regional as well as a national party. 
Mayawati's efforts to transform the BSP from an avowedly 'Dalit-bahujan' 
party (party for the lower castes) to a sarvajan party (for the entire society) based on 
her new social engineering agenda, has to be seen in the light of the structural changes 
in the party brought about by a new social phenomenon called the "reverse social 
osmosis".*^ Her goal was to create base similar to the erstwhile upper-caste-Dalit-
Muslim combine that had enabled the Congress Party to rule in Uttar Pradesh for a 
long time and build a coalition in which the Dalits occupied the commanding position. 
Mayawati sought to reach out to the Brahmans in order to put forth an 
understanding that the BSP was willing to listen to their concerns and grievances, 
while being fully convinced that the party would not lose the support of the lower 
castes while engaging in political dialogue with upper castes.^ ^ One major indicator of 
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this shift in BSP's ideology was the fact that throughout the 2007 election campaign, 
Mayawati did not commit herself to Mandal policy. Mandal policy refers to the 
various proposals concerning reservations and quotas that would improve the 
conditions of the lower castes from the socio-economic standpoint. This indicated that 
the BSP was clearly sensitive to the perceptions of the upper castes in Uttar Pradesh 
and began to think about the party's potential to hold power in the long run. In fact, 
the party decided against issuing a manifesto for the 2007 state elections in order to 
allow Mayawati more flexibility in mustering a more diverse support network for the 
BSP.^ ^ 
Mayawati's ideological transition permitted the party to exploit the acrimony 
the upper castes were having towards both the Congress and the BJP over a period of 
time. In UP, Brahmins constitute 8 percent of the state population and account for 10-
12 percent of the votes in as many as 40 of the 80 Lok Sabha constituencies. As it is a 
conservative state, they had traditionally preferred the Congress and the BJP, and had 
not voted for lower-caste parties. With the decline, first, of the Congress, which was 
the party the Brahmins had mainly dominated and then, the BJP, after the 2002 
elections they were once again in search of a party that they could submit their trust. 
They realized that a BJP-BSP coalition could not provide stability; and were unhappy 
because of the BJP's wooing of the OBCs. Furthermore, the party had not put forward 
a Brahmin as its candidate for Chief Minister. Conversely they were impressed by the 
fact that Mayawati had decided to bypass coalitions and instead opt for a direct mass-
contact programme in co-operation with the upper castes.^^ 
In order to capitalize on the prevailing socio-political distrust between the 
upper caste community and its political leadership, Mayawati quite early decided on a 
strategy of social engineering for mobilising these twice-born castes. The party held 
over 60 'Brahmin Jodo Sammelans' (Brahmin enrolment conventions) spread across 
21 districts of the state from February 2005 onwards. At these meetings- meant only 
for Brahmins (Dalits were not invited) - Mayawati was greeted with Brahminical 
rituals, such as the chanting of Vedic hynms and the blowing of conches, and 
presented with gifts.^° The attempt was to use new symbols in a bid to create a new, 
broad-based party identity. These meetings culminated in a state-level meeting of the 
BSP in Lucknow on 9 June 2005, addressed by Mayawati. This meeting which was 
organized by the Brahman leaders of the party such as Satish Chandra Mishra (who 
played a seminal role in the reconfiguration of the party's identity), attracted a 
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massive attendance of the Brahmins. It was attended by about one lakh Brahmins 
from across the state. Similarly, a series of 'Vaishya Sammelans' were held in Agra 
on 16 July 2005, followed by similar meetings in other cities, and culminating in a 
'Maha Sammelan' (grand convention) at which Mayawati called on the Vaishya 
community to join the party. Her pitch was clever. Emphasising on the exacerbated 
law and order situation in Uttar Pradesh which had occurred during the rule of the 
SP, she promised them economic security and political protection and represented 
both Dalits and ttaders as victims of social violence and crime. Attempts were also 
made before and after the elections to secwe the support of the minority community 
through 'Muslim Missions' and bhaichara (brotherhood) committees in many cities.^^ 
Mayawati, during the election campaign reiterated that her party had never 
been against the upper-caste communities or the Hindu religion; the fight was rather 
against discriminatory practices and perceptions such as caste oppression. The aim of 
the BSP had been to build an egalitarian society free of caste distinctions, but it had 
been misinterpreted as an anti-upper-caste party. As evidence of her bona fides in this 
respect, Mayawati promised to give more tickets to Brahmins in fiiture elections and 
also held out the prospect of cabinet positions afterwards. Dalits and Brahmins 
together could rule the state; 21 percent Dalits and roughly 9 percent Brahmins was 
potentially a wirming combination! She also reminded her audience that Ambedkar 
had 'not only accepted a Brahmin surname given by a Brahmin teacher but also 
married a Brahmin'. Mayawati continued to channel her new enthusiasm and set up 
bhaichara samitis (brotherhood committees), which are essentially committees to 
promote work between the higher and lower castes in every assembly constituency 
and put these committees under the chairmanship of Brahmans. Their task was to visit 
villages and try to foster a feeling of brotherhood between Dahts and Brahmms. 
Corollary to this strategic shift in the party's ideology was the change in the 
slogans that have acquired a peculiar place in the literature of the Dalit movement. 
The 1990s slogans which were directed against the upper castes who were painted as 
enemies and aggressors, were abandoned and replaced with new integrative political 
slogans like: "Haathi nahi, Ganesh hai, Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh Hai", "Haathi 
badtajayega. Brahman Shankh bajaega"^'' 
These quotes instead paint a very different picture of the BSP's view on the 
upper caste. The first slogan states that it is not about just the elephant (BSP symbol), 
but that one is also a part of a broader Hindu spectrum. This slogan intends to push for 
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more unity between different castes. The second slogan essentially states that the 
elephant will continue to rise and the Brahman will signal it. These slogans display 
how the BSP began to shift its Scheduled Caste dominated agenda to increase the 
depth of their voter bank, something that the party's founder, Kanshi Ram, was 
against.'^ 
The social engineering programme of the BSP would have hardly achieved the 
desired results without two other features noticed by commentators. First, the 
painstaking planning of this strategy began at least two years before the 2007 
Assembly elections and the party cadre under Mayawati's leadership displayed great 
discipline in executing it- for instance not contesting a number of by-elections or local 
government elections in 2006 to avoid internal strife within the party over tickets. 
Unity was maintained too by the party acting early to choose its candidates for the 
403 assembly seats up for grabs. Candidates for most key seats had been selected 
fully six months before the election. 
Second, there was a move towards democratising the BSP's authoritarian 
structures. For the first time, party candidates were allowed to sit on the same dais as 
Mayawati rather than on a lower stage or on the ground. Second-tier leaders such as 
Narendra Goyal, Satish Chandra Mishra and Nasimudeen Siddiqui were allowed to 
campaign independently. And the party's campaign style was transformed. The 
torrent of anti-upper-caste and anti-establishment sentiment, which had characterised 
Mayawati's speeches in the past, was gone, replaced by restrained argument from a 
prepared text. These changes substantially proved helpful in enhancing the image and 
strength of the party.^^ 
The feeling of social vengeance that the lower caste supporters of BSP drew 
from this conquest of power consolidated the core electoral base of the party. 
However, these subjective feelings were not the only reason for the BSP's growing 
success in Uttar Pradesh. Besides these symbolic reasons, sociial and economic 
policies taken up during Mayawati's regime had a deep impact on the political culture 
of the state, particularly the lower castes. Mayawati implemented public policies, 
which benefited mostly the lower castes. The Ambedkar Village Scheme that harks 
back to the mid-1990s is a case in point. It consisted in special development drives (in 
terms of roads, schools, irrigation, etc.) in the villages where Dalits were in large 
numbers. As soon as she took over as chief Minister, Mayawati also issued a 
Government Order on 31 May 2007 to clear the backlog quota of Scheduled Castes, 
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Scheduled Tribes and OBC's. In July of the same year she increased the daily 
agriculturalist wage from 58 to 100- a measure benefiting mostly Dalits. The 
government returned to a strict implementation of the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act by making the administration, 
including the police, more responsive to Dalits. This move caused a deeper 
embarrassment within upper and dominant castes that began to realize that the Dalits 
were asserting not only economically, but were doing so psychologically, under 
Mayawati.^ ^ 
In contrast to her exclusionary policies of the past, Mayawati also requested 
the centre to consider reservations and job quotas for the poor among the upper 
castes. Many of these policies were put forward keeping in mind the new 
constituency of 'Sarvajan' that the BSP needs to cater to. Hence the demand spelled 
out by Dalit leaders for introducing positive discrimination in the private sector, 
something the Mayawati government has initiated indirectly since in each Uttar 
Pradesh public/private partnership project-where the government's share cannot be 
less than 11 percent and more than 49 percent (10 percent of the posts would be 
reserved to the Scheduled Castes, 10 percent to the OBC's and religious minorities 
and 10 percent to the upper caste poor), needs to be understood in the framework of 
the party's expanding social base.*° She had made it clear as early as April 2006 in an 
interview she gave to The Hindu: 
The majority of the people in our country are poor. Even among the higher 
castes, it is a small percentage that is privileged, the rest are poor and have the 
same wants of rati, kapda, aur makan (food, clothes and shelter). [...] We are 
for an equal social order. Social inequality and discrimination result in 
economic inequality, if opportunities were truly equal, there would be no 
economic inequality. Our aim is to establish a samata muluk samaj (a society 
based on equality). [...] I am still against manuwad? It is division of society 
into four varnas. The BSP wants to end this discriminatory order, and we have 
succeeded to quite an extent. As upper castes integrate v^th Dalits, mutual 
suspicion and hatred will end. This is samajikparivartan (social change). 
The bureaucracy in Uttar Pradesh has always been dominated by the upper 
castes. Their social inheritance of the caste superiority complex classifies them as the 
official supervisors of the social division. This hyper caste conscious mentality on 
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their part creates hurdles for the Dalits to get justice delivered because of their stiff 
resistance to any move which could jeopardize their upper caste status. Hence, there is 
a need to democratize the bureaucracy along with fostering the development of 
political democracy. This can be done either by recruiting more Scheduled Castes 
members in the bureaucracy, or until that happens, we can recruit the people who can 
implement the Dalit agenda and tame other bureaucrats through stem action. The 
BSP-led government has taken the second route. Describing this with reference to 
Mayawati's 1995 government, Mendelsohn and Vicziany observe that 'by no means 
to say that this was not a significant or a distinctive administration. Part of this 
significance resides in the intrusion of a different culture into the machinery of 
government of the state... Quite deliberately she created a climate of fear in order to 
motivate vast officials to work to her agenda. She dealt particularly severely with 
officials judged to have failed to protect the most vulnerable people in a particular 
District, the Dalits above all.' According to many administrators, 'Mayawati has 
administered a powerful and long overdue lesson to bureaucrats that their place was 
as servant, not master of people'.*^ 
Another aspect of Mayawati-led government's agenda of governance was the 
steps taken towards the distribution of temporary patta land, regularization of land 
already imder the possession of Dalits and Most Backward Castes/Classes (MBCs), 
and possession of new land in the name of Dalits and MBCs. The BSP government is 
often blamed for not initiating land reforms in Uttar Pradesh. However, the available 
data shows that the Mayawati-led government fostered a process of silent land 
reforms. For instance, as Chief Minister Mayawati issued a letter dated 20 September 
1997, in which she gave details of the distribution of land during her tenure. 
According to her, 81,500 Dalits received 52,379 acres of land in a special drive. 
Further, about 1, 52,000 Dalits were given possession of land in which 1, 20,000 acres 
of land were distributed, not only on paper, but in reality. About 20,000 Dalits 
benefited when 15,000 irregular land nominations were regularized in their names. 
The letter shows that 10, 37,000 patta owners benefited when they got temporary 
rights to their land. This affirmative action by Mayawati led government provided a 
platform for the Dalits to foster their status from landless labourers to small land 
owners, thereby breaking the traditional caste shackled land relations in the country 
side. 
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While Mayawati's newfound support for Brahmans was not with any 
particular or official political party, it essentially served the same purpose. The BSP 
was able to attain power by broadening its previously narrow base of supporters, and 
the Brahmans benefited by attaining positions of power in her government. Despite 
gaining this majority and wining office, enthusiasm waned for Mayawati's newfound 
philosophy because while the main bulk of her supporters were Dalits and lower 
castes, the promises made by Mayawati concerning social transformation were truly 
made for the poor among the upper castes.^'' The BSP essentially shifted its 
philosophy from 'Bahujan' to 'Sarvajan', along wdth an ideological shift from 
exclusive to inclusive and reaped the benefits at the expense of its ideology. ^ ^ 
The adoption of inclusive, sensible politics had expanded Mrs. Mayawati's 
support base and placed her at the head of Uttar Pradesh's first majority government 
in 16 years, and it stood to reasons that she would go along on the same path-both to 
consolidate her position in the state and to extend her appeal beyond it. 
Indeed, from the vantage point of where Ms. Mayawati stood in May 2007, it 
seemed entirely in order that the next stop in this incredible odyssey should be the 
Indian Prime Minister ship. However, that dream could not be materialized as the 
road leading to that destination was strongly blocked first by the fractured mandate in 
the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, then by the SP's strong comeback in 2012 state 
Assembly elections and now the BJP in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, owing to 
certain policy failures of her government. 
In her previous three terms, Ms. Mayawati had devoted considerable time and 
energy in erecting memorials and statues to Dalit icons- which was small competition 
for the entrenched institutional prejudices against the community. The gesture went 
down well with her core voters who saw it as sweet revenge for centuries of exclusion 
and humiliation. Ms. Mayawati also afforded a measure of security to Dalits by 
strictly enforcing the Scheduled Castes (prevention of Afrocities) Act. Even if 
Mayawati would have dedicated a few more projects to the Dalit movement in her 
fourth term, few would have objected. But she made building of memorials and 
statues the centre price of the BSP Government's programmes. A score of gigantic 
new projects aside, hundreds of crores of rupees were lavished on razing and redoing 
projects already executed at a huge cost in her previous stints in office. From 
Lucknow to Noida on the Delhi border, the pink Dholpur stone was omnipresent. 
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testifying to the culture of waste and self-indulgence made into a credo by the 
Mayawati Government. 
Even this excess might have passed scrutiny if the chief minister had not 
erected dozens of her own statues, obsessing over their exact dimensions, and indeed 
ordering that they be reconstructed if they were not to her satisfaction. Moreover, 
the immaturity was evident in the treatment meted out to a bust of Rajiv Gandhi 
originally placed at the centre of a modest roundabout just off the chief ministerial 
bungalow in Lucknow. 
The Mayawati Government banished the bust, minuscule compared to her own 
statuesque version to a far comer of the roundabout. Her supporters had expected 
more than token gestures from a leader who brought them out from the seclusion, 
taught them to think about Dalit existence and inculcated in them a sense of 
independent thinking. 
As a result, the number of former BSP leaders who are now out of the party 
and have often foimded their own parties is now quite significant. Sone Lai Patel, the 
former BSP leader is at the helm of the Uttar Pradesh Apna Dal. Om Prakash Rajbhar, 
a former lieutenant of Mayawati has created the Bhartiya Samaj Party. R.K. 
Chaudhary, a former minister in Mayawati's government, has started the DS-4. 
Masood, another former minister in Mayawati's government has launched the 
National Loktantrik Hind Party (NLHP), and Raja Ram Pal, former BSP president has 
started the Bharatiya Sarvodaya Party. These parties have formed an alliance along 
with the Adhikar Manch, the Vanchit Party, and the Lokpriya Samaj Party. Such a 
division of the Bahujans recalls the trajectory of the RPI, which the BSP may follow 
if it does not build a more coUegial party structure.^^ 
In the aftermath of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP seems to be well in 
control of the Uttar Pradesh political spectrum. The BJP, by declaring Narendra Modi 
as its Prime Ministerial candidate and its attempts to revive its Hindutva agenda under 
Amit Shah, and with the recent Muzaffamagar riots changed the nature of the contest. 
The BJP offered an identity to incorporate Dalit identity into the larger Hindutva 
project and thereby gained the electoral support of sections of Dalits. By winning 71 
Parliamentary seats (the highest by any political party so far) in the state, the BJP is 
now a major power. 
Although, Mayawati made efforts to convince the Muslim community that the 
BSP is a secular Dalit-based party with which Muslims have much in common, she 
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could not win their confidence. She pointed out that while the BSP was in power 
(2007-2012) there were no riots in Uttar Pradesh as Hindu-Muslim "bhaichara 
(brotherhood)" communities were set up, and stressed that the Dalit-Brahman-Muslim 
alliance is an attempt to take the bhaichara concept further. Critical of the SP for 
fomenting communal divisions, Mayawati promised that if supported, her party will 
prevent the riots and honestly implement the Sachar Committee report. But the 
division of votes within the community among the Congress, SP, and the BSP halted 
any political gains for the party.^^ 
No doubt the 'sarvajan' strategy, which was forged in the mid-2000s, based on 
Kanshi Ram's notion ofbhagidari", or representation to social groups, enabled the 
party to gain power in 2007, but it encountered serious problems once the BSP was in 
office. Mayawati attempted to implement an inclusive agenda of development for all 
backward social groups and regions instead of Dalit-oriented policies, as in the past. 
But, as the party had come to power on its own, after several years of huge struggle, 
Dalits expected that their problems would be primarily focused, instead of those of the 
upper castes. Consequently, Mayawati realized that balancing aspirations and 
ensuring equal distribution of goods between upper and lower castes on the one hand, 
and among Dalit sub-castes on the other, was not that easy. Powerfiil sub-castes 
within the Dalits, such as the Jatavs, who formed the core constituency of the party, 
felt that they were neglected, as Mayawati sought to fulfil the aspirations of the upper 
castes that had helped to vote her in power. 
This shift fi"om 'bahujan' to 'sarvajan' also weakened bahujan identity as it 
went against the original goal of the BSP-led movement, that of ending social 
hierarchies and discrimination against Dalits. From its inception, the BSP has 
constructed symbols and ideas that created a meaning for the term bahujan, which 
arose from historical oppression and present day problems. But this could not be done 
for the term sarvajan, a heterogeneous grouping. Hence, the attempt to create a broad-
based party with a Dalit core became problematic as both sides did not enjoy the same 
economic and social status. The upper castes did not accept Dalits as their social 
equals even if they occupy superior posts, and there is a huge economic and cultural 
gap between them. Equally significant, Mayawati's strategy oi sarvajan politics kept 
the process of democratisation from moving downwards, bringing the smaller 
subaltern Dalit groups into the BSP fold and then into mainstream politics. 
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Furthermore, the strategy of using caste as a double-edged sword to break the 
hegemony of the upper castes and mobiUze the lower castes has faded.^' 
Mayawati, ever since her defeat in 2012 Assembly elections, has been 
purposeftilly working to bring back all sub-castes, particularly the non-Jatavs and the 
lower backwards, into the BSP fold and to reach out to the minorities. 'There were 
media reports of a large community meeting, organized by the party in Lucknow in 
2013, to unite all Dalit groups. She has tried to convey to her followers that the BSP, 
under her leadership, is still committed to its original path of social transformation'.^*^ 
However, the BSP is beset with fragmentation in the Dalit community over the 
sarvajan issue, creating divisions on the ground. Simultaneously, the aspiration for 
development among subaltern Dalits appears to have overshadowed the identity 
politics, creating an anti-BSP sentiment. Mayawati, as a Dalit political leader faces an 
uphill task of catering to the dynamic needs and aspirations of the Dalits who, 
although being sensitive to their social amelioration, are also eager to share the 
benefits of economic development vis-a-vis other communities. 
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Conclusion 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION 
Understanding Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh (UP) is a challenging and 
complex topic, since Uttar Pradesh is an important nerve-centre of socio-politico-
economic change v^th major implications on the national politics. The road to Delhi, 
it is said, passes through Uttar Pradesh. The state has played an important role during 
the Freedom Movement and it is suffused with antiquity, intellectual depth, social 
change and, now, with the politicisation and assertion by the lower castes, the Dalit 
community and the subaltern classes. A few decades ago, the Dalit movement was 
weak and confined to some pockets of the state, but now, it is being felt in almost 
every nook and comer of the state. In order to understand this genesis, progression 
and proliferation, we have exhaustively discussed the history of Dalit movement in 
India and derived some of the important trends which affected the politics of Uttar 
Pradesh immensely. 
The Dalit movement, as our study shows, started far back where some scholars 
traced the beginning of the movement right from the Bhakti period which produced 
great saints like Chokhamela, Eknath, Kabir and Ravidas. The writings of these saints 
were/are so instrumental in the Dalit awakening that they served as a sound 
background to the modem Dalit assertion which made its appearance on the national 
political scene soon after the Montague declaration in August 1917. There has been a 
general consensus that the Dalit movement, during the National Freedom stmggle, 
more especially after the arrival of Babasaheb B.R. Ambedkar, gained momentum, 
where the focus of the stmggle was upon gaining recognition, representation and 
power within the changing political order. 
Our study also reveals that the Dalit Movement in the beginning was 
reformatory in nature where attempts were made to purify Hinduism of its evils and 
fought against the tyraimy of the caste system, but later on altemative movements 
were also envisioned to create an altemative socio-cultural stmcture where each 
individual can enjoy respectfially a dignified life without any kind of discrimination. 
The themes of the movement were feU not only in Maharashtra but in every region of 
the country, though with varying degrees of strength. The Dalit movement was not a 
caste-based movement but Dalits as workers, peasants and agricultural labourers were 
involved with economic or class issues everywhere, and an important observation 
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which came out of this study is that of the broadening of the term Dalit, which has 
now a wider connotation and refers to all those who are deprived of their socio-
economic and cultural rights. 
In order to understand the political consciousness and participation of the 
Dalits in Uttar Pradesh this study examined thoroughly the origin, nature and strength 
of the Dalit movement in the state and found that the Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh 
arose later than the Western and Southern India and during the colonial period was 
both weak and confined to the pockets of the state. We find only a few examples of 
the anti-caste movement in the state during the colonial period. This was because of 
the Dalits inability to organize and consolidate themselves for various reasons. One 
important reason was that of the effects of Mahatma Gandhi upon the anti-colonial 
struggle, who shaped the identity of the Scheduled Castes as 'Harijan' and made the 
problems of the Untouchability as a moralistic rather than a political one. As a result 
they remained poor, submissive and politically backward. However, towards the end 
of the Colonial period, a small section of the Scheduled Castes rejected this view 
under the influence of Dr. Ambedkar and began to use politics as a means to achieve 
an equal status in the Indian polity. 
Since Independence, Dalit movement has passed through a number of phases 
of strength and weakness, autonomy and co-optation and faced a number of problems 
which has given it a complex nature. The formation of the Republican Party of India 
(RPI) in 1956 and its initial electoral gains in the early 1960s raised some hopes for 
independent Dalit assertion but it proved to be short-lived. The reasons for its 
electoral decline and the eventual demise were the lack of dynamic leadership; 
internal factionalism over the strategy for the struggle and the ability of the Congress 
to win over the confidence and maintain within its fold a majority of Dalits. But the 
formation of the BSP (which was the result of affirmative action or protective 
discrimination and democratization combined with educational progress, political 
consciousness and self-confidence among the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh) gave a new 
shape and vigour to the movement by creating a more identity conscious and 
politically aware Dalits. The party has changed the idiom of politics by bringing the 
Dalits in the centre stage of politics. The BSP has succeeded in breaking down the 
vertical patron-client relationship with the upper castes and accompanying political 
mobilisation pattern of the vote banks which was characteristic of Uttar Pradesh for a 
long time and has constructed new solidarities on horizontal dimensions. 
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Our study shows that the demand for social justice through political 
empowerment, improvement in socio-economic conditions, protection of their life and 
property, and a fair share of the fruits of economic development constitutes the 
central concern of the Dalit assertion. These concerns are based on two major planks 
of the party i.e., self-respect and self-determination (both of them inextricably 
interrelated). It is through them that this party distinguishes itself from the Congress 
variant of welfare policies and measures towards depressed sections of the society. 
This movement not merely exhibits the agitational upsurge of the Dalits for 
social change but it has been cemented with well thought out developmental and 
political premises. Ambedkar who was the chief architect of the movement left the 
movement with a mission to be continued to fiilfil its goal. Its leaders, the late Kanshi 
Ram, the founder of the party, and more particularly Mayawati, its present head, 
epitomise the post-Ambedkar leadership, which believes that capture of state power is 
required for both Dalit empowerment and societal transformation. In order to reach 
that destination, the BSP, since its formation has been able to redefine itself and adjust 
its mobilizational strategies and developmental agenda to the rapidly-changing 
political scene in Uttar Pradesh, and yet at the same time retain and consolidate its 
core support base among the Dalits. 
The study inquired into the changing strategies of the BSP in its post Bahujan 
phase which were made possible because of the party's flexible ideological position 
and its pragmatic imderstanding and appreciation of the various social dynamics that 
have hugely impacted the political landscape in Uttar Pradesh since the second 
democratic upsurge. Furthermore, this transformation of the party from an avowedly 
'Dalit Bahujan Party' (party for the lower castes) to a 'Sarvajan' party (for the entire 
society) based on its new social engineering agenda and the tremendous challenges it 
now faces, was predicated on the idea of creating a party base similar to the erstwhile 
upper-caste-Dalit-Muslim combine that had enabled the Congress party to rule in 
Uttar Pradesh for a long time and build a coalition in which Dalits occupied a 
commanding position. 
Thus, in the course of the study, we find that the political mobilisation of 
Dalits in Uttar Pradesh is undermining, the traditional caste hierarchy of a social order 
which has made them subjugated for centuries. Uttar Pradesh is experiencing a new 
phase of social change where lower castes are playing an important role and an 
egalitarian restructuring of the social order is the final aim of the movement where 
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caste should not determine whether an individual is treated as an inferior or superior 
human being. The Dalit movement concentrates its struggle "against socio-economic 
exploitation; for better access to the opportunities; and for gaining self-respect and 
dignified social identities". 
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